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ABSTRACT
FASCISM REVISITED OR MILLENNIAL EUROSCEPTIC POPULISM?
ANALYSIS AND RATIONALE FOR A NEW POLITICAL
MOVEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY
by Prebble Quinn Ramswell
May 2016
Euroscepticism has steadily increased since the late 1990s, culminating in the
emergence and success of numerous Eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties at the
national and international level. Though often considered fascist and extremist, these
groups have successfully achieved recognition and mainstream support as their once nontraditional ideas have become the norm. It is argued that these groups are a new class of
social movement organization, a modern-day manifestation of fascism called Millennial
Eurosceptic Populism. What conditions have allowed for these groups to emerge and
attain such levels of success? Analysis utilizing fsQCA will test variables from
McAdam’s Political Process Model (1982) and the proposed Organizational/ Opportunity
Theory in order to determine their efficacy as well as the causal conditions leading to
Millennial Fascist Group success.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Marcellus famously remarked to Horatio in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, “Something is
rotten in the state of Denmark.” Such sentiment captures the thoughts echoing in the
minds of many Europeans as they witness the rise of euroscepticism1 within member
states across the European Union (EU) and the greatly altered European political
landscape emerging as a result.
In 1998, scholar Robert Paxton noted fascism’s ‘politics in a new key’ through
much of Europe at the turn of the 19th century, reflected in a changing political
environment that emerged as ‘an assembly of all nationalists who hated the Left and
found the Right inadequate.’ His observations led to this thought-provoking idea:
We must be able to examine this phenomenon as a system. It is not
enough to treat each national case individually, as if each one constitutes a
category in itself. If we cannot examine fascism synthetically, we risk
being unable to understand this century, or the next. We must have a word,
and for lack of a better one, we must employ the word that Mussolini
borrowed from the vocabulary of the Italian Left in 1919, before his
movement had assumed its mature form. Obliged to use the word
fascism, we ought to use it well. (Paxton 1998, 9)
Paxton was clearly on to something. Even to an untrained eye, the sense of great change
throughout Europe in the new millennium is palpable and no longer able to be ignored.
There is a certain “something” occurring in Europe, a certain something that has allowed
for the reemergence of right-wing “fascist” parties in large numbers, with manifestations
evident at both the national and international levels.

It should be noted that “euroscepticism” and its various derivatives can alternatively be
spelled using a ‘k’ instead of a ‘c’ as in “euroskepticism.” Factors such as location and
language contribute to the variance.
1
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Speculation abounds. Scholars, historians, theorists, and politicians alike all have
widely varying ideas as to the cause and explanation of the emergence and subsequent
success of previously dismissed fascist groups. One common thread can be clearly
identified and established: the pervasive presence of nationalism within eurosceptic
groups. Kedourie (1960) observed that nationalism was often associated with the radical
right and criticized as “an irrational doctrine with a fanatical vision and a propensity
towards violence.” Nairn (1975) also highlighted the historical link between nationalism
and right-wing extremism, including traditional Italian fascism, National Socialism
(Nazism), and Japanese militarism.
The negative connotation associated with far-right political parties remains
rampant, despite repeated denials from many groups accused of relationships with
perpetrators of violence and hate crimes. In 2006, a young member of a family of known
Flemish Block2 militants who shot a child and two women from ethnic minority
backgrounds was alleged to have been motivated by racist beliefs; however, Flemish
Interest denied any direct or indirect connection to the shootings (Ramalingam 2012).
In the United Kingdom, the vast majority of radical right political parties profess
to be non-violent. However, Ramalingam (2012) has shown that some of the most
prominent cases of convicted far-right extremist perpetrators have been linked to far-right
parties in a variety of ways-- this includes former British National Party (BNP) member

2

The Flemish Block is known in Belgium as the Vlaams Blok or VB. They were a
Belgian far-right and secessionist political party with an anti-immigration platform. The
group was strongly nationalist and sought the independence of northern Belgium, known
as Flanders. In November 2004, the group instituted several changes to address charges
of racism and changed its name to Vlaams Belang, or Flemish Interest.
2

David Copeland, known as the ‘British nail-bomber,’ and former BNP candidate Robert
Cottage, arrested in 2006 for stockpiling weapons (Ramalingam 2012, 2-3).
Yet, many of these nationalist, right-wing fascist groups have been successful in
extricating themselves from the pejorative press and public, so much so that they are no
longer considered to be ‘extremist.’ Historically, fascism has been viewed in many
different lights from radical to patriotic, though the perjorative connotation has proven
most enduring. As will be discussed in Chapter II, the term is considered by many
scholars to have been overused to the point of losing its sting. Indeed, George Orwell
wrote in 1944 of how trite the term had become: "the word 'Fascism' is almost entirely
meaningless ... almost any English person would accept 'bully' as a synonym for
'Fascist.'"
The turn-of-the-century wave of euroscepticism, anti-European Union (EU)
attitude, and surging presence of nationalist sentiment has strongly resounded with the
masses, changing the face of right-wing extremism and rendering it palatable to those
who previously deemed it radical and even perverse. Indeed, eurosceptic groups have
become widely accepted legitimate groups and political parties now making an indelible
mark on the political landscape throughout Europe.
What led Europe to this historical shift, moving the populace from a region
embracing unity and a European (rather than national) identity to a public growing
evermore wary and disillusioned with the reality of membership in the European Union?
Instead of a battle of ideas, Leonard et al. (2013) opined that “the EU has been marred by
a vicious circle between anti-EU populism and technocratic agreements between member
states whom are afraid of their citizens.” Regardless of reason, a deeply divisive strand
3

of discontent has led to increasing criticism of the EU and opposition to the process of
political European integration, extending throughout the political spectrum. Those
citizens and politicians who identify themselves as ‘skeptical’ and critical of the EU have
become known as “Eurosceptics” and contend that the EU usurps power from national
governments and poses a threat to national sovereignty (EurActiv.com, 2013).
This eurosceptic sentiment has steadily increased since the late 1990s,
culminating in the emergence and success of numerous eurosceptic and antiestablishment parties at both the national and international level. Though often
considered fascist and extremist, these groups have managed to achieve national
recognition and mainstream support and success as their once untraditional ideas have
become the norm.
If traditional perceptions and trajectories of fascism remained, the emergence of
these right-wing nationalist parties would be short-lived, fail to represent popular belief,
and incapable of reaching and resonating with the masses. However, what is observable
is a new reality, a world in which these groups have endurance, mainstream popularity,
and growing positions of power in Europe. Indeed, many of these groups have become
successful political parties winning seats in their national elections and in European
Parliament.
Such success has been increasingly underscored, perhaps most notably following
the European Parliamentary elections in May 2014. In a massive political shake-up,
eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties captured nearly one-third of the vote in the
2014 European Parliamentary election. The most remarkable victories occurred in
France, with the far-right Front National (FN) taking 25 percent of the votes, as well as in
4

Britain, where the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) garnered 26.8 percent
(Wagner and Nagy, 2015). The momentum has been so strong that an August 2014 poll
indicated that FN leader Marine Le Pen would have won the French Presidential election
had it been held at that time (Hallett, 2014).
The success is not limited to England and France. The anti-immigrant Danish
People’s Party won in Denmark; the far-right Jobbik came in second in Hungary; and
Germany saw its first neo-Nazi member elected to Parliament (Economist May 2014). Al
Jazeera noted that “Golden Dawn, a former neo-Nazi organisation whose leader and
members are to face trial for criminal acts including murder, arson and extortion, will
send three representatives to the European parliament….Austria’s far-right Freedom
Party advanced to take 20 percent of the vote with an anti-immigrant campaign that
called for halving Vienna’s EU contributions and demanded a referendum on the EU’s
crucial bailout fund” (al Jazeera May 26, 2014).
The startling developments in European Parliament, clearly demonstrating
Europe’s swing to the right, led to an affirmation by socialist French Prime Minister
Manuel Valls that the situation was equivalent to “a political earthquake.” In an interview
with the British newspaper The Guardian, UKIP leader Nigel Farage said the result
justified the description of an earthquake because "never before in the history of British
politics has a party, seen to be an insurgent party, ever topped the polls in a national
election" and voters had "delivered about the most extraordinary result that has been seen
in British politics for 100 years" (Wintour and Watt 2014).
Now, for the first time, fundamentally skeptical formations on the right margins
are seeing simultaneous growth in several states of Western and Northern Europe (Kietz
5

and von Ondarza 2014, 1). Understood as a strong signal of loss of trust in the EU and its
institutions in significant parts of the European electorate, the impact of the rise of the
Eurosceptics on political processes in the Parliament and the EU becomes a decisive
question for the future of the Union (Kietz and von Ondarza 2014, 1).
Indeed, in 2008, Eurosceptic momentum led the EU assembly’s political
establishment to pursue changes that would have altered the rules allowing Members of
European Parliament (MEP) to form political groupings (Waterfield 2008). The attempt
was foiled only months later when voters solidly rejected the ratification of the Treaty of
Lisbon, the international agreement forming the constitutional basis of the EU. Further,
in November 2014, it was reported that as many as 200 Conservative Members of
Parliament (MP)3 would be prepared to call for Britain to leave the European Union in an
escalation of pressure on David Cameron over Europe and immigration (Merrick 2015).
Thus, in the new millennium, the EU, once held as a harbinger of hope and source
of a European unity and identity, has now become a despised enemy- the source of stolen
nationalism, culture and tradition. Peripheral groups of the far right have now emerged
as the voices of moderation, attempting to forge a path to a Europe reflective of the union
they had envisioned, a Europe that at once embraces national and European identity
without a loss of economic and political sovereignty. These groups are proving resilient,
competent, rational, and, above all, successful. It is fascism in a new light, fascism for the
new millennium, fascism through the lens of euroscepticism; it is Millennial Eurosceptic

By definition, MEPs are Members of European Parliament and MPs are members of the
British Parliament.
6
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Populism: the reinterpretation and new iteration of the ideology that propelled Mussolini
and Hitler to infamy.
What best explains the emergence and success of these groups? Sorenson (2008,
6) noted that “no coherent theory exists that details what euroscepticism is, or why, when
and how it occurs and develops.” This observation serves to introduce the purpose of this
dissertation.
The focus of this dissertation is twofold: 1) establishing the concept of millennial
eurosceptic populism and determining which groups fall within its parameters, and 2)
theoretical testing to explain the emergence and success of these groups. Before
determining the why and the how, an evaluation of the ‘who’ is necessary. An important
piece of this dissertation is making a case for a new class of fascism, a class better suiting
the millennial crop of political parties and groups achieving record levels of success.
To establish a foundation and need for this new category, it is necessary to first
define fascism and its subcategories. Ascertaining a single definition for fascism, neofascism and neo-Nazism is difficult; however, there are many aspects of the terms which
overlap amongst the various definitions put forth by scholars in the field. By default,
these commonalities allow for the construction of a consensus-based definition.
Therefore, it is prudent to examine various definitions put forth by experts in the field to
arrive at standard definitions which will serve as a starting point for categorizing the
varieties of fascism. Once these standard definitions have been established, a definition of
millennial eurosceptic populism will be provided based on characteristics from current
groups and traits from traditional fascism, neo-fascism and neo-Nazism. The
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characteristics of millennial eurosceptic populism will be explored in depth as qualifiers
and disqualifiers are established to determine members of the category.
Once the components of millennial eurosceptic populism have been established,
the dissertation will revisit the research question of “why now,” methodologically.
Modern social movement theory appears to provide some degree of explanatory power.
In particular, the concepts within the political opportunity framework, resource
mobilization theory, protest cycles, and the political process model contain plausible
rationales. This dissertation argues that McAdam’s 1982 conception of the political
process model (PP) appears to provide considerable explanatory power of these theories
and merits further exploration and testing as a theoretical explanation for millennial
eurosceptic populism which shall be considered to begin circa 1990. However, though
McAdam’s model does appear to offer potential explanatory power, this dissertation
argues that it cannot fully account for the unprecedented number of emerging groups and
subsequent paradigm shift, and that its open-ended framework is too easily applicable.
Therefore, an alternate theory is proposed: Organizational/Opportunity Theory, or OO.
OO focuses on the occurrence and impact of a trigger event which acts as an impetus for
social change. Coupled with structural capacity, marketing presence, and public
involvement, this relationship is theorized to explain the success of far-right political
parties and other non-traditional groups.
This dissertation focuses on the research question: what conditions allowed for
the emergence and success of millennial Eurosceptic populist groups? It is asserted that
the elements of the PP model (political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength,
and cognitive liberation) can lead to the success of MEPGs in Europe but not their
8

emergence or long-term success. It is hypothesized that the more specific causal
conditions of the proposed OO model best explain the emergence and success of MEPGs
in Europe.
In Chapter III, a case study approach will be utilized during the establishment of
Millennial Eurosceptic Populism and subsequent determination of groups which will be
classified as a Millennial Eurosceptic Populist Group (MEPG). Parties determined to
meet the criteria of a MEPG will serve as the subject cases in Chapter IV for testing of
the efficacy of the PP and OO models. The analytical method of Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA), designed by Ragin (1987; 2000; 2008) and popularized by
Rihoux and Ragin (2009), will be utilized. Rihoux (2008, 3) posited that “the various
techniques of QCA precisely identify and narrow down ‘conditions of occurrence’” and
“were important tools for reducing the enormous complexity that is routinely confronted
in the social sciences.”
Identifying the factors that have led to the rise and emergence of MEPGs is
important for many reasons. Of primary importance is understanding and explaining the
profound impact these groups are having on European politics and society. They have
served to create a new European political landscape. Further, many of these groups have
established connections with increasingly complex Russia. Discovering the factors and
conditions that have allowed for millennial eurosceptic populism to emerge is, thus,
vitally important in terms of international relations and political stability.
Chapter II of this dissertation will review relevant literature in the areas of
fascism, euroscepticism, and theory. As noted above, Chapter III will present the case for
“Millennial Eurosceptic Populism,” with in-depth examination into the reasons why this
9

new term is necessary as well as the qualifiers and disqualifiers for a group’s inclusion.
An examination of various existing groups/parties will be performed to determine
whether a party meets all requirements for recognition as a MEPG. The groups which
meet all requirements will then serve as the case studies for causal condition testing in
Chapter IV. Chapter IV will detail the research design and methodology, with research
being performed in two phases: Phase One will focus on the required elements of PP
model and the selection of applicable variables, and Phase Two will follow suit for the
OO model. Testing will seek to answer the research question of what conditions are in
place that allowed for the increase and emergence of MEPGs. Data testing using fsQCA,
as well as accompanying analysis, will be performed in Chapter V, with a discussion of
the results provided in Chapter VI. The final chapter will provide implications and
closing remarks.

10

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Because this dissertation focuses on relationships among amongst several subject
areas, the literature review was best presented in a delineated manner. As such, this
chapter is divided into three sections: fascism, euroscepticism and theory. Each section
will discuss the pertinent material in that respective subject area. The subsequent
chapter, Chapter III, will introduce and discuss the concept of millennial eurosceptic
populism as well as present its working definition and characteristics in comparison to
fascism, neo-fascism, neo-Nazism.
Fascism
In 1944, Orwell posed a compelling and enduring question: “Of all the
unanswered questions of our time, perhaps the most important is: ‘What is Fascism?’” It
is a question that continues to perplex scholars and historians alike as deeper analysis
generates more questions than answers. Observed prominent fascism scholar Roger
Griffin (2003): “Every attempt made by a non-Marxist scholar since the 1920s to offer a
way out of the conceptual labyrinth posed by fascism seemed only to have enlarged and
complicated it further, with the result that historians attempting to study aspects of the
generic phenomenon ‘ideographically’ were generally at a loss as to which ‘expert’ to
turn for a working definition.”
Fascism has consistently been viewed by scholars through a traditional lens. This
view neatly packages fascist groups within one of three categories: fascism, neo-fascism,
and neo-Nazism. However, the nature and composition of fascism have changed,
necessitating, it is argued, a new conceptual perspective.
11

Traditional Lens
Fascism has long been studied but the literature tends to focus on classifying
groups within its existing categories. In an effort to sidestep the problem of answering the
question “what is fascism,” scholars have attempted to develop a consensus definition.
The concept of ‘generic fascism’ developed from a need to identify and concisely define
the shared essential elements of fascism. Attempting brevity, Nolte (1968) proposed the
concept of a “fascist minimum”- a succinct, concise definition of fascism. This led to
Griffin’s infamous three-word definition, “palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism.” In
their efforts to establish a definition, scholars in the field have tended to take one of two
paths: one focusing on cause and viewed through a political and institutional lens
(Sternhell, Gentile, Paxton); or one referred to as the ‘new consensus” which often takes
a more culturalist and ideological approach (Griffin, Iordachi, Payne, Kallis, Eatwell).
Other scholars, such as Renton (1999, 1), tweak the two perspectives such that there is a
distinction between those who view fascism primarily in terms of its ideas, such as
Griffin, Payne and Sternhell, as opposed to those who define fascism through the actual
practice of Mussolini’s Italy or Hitler’s Germany. Still, others utilize a dividing line
based on Marxist versus non-Marxist perspectives.
Paxton (1998, 9) noted that Pierre Milza (1987) presented a four-stage model of
fascism; Philippe Burrin (1986) traced the itineraries by which Jacques Doriot, Marcel
De´at, and Gaston Bergery, steering between blockages and opportunities, shifted from
the Left to fascism. Indeed, Paxton (1998, 9) observes that most recent authors seek
some “fascist essence.” Rejecting any mono-causal or reductionist theory, Payne (1995,
489) presented the “elements of a retrodictive theory of fascism” that applied to
12

movements and regimes; Laqueuer (1997, 6) found fascism similar to pornography in
that “it is difficult—perhaps impossible—to define in an operational, legally valid way,”
yet still presented “the essence of fascism.”
All of these studies have systematically laid the foundation for fascism of varying
types and degrees, allowing for expansion (and perhaps in hopes of expansion) when the
time and conditions were appropriate. Robert Paxton (1998, 21) maintains that “fascism
is the most original political novelty of the twentieth century, no less. It successfully
gathered, against all expectations, in certain modern nations, such as Germany and Italy,
which had seemed firmly planted on a path to gradually expanding democracy, a popular
following around hard, violent, anti-liberal and antisocialist nationalist dictatorships.”
Further, it then “spread its ‘politics in a new key’ through much of Europe, assembling all
nationalists who hated the Left and found the Right inadequate” (Paxton 1998, 9). His
thoughts, though originally directed at turn of the 19th century issues were eerily prescient
of circumstances at the end of the 20th century.
The seminal works in the field of fascism have stemmed from three primary
scholars: Stanley G. Payne, Griffin and Paxton. As the foundational theorists in the field
of fascism, these authors are a necessary component of any work done in the field. Of
course, there are many other authors who have contributed engaging and provocative
work and whom will also be explored. A central tenet of this dissertation is that fascism
has evolved. To determine its evolution, it is necessary to explore all aspects of it as a
solid basis is built for the necessity of a new form of fascism.
In 1995, Payne created a lengthy itemized list of characteristics to identify
fascism. This typology is regularly cited as the standard descriptor of fascism and built
13

upon ideas he presented Fascism: Comparison and Definition (1980). Payne presented
these elements as “a wide-spectrum description” comprised of three main components
that embody the idea of fascism (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1
Payne’s Typology of Fascism

The Fascist
Goals
(Ideology and
Goals):

The Fascist
Negations:

The Fascist
Style (Style
and
Organization):

o Espousal of an idealist, vitalist and voluntaristic philosophy, normally involving
the attempt to realize a new modern, self-determined, and secular culture;
o Creation of a new nationalist authoritarian state not based on traditional principles
or models;
o Organization of a new highly regulated, multiclass, integrated national economic
structure, whether called national corporatist, national socialist, or national
syndicalist;
o Positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use violence and war; and
o The goal of empire, expansion, or a radical change in the nation’s relationship with
other powers
o Anti-liberalism;
o Anticommunism; and
o Anticonservatism (though with the understanding that fascist groups were willing
to undertake temporary alliances with other sectors, more commonly with the
right)
o Specific tendency toward an authoritarian, charismatic, personal style of
command, whether or not the command is to some degree initially elective
o Attempted mass mobilization with militarization of political relationships and style
and with the goal of a mass single party militia;
o Emphasis on aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols, and political liturgy,
stressing emotional and mystical aspects;
o Extreme stress on the masculine principle and male dominance, while espousing a
strongly organic view of society;
o Exaltation of youth above other phases of life, emphasizing the conflict of the
generations, at least in effecting the initial political transformation; and

Note. From Payne, Stanley. A History of Fascism 1914–45; London: University College London Press, 1995; and Payne, Stanley.
Fascism: Comparison and Definition, University of Wisconsin Press; p. 7; 1980.

Payne posited that the fascist ‘style’ included such traits as its emphasis on
violence, its exaltation of men above women and its positive evaluation of the young
against the old (Renton 1999, 20). He also espoused the intellectual caliber of fascist
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thought with focus on the psychological and sociological aspects, as did historian Zeev
Sternhell (1980, 1995). Sternhell (1995) argued that fascism first emerged in France
during the 1880s and 1890s as a concept borne of intellectuals and artists such as
Drumont, Peguy, Barrès, and Maurras. This first incarnation of fascism began as a
rejection of the idea that reason could be used to understand society and resulted in the
formation of a ‘new generation of intellectuals [which] rose violently against the
rationalist individualism of liberal society’ (Sternhell, 1995).
Building on Payne’s typology, Dimitri Kitsikis (1988) offered a typology of
fascism comprised of 13 categories in which fascist ideologies, movements and
establishments could be analyzed and contrasted with others. Kitsikis (1988) echoed
Payne’s observations but created a shorter list of values he felt were most relevant:














The idea of class and the importance of agrarianism;
Private ownership, the circulation of money, the regulation of the economy by
the state, the idea of ethnic bourgeois class, economic self-sufficiency;
The nation and the difference between nation and state;
The attitude towards democracy and political parties;
The importance of political heroes, i.e. the charismatic leader;
The attitude towards tradition;
The attitude towards the individual and society;
The attitude towards equality and hierarchy;
The attitude towards women;
The attitude towards religion;
The attitude towards rationalism;
The attitude towards intellectualism and elitism; and
The attitude towards the Third World. (Kitsikis 1988)

Arguably the most seminal work in the field of fascism comes from Griffin
(1991), whom posited that fascism was best understood as a series of propositions or
‘myths.’ In 1991, Griffin began what he called an ‘odyssey’ to unveil what he termed the
‘fascist minimum.’ He conceded to “the realization that there is no mysterious essence
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waiting to be discovered which will constitute the ‘fascist minimum;’” and contended
that “the ‘fascist minimum’ had to be invented ‘ not discovered ‘ through a process of
‘idealizing abstraction,’” (Griffin 2003, 9).
Griffin is perhaps best known for his theory of ‘palingenetic ultranationalism’
which holds that fascism is defined by its core myth, namely that of national rebirth, or
palingenesis. He believed fascism was anti-liberal, anti-conservative, charismatic, antirational, socialist, totalitarian, racist, and eclectic. He suggested that fascism emerged
when a nation perceived itself to be in crisis; he also maintained – like Payne – that it had
no common class basis of support. Dave Renton (1999) observed that Griffin, however,
moved beyond Payne, arguing that there was one single thread which linked this common
‘mythic core:’ nationalism.
Paxton (1998) contended that there were five major difficulties undermining any
effort to define fascism: a problem of timing; the problematic role of mimicry in defining
fascism; the problem with defining fascism posed by the dauntingly wide disparity
among individual cases in space and in time; the ambiguous relationship between
doctrine and action in fascism; and the overuse/misuse of the word. Indeed, Paxton
believed that the word “fascist” had become the most banal of epithets (1998, 8).
Paxton is perhaps most widely recognized for isolating five stages of fascism,
each utilizing very different sociopolitical processes: (1) the initial creation of fascist
movements, (2) their rooting as parties in a political system, (3) the acquisition of power,
(4) the exercise of power, and (5) radicalization or entropy (Paxton 1998). Quite
logically, he asserted that since different kinds of historical processes are involved in
each stage, different scholarly strategies must be utilized in the analysis of each (Paxton
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1998). Such perspective has far-reaching significance, particularly in conjunction with
euroscepticism.
In his 1995 essay "Ur Fascism," philosopher Umberto Eco used the term "Urfascism" or “eternal fascism” as a generic description of different historical forms of
fascism. Eco also enumerated 14 general properties of fascist ideology, arguing that the
impossibility of organizing these elements into a coherent system (1995, 5). However, he
also contended that it was ‘enough that one of them be present to allow fascism to
coagulate around it’ (Eco 1995, 5). Observed Eco:
Fascism became an all-purpose term because one can eliminate from a
fascist regime one or more features, and it will still be recognizable as
fascist. Take away imperialism from fascism and you still have Franco and
Salazar. Take away colonialism and you still have the Balkan fascism of
the Ustashes. Add to the Italian fascism a radical anti-capitalism (which
never much fascinated Mussolini) and you have Ezra Pound. Add a cult of
Celtic mythology and the Grail mysticism (completely alien to official
fascism) and you have one of the most respected fascist gurus, Julius
Evola. (Eco 1995, 5)
In 1963, German historian and scholar Ernst Nolte published what many scholars
consider to be the magnum opus of fascism. Released in English in 1965 as The Three
Faces of Fascism, Nolte argued that fascism arose as a form of resistance to and a
reaction against modernity. Further, he asserted that fascism functioned at three levels: in
the world of politics as a form of opposition to Marxism, at the sociological level in
opposition to bourgeois values, and in the "metapolitical" world as "resistance to
transcendence" (Nolte 1965, 537). Scholars, such as Griffin (1998), acknowledged
Nolte’s work as “a seminal contribution to the creation of a theory of generic fascism
based on a history of ideas, as opposed to the previous class-based analyses that had
characterized both Marxist and liberal interpretations of fascism.”
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Renton (1999, 22) posited that the interpretations offered by scholars in the field
of fascism clearly diverged. Indeed, Griffin (1995) argued that fascism and Nazism are
different from one another, though at the same time linked, through a common mythic
core. However, Sternhell (1995) maintained that National Socialist German Chancellor
Adolf Hitler “was not fascist” and that, despite such differences, there were far more
significant areas in which the historians agreed. For example, Roger Eatwell, Griffin,
Sternhell, and Payne all adhere to the concept of an ‘ideal type,’ derived from Max
Weber. Renton (1999) observed that they generated an ‘ideal’ fascist by presenting a list
of carefully selected ideas of fascism out of which they then constructed a ‘fascist
minimum,’ and if a group or individual adhered to the greater number of these fascist
ideas, then the adherent himself was fascist (Renton 1999, 22).
Much literature rightly focuses on the negative connotation of the word ‘fascism.’
Sakai (2002) observed that some people still believe fascism is just extreme white racism.
A recurrent them was the idea that in order to be racist one had to be white. Indeed, Sakai
noted the insanity of the concept that fascism was a unique idea that could only lodge in
the brain of members of one race. Others scholars echoed the 1920s European belief that
fascism was "a tool of the ruling class… violent thugs in comic opera uniforms doing
repression for their capitalist masters” (Sakai 2002). More often than not, both views
overlap and are held simultaneously. As a result, Sakai opined, that we "know" fascism,
but really we don't know it yet. Indeed, “Once reclothed, not spouting old fascist
European political philosophy, fascism walks right by us and we don't recognize it at
first,” (Sakai 2002). Such views serve to highlight the reasons why fascism needs to be
viewed in a “new light.”
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Modern Lens: New Politics, New School of Thought
Scholars have focused on various aspects within the existing paradoxical confines
and breadth of fascism, often with significant overlap or no logical placement
whatsoever-- a significant reason in itself to propose and refine parameters for a new
form of fascism. Groups and parties of the 21st century have a very different world in
which to operate with multiple tools in their proverbial toolboxes to facilitate their
operation.
In 1993, Emilio Gentile published a highly-regarded book on fascism
underscoring his conviction that “Italian fascism was more than just the use of force, that
it achieved a form of consensus.” Gentile combined the idea of myth and consensus as a
single concept with “the fascist stress on externalities, both on a lower (in the realm of
‘culturalist’ studies) and on a higher (the masses as the aesthetic, active element in the
creation of consensus) level, with an analysis of the cultic character of Italian fascist mass
society….. he sees fascism as action, as theater” (Nelis 2006, 141-151). In 2000, Gentile
discussed the fall of fascism and how the world was witness to a ‘de-totalitarization’ of
fascism that was “reduced, in totalitarian theories, to a kind of authoritarian regime or
even to a personal dictatorship, a ‘mussolinism.’ ” Gentile observed that during the
1990s, a new side of the problem of fascist totalitarianism had risen via an “expanding
range of research on fascism to areas long remained unexplored by historians, such as
ideology, the party, the regime, the system of rites and symbols of fascism intended as a
political religion” (Gentile 2000, 6).
In 1999, Kaymak argued for an alternative classification for the rising number of
rightwing populist parties. He observed that some neo-populist parties had been
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successful at exploiting resentment among a growing number of unaligned voters. What
differentiated neo-populist parties from their supposed forerunners, Kaymak argued, was
their distinct ability to mobilize their resentment (Kaymak 1999, vii). Unlike neo-fascist
parties, he argued, successful neo-populist parties appealed to heterogeneous groups; a
populist style, including scape-goating common enemies, real or imaginary, helped keep
the disparate coalitions together (Kaymak 1999, vii). The organizational attributes of
successful neo-populist parties, centralized authority and charismatic leadership, not only
distinguished neo-populist parties as a unique party type, but also accounted for their
success and appeal (Kaymak 1999, vii). Kaymak’s findings implied that growing
disenchantment with institutions of authority actually served to increase the support of
neo-populist parties. Such findings are relevant to this examination of fascism in that
they indicate the significance of discontent and institutions (structural integrity),
particularly in France, Germany, Italy, and Norway. Like Paxton, Kaymak noted an
atmosphere of impending change. Indeed, the growth and success of neo-populist parties
and right-wing nationalist groups such as England’s UKIP, France’s Front National, and
Hungary’s Jobbik, has increased exponentially.
In 1998, Paxton observed fascism’s “politics in a new key” throughout Europe in
the late 19th century (Paxton 1998, 1-23). Paxton (2004) theorized that this ‘new form of
politics’ was the creation of the “first popular movements dedicated to reasserting the
priority of the nation against all forms of internationalism or cosmopolitanism.” He
observed that the 1880s—with its simultaneous economic depression and broadened
democratic practice—was a crucial threshold (Paxton 1998, 1-23). Undeniably, the
world was about to enter into a significant time of change, an era that would see World
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War and fascism at an unprecedented level. Paxton’s identification of a new form of
politics riding on the heels of depression and expanded liberalism is not only highly
perceptive, it is wholly applicable to the current changes in Europe’s political landscape
due to the rise of euroscepticism.
Euroscepticism
The source of euroscepticism is firmly embedded within the EU during the late
1980s and early 1990s. However, determining whether this skepticism originated within
and/or as a direct result of the European Parliament, the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU), the establishment of the Schengen area, or from any other of a myriad of
possibilities, is a source of ongoing debate often resulting in the answer “it depends.”
It is no secret that as the European Union grew increasingly authoritative, it also
became more contentious (Albert, 1992; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hooghe and Marks,
1999; Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn, 1997). Eichenberg and Dalton (2007, 507-534) noted
that the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 19934 evoked concerns regarding the
proper parameters of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2007, 122). Indeed, scholars have
noted that “social movements, along with political parties and the public began to pay
serious attention. A new political front of contestation was opened between those seeking
to protect their communities from the disruptive forces of globalization and European

4

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992 and
entered into force on 1 November 1993. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty created the
European Union, which consists of three pillars: the European Communities, common
foreign and security policy and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The
Maastricht Treaty brought the three Communities (Euratom, ECSC, EEC) under one
umbrella-- The European Union-- and institutionalized cooperation in the fields of
foreign policy, defense, police and justice. The EEC was renamed, becoming the EC
(Europa.eu).
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integration and those supporting integration” (Hooghe and Marks 2007; 119). Asserted
Walsh (2014), founded in the wake of World War II, the EU was a self-conscious
rejection of nationalism.
Though the modern iteration of the EU was borne from the Maastricht Treaty, the
European Union traces its roots to the aftermath of WWII. Observed Sliwinski (2015):
With the continent in ruins, several representatives from leading nations
attempted to finally find some way to unify the region and put an end to
the seemingly endless fighting that had just led to the most destructive war
the world has ever known. The process started with the European Coal and
Steel Community in 1951, with six founding members whom agreed to
merge their coal and steel production: West Germany, France, Italy,
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The foundation was further
solidified with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which created the European
Economic Community (EEC). In 1967, the European Parliament was
created and had its first direct elections in 1979; in 1993, the European
Union was codified through the Treaty of Maastrich. (Sliwinski 2015)
European Parliament (EP) has a unique composition. A Member of European
Parliament (MEP) is elected via national vote. Once elected, MEPs either join one of the
existing cross-national political groups (eight as of March 2016) or choose to be
unattached and identify as a “Non-Inscrit” (NI). These groups differ from national
parties in that they consist of members from several different parties from different
member states. MEPs are able to (and often do) switch groups during their term. EP was
founded on June 23, 1953, as the Christian-Democratic Group in the Common Assembly
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (CVCE 2015). The ECSC
established several supranational institutions, including the High Authority, the Council
of Ministers, the Assembly and the Court of Justice. The six founding countries (the
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands)
formally decided to sit together in the Assembly according to political affiliation, rather
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than in national delegations (Fontaine, 2010). This tradition carried as the Assembly
evolved into its modern iteration as European Parliament comprised of 27 European
countries with 500 million inhabitants.
Since 1979, members have been directly elected by the citizens of the Member
States. This first election resulted in seven groups and several non-attached members.
Following the second enlargement of the EU and national developments leading to the
realignment of political groups within EP, the number of groups peaked at 10 in 1989.
Subsequent elections saw this number start to fall, returning to its 1979 level in 2004
(European Parliament 2015, 60). According to European Communities (2009), since
2004, several enlargements of the EU and increasing fragmentation of national partisan
systems during European elections – particularly in France, the UK, and Italy – have
caused a threefold increase in the number of national parties with elected representatives.
In 2008, 185 parties were represented in the European Parliament, however, despite one
or two fluctuations, the number of groups has remained constant (European Communities
2009, 60-61). Consequently, the ratio of groups to parties has steadily risen over the
years to stand at 26.4:1 in 2008, compared with 7.7:1 in 1979 (European Communities
2009, 61). The 8th EP, elected in 2014, resulted in the highest number of Eurosceptic
MEPs in history.
Though Paxton’s observation of a ‘new form of politics’ was made in connection
to the political atmosphere at the turn of the 19th century, it is equally applicable a century
later in conjunction with the burgeoning euroscepticism that has changed the political
environment in Europe. The European Parliamentary elections in May 2014 resulted in
an influx of far-right and far-left eurosceptic and euroreject parties, which now form
23

approximately 27 percent of the assembly. Observed Siddi (2014) in EU-Watch,
“Overall, populist, right-wing and far-right parties are much more strongly represented in
the new European Parliament: the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFD)
group has 48 seats (17 more than in 2009), while the number of non-attached members –
who are almost exclusively representatives of the xenophobic far right – rose from 33 to
52.” Following the 2014 EP elections, the Economist reported: “anti-establishment
parties [now] control nearly one-third of the parliament. Beyond the victories of the
Eurosceptics in France and Britain, the anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party won in
Denmark, the far-right Jobbik came second in Hungary and Germany has its first neoNazi MEP” (Economist 5/31/2014).
However, the formation of the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) in 2015,
led to significant shuffle. As of March 2016, EFD lost three members, dropping to 45;
the Non-Inscrits (NI) dropped to 15; and the newly formed eurosceptic ENF grew to 38
members (European Parliament 2016).
In 2016, nationalists and eurosceptics accounted for approximately one-third of
MEPs in the 751-seat European Parliament. Prior to the creation of EFD, most sat as
NIs, or joined one of the existing political groupings, which provides extended funding
options and allocated time allotments for speaking (Wagner-Nagy 2015). The largest
cluster of eurosceptics was previously found in the Europe of Freedom and Direct
Democracy (EFD) group. This 48-member (45 in 2016) eurosceptic group is led by
Nigel Farage of UKIP and is dominated by UKIP and the Italian Five Star Movement.
The other nations in the alliance, Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Poland, and
Sweden, contribute only one or two representatives each (Wagner-Nagy 2015).
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The next largest grouping of eurosceptics had been found in the “far more
eurocritical than eurosceptical” European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL- 52
seats) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR- 70 seats), respectively left
and right of the political spectrum (Poli and Rosselli 2014). The 21 French Front National
MEPs and the handful of Hungarian Jobbik and Greek Golden Dawn MEPs are NIs.
Several anti-establishment parties won their first seats in parliament, including
Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement (Italian) and Germany's Alternative für Deutschland
(AfD). Observed Bruneau (2014), following the elections, there were 65 newly elected
members whom joined a political group, and 41 others declared as NIs; therefore, there
are “more than 100 MEPs and 14% of European Parliament who can influence the
direction of new policy over the next five years. It is certain to be a very vocal minority”
(Bruneau 2014).
It did not take long for the “very vocal minority” to form its own group. Reported
the New Observer, “The Europe of Nations and Freedom was launched on June 15, 2015,
after extended negotiations between the French National Front (FN), the Dutch Party for
Freedom (PVV), the Italian Lega Nord (LN), the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ),
Belgium’s Vlaams Belang (VB), and the Polish Congress of the New Right (KNP)…the
36-strong group gained two additional members when former UK Independence Party
member Janice Atkinson, and former Conservative Party of Romania (Partidul
Conservator, PC) member Laurentiu Rebega, joined in their private capacities” (New
Observer 2016). As a result, EP now consists of eight political groups: European
People's Party–European Democrats (EPP–ED); Party of European Socialists (PES);
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE); Union for Europe of the Nations
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(UEN); The Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens–EFA); European United Left–
Nordic Green Left (GUE–NGL); Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM); Europe of
Nations and Freedom (ENF); and the Non-Inscrits (NI).
At the local level, results are even more impressive. The March 2015 French
elections gave the French extreme-right party Front National the highest percentage of
votes it had ever achieved in a local election (Pezard 2015). With 26 percent of the votes,
the Front National staunchly confirmed that it is in the ascendant and its leader, Marine le
Pen, stands well-positioned as a strong contender in France's presidential elections in
2017 (Pezard 2015).
Interestingly, England’s UKIP fell surprising short in the April 2015 UK local
elections. Predicted to take upwards of 18 seats, the party succeeded in only earning two.
Did the “loss” signify a loss in popularity and the beginning of a downward spiral? Quite
the opposite. The voting results were indicative of UKIP’s widespread appeal in the UK,
and highlight the important fact that their popularity is not limited to a few districts.
They won 14 percent of the vote in England (and 12.6 percent across the UK); they
finished second in more than 120 seats and won 20 percent in at least 45 seats; and, in
total, the party accrued approximately four million votes – that’s as many votes as the
Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, and the Liberal Democrats combined (Black 2015).
In May 2014, The Economist emphatically declared that “the blunt reality is that
Europe's political fault-line is shifting: from left versus right, to pro-Europeans against
anti-Europeans. This election night belongs to the likes of Marine Le Pen, who has
polished the Front National [National Front] in France and trounced both the centre-right
UMP party and the Socialist Party of President François Hollande. Further, they
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acknowledge that the Euroskeptics now have political momentum” (Economist May
2014). Indeed, governments in Britain and France face an acute dilemma regarding how
they should respond, and the likelihood is that they will harden their stance on a host of
issues, particularly immigration and EU enlargement; pressure will rise for EU powers to
be repatriated (Economist May 2014). Further muddying of the waters in the UK was the
July 2014 appointment of outspoken Eurosceptic Phillip Hammond as foreign secretary
in what many observers called “a major cabinet reshuffle.”
But euroscepticism was not a construct of the 2014 Parliamentary elections. The
2005 referenda defeats in France and Holland for the proposed treaty establishing a
European Constitution were widely interpreted in EU studies as signaling a major
dislocation between political elites and the wider population of citizens (Fossum and
Trenz 2006). Wellings (2014) reported that the ‘Future of England’ surveys, published
by the IPPR in 2012 and 2013, were the first to note a link between “Englishness and
Euroscepticism:”
The first point they discovered was that Englishness had become
politicised, mostly since 2007, and was a vehicle for a variety of political
grievances. The second point was that the British were not Eurosceptic,
but that the English were. In other words, among those who identified as
‘British not English’, 45% thought that UK membership of the EU was a
good thing, but this figure dropped to 14% for those who identified as
‘English not British.’ (Wellings 2014)
Scholars offer a variety of causes as explanation for the surge in eurosceptic
parties. Many cite economic causes and soaring unemployment (Sliwinski 2015;
Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Brown 2015;
McLaren 2002); others point to a loss of nationalism and identity (Hooghe, Huo, and
Marks 2007; Halikiopoulou et. al. 2012; Brown 2015; McLaren 2002; Lochocki 2014);
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still others cite socio-economic, socio-cultural and political factors, pointing to the
relationship between low education and euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2005;
Loveless and Rohrschneider 2008; Lubbers and Jaspers 2011; Lochocki 2014).
Studies have sought an explanation for the success of some far-right groups and
not others, when conditions appear similar. Golder (2003, 433) observed that empirical
studies investigating the variation in the success of these parties have quite often
produced inconsistent results. For example, Golder noted that some studies find that
immigration matters (Anderson 1996; Knigge 1998; Martin 1996), others find that it does
not (Mayer and Perrineau 1989). Others have found that it only matters in some countries
(Givens 2000). Further, as Golder acknowledged in 2003, the same inconsistent results
can be found for unemployment and electoral institutions. Jackman and Volpert (1996)
argued that electoral thresholds influenced the support for extreme right parties, whereas
Swank and Betz (1996) provided evidence to the contrary. Knigge (1998) claimed that
unemployment reduced support for extreme right parties, though Jackman and Volpert
(1996) concluded the opposite. Lewis-Beck and Mitchell (1993) stated that the effect of
unemployment depended on the level of immigration (Golder 2003, 433), yet Sliwinski
(2015) argued that what has led to this rise is how economic problems are perceived as
being compounded by immigration. Sliwinski noted, in particular, that in the EU the
youth unemployment rate as a whole was 23 percent; in Greece it had risen as high as 60
percent. Thus, studies reveal contradictory information and mixed results.
In 2008, White (2008) cited ‘cleavage theory’, a common analytical perspective
in the EU literature, as the causal factor of euroscepticism. Lochocki (2014) observed
that “studies have identified two components that make right-populists’ programs
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appealing to voters: they offer an agenda of neo-nationalism, combined with an
opportunity to cast a protest vote expressing general dissatisfaction with the political
establishment…their programs combine “neo-nationalism” with “anti-elitism:” for the
nation, against the political establishment (Lochocki 2014). In doing so, he believed,
they blame the established, moderate parties for any alleged social change — primarily
caused by globalization — brought upon the alleged homogenous community of the
nation (Lochocki 2014, 5). Indeed, Lochocki (2014, 5) posited that prime threats were
generally symbolized by immigration and multiculturalism as much as the influence of
the European Union on daily life (Ivarsflaten 2008; Arzheimer 2009; Ellinas 2010;
Yilmaz 2012).
Analyses of citizens’ attitudes toward the EU have consistently identified a masselites divide or an ‘elite-mass opinion incongruence,’ one Bertoncini and Koenig (2014)
believed lent itself to the idea that so-called ‘populist’ discourses usually reject European
integration.
In an effort to better explain the many dimensions of euroscepticism, many
scholars have chosen to focus on the differences between eurosceptic groups. The
subsequent research led to a flurry of manuscripts heavily focused on typologies. Taggart
and Szczerbiak (2001) presented the concept of hard vs. soft euroscepticism, with hard
euroscepticism defined as the opposition to membership of, or the existence of, the
European Union as a matter of principle (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001, 10). Szcerbiak
selected the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group, typified by such parties as
the United Kingdom Independence Party, as an example of hard euroscepticism. Soft
euroscepticism, on the other hand, was what he described as support for the existence of,
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and membership of, a form of European Union, but with opposition to specific EU
policies, and opposition to a federal Europe (Szczerbiak 2008). Blurred lines and further
research led the pair to redefine hard euroscepticism as “principled opposition to the
project of European integration as embodied in the EU” and soft euroscepticism as “not a
principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a
supranational body such as the EU, but… opposition to the EU’s current or future
planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning
to make” (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, 7-8). Thus, soft euroscepticism can best be
described as “qualified” opposition, while hard euroscepticism is viewed as outright
opposition. There is a debate amongst scholars concerning the tipping point when soft
euroscepticism transitions into hard. Kopecky and Mudde 2002, and Vasilopoulou 2009,
have noted the flaws in such a distinction. As Vasilopoulou (2009, 5) queried, “if a party
opposes three or more EU policies, is its euroscepticism still soft or has it crossed the
boundaries and has become hard? Would this depend on the number of policies or their
substance? Or somehow on both?”
Pursuant to Szczerbiak and Taggert’s distinction of hard and soft euroscepticism,
scholars began to immerse themselves in study and debate to further delineate
euroscepticism. In 2007, Flood and Usherwood presented a six-point scale ranging from
EU-reject to EU-maximalist, while Rovny (2004) focused on differentiating between the
motivation and the magnitude of opposition to the EU. Krouwel and Abts (2007)
developed a two-dimensional conceptualization by combining both the targets and the
degree of popular discontent toward ‘Europe’ (Brack and Startin 2015, 83).
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Using qualifiers such as pro- or anti-integration, and pro- or anti-EU, many
scholars began to reclassify eurosceptic groups using terms such as Europhobe,
Euroreject, Euroenthusiast, Eurorealist, and Eurosceptic (Vasilopoulou 2011; Sorenson
2008; Kopecky and Mudde 2002). Heinisch and Lansberger (2011, 6) note that,
according to the typology proposed by Kopecky and Mudde (2002, 300), “so-called
‘Euroenthusiasts’ support the general idea of European integration as well as its current
manifestation as embodied by the EU, ‘Eurorejects’ are opposed to both. By contrast,
‘Europragmatists’ do not support the general idea of European integration but accept the
EU for pragmatic reasons. Finally, the term ‘Eurosceptic’ is left for those supporting the
general idea of European integration while rejecting the current gestalt of the EU”
(Heinisch and Lansberger 2011, 7).
Factors such as exit strategy and basis, national influence, vision, and ideology
often serve as variables. Interestingly, some terms have been incorporated by groups in
EP; on its website, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) presents
itself as “eurorealist” and calls for an EU of openness, transparency, and eurorealism
(ecrgroup.eu 2015).
Another area of focus in eurosceptic research has led to what some scholars refer
to as the North Carolina/Sussex debate. Mudde (2011, 7-9) highlighted the respective
impacts of ideology and strategy in euroscepticism and elaborated the concept of two
schools of thought in Euroscepticism studies: the Sussex School and the North Carolina
School. The foundation of the North Carolina School was the 1999 work of Leonard Ray,
research from Hooghe and Marks (2007), and, in particular, Hooghe’s 2007 “What
Drives Euroscepticism?” (Mudde 2011, 8). The North Carolina School emphasizes
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party-based Euroscepticism and argues that party positions on European integration are a
reflection of a new cleavage in European politics (Mudde 2011, 9).
The Sussex School is based on the works of Szczerbiak and Taggart (1998, 2001,
2008) and was the first attempt to comparatively and systematically research party-based
Euroscepticism. This approach focuses on characteristics inherent to the nation as a
whole, such as party competition and objectives, electoral systems, and institutional
structures.
Vasilopoulou (2013) observed that this segment of literature portrays
“Euroscepticism as a new and marginal phenomenon, located at the periphery of society
and the party system and to focus mostly on its nature and its sources” (Brack and Startin
2015, 242). Serricchio, et al (2013) concurred, observing how Euroscepticism has
increasingly moved from the periphery of society t”o the mainstream and the Eurozone
crisis triggered fundamental changes in the attitudes of both citizens and elites vis-á-vis
the EU but also towards national institutions” (Brack and Startin 2015, 242).
It is precisely the change in attitude and perspective described by Vasilopoulou
that warrants examination of euroscepticism on a macro level. Further, though the
emergence and success of euroscepticism and, subsequently, Eurosceptic groups, is a
relatively new phenomenon, the underlying tenets are not. The similarity to fascism
should not and cannot be ignored.
Griffin (2003) believed that fascism (like euroscepticism) was influenced by both
left and right, conservative and anti-conservative, national and supranational, rational and
anti-rational. Additionally, nationalism, considered the foundation of fascism, is also a
primary component of euroscepticism. Another compelling aspect is the fascist view of
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the nation as “a single organic entity which binds people together by their ancestry and is
a natural unifying force of people” (Zimmer 2003). Yet perhaps the most persuasive
example of a parallel between fascism and euroscepticism is recognition that fascism
seeks to solve economic, political and social problems by achieving a national rebirth
(Paxton 2005; Griffin 1991; Laqueuer 1998; Passmore 2002).
To date, research in the areas of fascism and euroscepticism has focused on each
field independently, failing to unite the two. Scholars routinely focus on the right-wing,
populist and nationalistic aspects of each and often label many of the emergent groups as
“fascist.” The similarities go far beyond labelling and name-calling. As a result, this
dissertation links these two areas of study together, forging a theoretically grounded new
conception of fascism in the 21st century: Millennial Eurosceptic Populism. Chapter III
will discuss and dissect millennial eurosceptic populism in depth, establishing a working
definition, its characteristics, parameters, and the necessary components required for a
group/party to be recognized as a Millennial Eurosceptic Populist Group.
Theory
The surge of 21st century fascism has not gone unnoticed. Efforts to explain this
rise, however, have presented more of a challenge. With academic opinion on its
occurrence ranging from perceptions of it as a distinctly marginal phenomenon, to those
maintaining it is the wave of the future, a solid theoretical explanation remains to be seen.
Hooghe and Marks (2007, 120) noted that Wessels (2005), building on Eastonian systems
theory, argued that a political system can weather opposition if citizens identify with the
political community. Other scholars of the EU shift have focused on geographic angles
(Carey 2002; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998a; Gabel 1998b; McLaren 2002;
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Ray 2003; Taggart 1998) or more comparative perspectives (Herzog and Tucker 2009;
Marks et al. 2006; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004).
Fortunately, scholars of social movements have an array of tools in their
proverbial toolbox from whence they can choose. The broad nature of the groups’ goals,
capabilities, abilities, and tactics belies a quite simplistic commonality: achieving change.
The methods these groups employ to seek change vary as greatly as their goals, though
there are several traditional theories of social mobilization which are typically utilized to
explain a movement’s rise. What underlying theories explain the rise of millennial
eurosceptic populism? This section examines classic and modern theory in search of a
theoretical model that could potentially explain the conditions that have allowed for the
rise and emergence of euroscepticism as hypothesized above.
Classic Theory
The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal
society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established
new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place
of the old ones –Karl Marx, 1848. (Marx and Engels 1969)
Marx. In classic Marxist theory, competition between workers alienated them
from one another (as well as from the means of production) as they had no say in its
operation. Workers were relegated to this state of oppression, a state in which happiness
or even personal fulfillment was difficult to find. Thus, according to Marx, the division
of labor and conflict between capitalists and workers were critical problems of modern
society in which social stratification played a pivotal role, both for and against,
mobilization. Nolte (1966, 421-434) viewed fascism as “a reactionary, anti-modern
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movement despite its borrowing of certain techniques such as mass mobilization and
propaganda from the Marxists.”
The Encyclopedia of Marxism (2008) defines fascism as "right-wing, fiercely
nationalist, subjectivist in philosophy, and totalitarian in practice", and identifies it as "an
extreme reactionary form of capitalist government." It enumerates nine fundamental
characteristics of fascism: right wing, nationalism, hierarchy, anti-equality, religious,
capitalist, war, voluntarist ideology, and anti-modern (The Encyclopedia of Marxism
2008).
Yet, in the vein of classic Marxist theory, many scholars have deferred to a
Marxist theory of fascism which stems from Leon Trotsky. Some scholars consider this
theory to be Trotsky's greatest contribution to Marxism. He began the task after
Mussolini's victory in Italy in 1922, and brought it to its apogee in the years preceding
Hitler's triumph in Germany in 1933. Weissman (1969) notes that Trotsky began the task
after Mussolini's triumph in Italy in 1922, and brought it to a high point in the years
preceding Hitler's victory 11 years later. Observed Weissman, “in his attempts to awaken
the German Communist Party and the Communist International to the mortal danger and
to rally a united-front against Nazism, Trotsky made a point-by-point critique of the
policies of the social-democratic and Stalinist parties.” According to Weissman (1969),
this constituted “a compendium of almost all the mistaken, ineffective, and suicidal
positions that workers' organizations can take regarding fascism, since the positions of
the German parties ranged from opportunistic default and betrayal on the right (social
democratic) to ultra-left abstentionism and betrayal (Stalinist).”
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To the Stalinists, every capitalist party was automatically ‘fascist’ (Weissman
1969). Stalin famously noted “that, rather than being opposites, fascism and social
democracy were ‘twins;’ the socialists were thereupon dubbed ‘social fascists’ and
regarded as the main enemy …there could be no united front with social-fascist
organizations, and those who, like Trotsky, urged such united fronts, were also labeled
social fascists and treated accordingly” (Weissman 1969).
Subsequently, much has been written on Marxist theories of fascism and there
have been a number of Marxist influenced analyses of fascism. Since 1945, most of these
works analyzed the fascist regimes in a time-specific manner and had little immediate
relevance to a theory of fascism for the present (Smith 2012). Renton (1997) noted that
a Marxist theory of fascism had its roots in a number of Marxist theories which predated
the rise of fascism. These include the idea, present in The Communist Manifesto, that
ideologies should be seen as class ideologies.
In 1999, Renton offered a succinct explanation of Marxist fascism: “First,
Marxism is wholly critical of fascism: it is individual Marxists who have provided the
most thorough opposition to the several fascist parties. Second, Marxism interprets
fascism: it explains the growth of fascism with relevance to a broader theory which seeks
to explain the totality of social relations under capitalism” (Renton 1997, 44).
Many Marxists utilize the insights of psychology to analyze what they perceive as
a ‘fascist personality’ (Renton 1997, 80). The most important of these ‘Freudian
Marxists,’ according to Renton, were the members of the Frankfurt School, which
included Erich Fromm and Theodor Adorno (Renton 1997, 81). Fromm contended that
“fascism was a product of capitalism which, in turn, marked the most extreme distance
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from the natural economy” (Renton 1997, 81). In response to alienation, humanity could
choose only socialism or fascism: “Man must either unite himself with the world in the
spontaneity of love and productive work, or else seek a kind of security, by such ties with
the world as destroy his freedom” (Renton 1997, 81).
Smith observed that: “One of the fundamental principles of the Marxist
interpretation of fascism is that fascism is not an ideology buried in the historical past,
but a living phenomenon that has re-emerged in times of economic and political turmoil”
(Smith, 2012). Indeed, throughout Europe and in other former colonies around the world
including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, there has
been a “revival of fascist groups” at different times (Smith, 2012). Smith also asserted
that in the immediate post-war period, “these groups were often remnants of the inter-war
fascist parties, but the social mobilization of groups of ‘classical fascism’ were replaced
by new groups who took inspiration from the groups of the 1930s and 1940s, but with
new and younger personnel, often including figureheads from the inter-war period”
(Smith, 2012).
Neocleous (1997, xi) concurred: “seeing fascism as a historical phenomenon that
ended in 1945 or thereabouts… encourages a dangerous forgetting.” For Marxists,
fascism is inherently linked to capitalism, as asserted by both Renton (1999, 16):
“fascism is a recurrent feature of modern capitalism;” and Neocleous (1997, xi): “fascism
is first and foremost an ideology generated by modern industrial capitalism.”
Similarly, in the 1960s, John Cammett (1967, 162) argued that while fascism is
the ‘fullest expression’ of capitalism, it is “not identical at every stage… with monopoly
capitalism….As a Marxist, in order to eliminate the conditions for a revival of fascism,
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one would need to abolish capitalism.” As Renton (1999, 16) concluded in true Marxist
fashion: “the only decisive way to stop fascism is by fighting for a society where the
potential of all humanity is fully realised and all forms of oppression are swept away.”
Marxist theory as applied to all genres of fascism offers explanatory power in
some cases but fails in regards to euroscepticism. Though alienation certainly plays a
role in the emergence of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, the concept of class struggle
does not adequately explain a movement/group that transcends social class. As Skocpol
(1985, 3-5) explained it: "With respect to all that is non-state, [the state-centered]
paradigm [thus] continues the reductionist tendency of Marxism and neo- Marxism by
identifying class relations and interests as the key to contemporary forms of collective
action.” Struggle in terms of Eurosceptic ideology is one of sovereignty and nationalism
rather than, or regardless of, class.
Durkheim. Like Marx, Durkheim emphasized the fact that human qualities, needs
and motives are, in large part, the product of social development (Durkheim [1893]
1986). Indeed, both men emphasized the structural-anatomical links between political
society and the state, and that the state is the political organ of the society with the
ultimate decision being made by persons society has empowered and entrusted
(Durkheim [1912] 1965). Durkheim held that political society is “polycellular” in form
and comprised of secondary groups whose existence made politics both necessary and
possible. While Marx adopted a negative perception of the division of labor, Durkheim
casted it in a more positive light, as a way of connecting members of society, for “it is
through the division of labor…that the cohesion of societies would be ensured”
(Durkheim [1893] 1986, 277).
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Durkheim believed that the essential elements of a modern society (as well as the
primary problems of it) were similar to those of Marx though they differed in some ways.
Durkheim asserted that modern society was a product of the norms, values belief systems
that governed it. A further differentiation stemmed from Durkheim’s interest in reforming
society while Marx sought to eliminate it.
A key component of Durkheimian theory was solidarity. With modernization and
industrialization, labor became increasingly specialized. Previously in pre-modern
societies, all workers engaged in essentially the same work as a means of sustenance.
These workers shared social cohesion based on similarities and commonalities. This
‘mechanical solidarity’ was soon replaced by ‘organic solidarity.’ With organic
solidarity, social cohesion was based on each individual’s dependence on all others in the
society for his survival (Durkheim 1893).
In The Division of Labor in Society ([1893]1986), Durkheim proposed two
concepts: first, societies evolved from a simple, non-specialized form (mechanical)
toward a highly complex, specialized form (organic); second, when societies become
more complex, or organic, work also becomes more complex. In the former society,
people behave and think alike and generally perform the same ‘work tasks’ with the same
group-oriented goals; in the latter, people are no longer tied to one another and social
bonds are impersonal (Durkheim [1893]1986). This loss of connection is what Durkheim
believed led to ‘anomie,’ and a breakdown of social norms and control over the members
of society. As a result, individuals were unable to function in society without clear rules
to serve as guides and limiters (Durkheim [1893] 1986).
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Durkheim ([1893] 1986) contended that man was a product of his social
environment; thus, socialization began at birth and continued through language and
interaction with other people. The basis of his theory rested on the notion that the
“conscience collective of a society varies alongside the division of labor. In less complex
and more primitive societies, people tended to do and think alike and there was little
tolerance for difference” (Smith 2008; Durkheim [1893]1986). Durkheim concluded
that “two consciousnesses exist within us: the one comprises only states that are personal
to each one of us, characteristic of us as individuals, whilst the other comprises states that
are common to the whole of society” (Durkheim [1893]1986, 84).
Durkheim ([1912]1965) coined the term ‘collective effervescence’ to indicate
how communal gatherings intensify, electrify and enlarge and individual’s experience.
He believed that the act of bringing people together in close physical proximity
‘generates a kind of electricity that quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of
exaltation’ (Durkheim [1912]1965, 162). He asserted that this collectively-experienced
euphoria served to reaffirm social bonds: “Within a crowd moved by a common passion,
we become susceptible to feelings and actions of which we are incapable on our own...
and when the crowd is dissolved, when we find ourselves alone again and fall back to our
usual level, we can measure how far we were raised above ourselves” (Durkheim,
[1912]1965, 157). Social mobilization, therefore, occurs as both a product and factor of
collective effervescence.
Durkheim claimed anomie is an experience comprised of much more than one
simple thing. Writing of Durkheim’s concept, Bernburg (2002, 731) described it as a
normlessness of goals in which the “absence of social authority causes our capacity for
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feeling in itself insatiable and bottomless.” Elaborated Bernberg, “anomie may also
come forth when socially prescribed goals are practically unattainable…to pursue a goal
which is by definition unattainable is to condemn oneself to a state of perpetual
unhappiness, ends are not really undefined…they are limitless” (2002, 731).

Durkheim

believed that anomie is characterized by unrealistic aspirations and expectations that
often cause conflict between means and ends and leave individuals with feelings of
meaninglessness and hopelessness and a sense of injustice. “The limits are unknown
between the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate
claims, and hopes and those which are immoderate” (Durkheim 1897; 1951, 231).
Ultimately, for a social order to be just, it has to be fairly stable and consistent, it has to
be characterized by equal opportunity and a predictable future (Durkheim, 1897; 1951).
A Durkheimian theory of fascism would likely stem from the concepts of anomie
and collective effervescence. Richman (2002, 106) argued that “collective effervescence
manifests a new paradigm of human social existence wherein the individual is no longer
opposed to the group.” Rather, she posited, there was a synergy found within Durkheim's
composite idea of man as homo-duplex: an integral being at once social and individual, at
once the whole society and one of its constituent parts (Richman, 2002, 106). By
extension, normative behavior for Durkheim ([1912]1965) is at once the principle and
‘fons et origo’ [source and origin] of society itself. Collective effervescence, therefore,
served as the means through which social normativity was achieved and reinforced,
despite the fact that it typically occurred during fleeting moments of “taboo ritual and
non-normative social behavior” (Connolly 2004).
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In his study of Durkheim’s theory of social order, Thorlindsson (2004) asserted
that Durkheim’s emphasis of the idea that collective life of groups and social institutions
cannot be reduced to the mere psychology of individuals. He contended that: “Rather,
social groups have structural properties where norms, values and ongoing social
relationships place constraints on the individual…Social order is rooted in the emergent
nature of social life where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Thorlindsson,
2004, 271). Consequently, Durkheim viewed rapid social change as a cause of anomic
collective action and irrational behavior.
Durkheim would likely hold that fascism is borne from the concept of collective
action stemming from social change and feelings of anomie leading to solidarity. As
noted by Traugott, for Durkheim "solidarity constitutes the defining characteristic of
group life. It is, by extension, the sine qua non of collective action" (Traugott 1984, 325
Indeed, far from stressing emotional disintegration, "Durkheim typically characterizes the
variations in solidarity associated with social movements as intensifications of ...
integrative bonds" (Traugott 1984, 325).
Durkheim’s concepts of anomie and collective effervescence may serve as
theoretical explanation for many groups and movements, but they cannot be applied
universally, particularly in light of research identifying collective action as a logical act.
Olson (1965) believed that all motivations are individualistic; only a separate and
"selective" incentive would ultimately stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to
act in a group-oriented way. Whilst Durkheim believed that groups socialize individuals
into their obligations to one another, Olson (1965) contended that members of groups did
not act out of sentiment, loyalty or a sense of belonging. They joined groups purely for
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the benefit they could derive as individuals. In 1960, Kedourie observed that nationalism
was often associated with the radical right and criticized as “an irrational doctrine with a
fanatical vision and a propensity towards violence” (Halikiopoulou 2012, 7). Olson’s
work does much to counter this erroneous concept which continues to permeate society.
Indeed, euroscepticism is very much a product of logic and rational thought, weighing
costs against benefits.
Weber. Weber (1968) believed that classes and status groups should be associated
with power and attempting to achieve one’s will, even in the face of opposition. Indeed,
Weber viewed states as autonomous organizations with their own distinctive interests and
goals and as sites of "independent and effective official actions," (Skocpol 1985, 21).
Weber (1965) held that differences in wages resulted in different material conditions and,
therefore, different patterns of social action. Further, “antagonisms among property-less
groups can often be based on rational motives rather than false consciousness”
(Appelrouth and Edles 2010, 155-162).
A recurrent theme in Weber’s work is the concept of rationalization. When
discussing rationalization, Appelrouth and Edles (2010) noted that Weber referred to an
ongoing process in which social interaction and institutions became increasingly
governed by methodical procedures and calculable rules. Thus, in steering the course of
societal development, values, traditions, and emotions were being displaced in favor of
formal and impersonal bureaucratic practices (Appelrouth and Edles 2010, 155-162).
While such practices may breed greater efficiency in obtaining designated ends, they can
also lead to the “disenchantment of the world” where “there are no mysterious
incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all
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things by calculation” (Weber, [1919]1958, 139). Weber maintained that
rationalization—and the scientific, calculative outlook in which it is rooted—did not
generate “an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives”
(Weber [1919] 1958, 139). Instead, they offered techniques that were ultimately devoid
of meaning (Appelrouth and Edles 2010).
As discussed by Appelrouth and Edles (2010, 155-162), Weber “believed the
ascetic ideals lying at the heart of the Protestant ethic were carried into the practical
affairs of economic activity and social life more generally… this unleashed the process of
rationalization, disenchanting Western society and creating an ‘iron cage’ from which the
individual is left with little power to escape.” Further, the dominance of capitalism and
impersonal, bureaucratic forms of organization was a ‘collective force’ that determined
an individual’s opportunities (Appelrouth and Edles 2010, 166, 169). The iron cage
served to imprison us in the pursuit of the “lifestyles of the rich and famous” whether or
not we can afford to live like the affluent (Appelrouth and Edles 2010, 166, 169).
Weber (1968, 927) argued that status honor was a “more important source of
group social action than class or relation to markets.” Gingrich (1999) delineated the
ways this could be accomplished:
First, status may be a means of maintaining the position of a group that does have
privilege. The status group may be closed, with privileges available only to those
in the group, and denied to those outside the group. Further, a status group may
lead to the development of parties to further some specific interests of the status
group. Thus, status groups may become the means by which power or authority is
exercised. (Gingrich 1999, 1)
Gingrich noted that “social honor may be accorded to those who behave in the
manner considered desirable by the status group” (Gingrich 1999, 1). Further: “In this
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way, the ends of a status group may be furthered. Social approval is a means of achieving
the ends of the group while social disapproval may be used as a means of disciplining
those who do not behave in the approved manner” (Gingrich 1999, 1). He continued:
Second, people who have limited power may form a status group in an attempt to
gain greater control of economic and social resources. Thus, if resources are
scarce, forming a group which is able to exercise some control of the distribution
of these resources may be a means of increasing the power of that group in
society (Gingrich 1999, 1).
The restrictions placed on entry may be partially economic, but they are also
partially social in nature, having to do with status honor and prestige. Professions which
are male-dominated and have excluded women are but one example and appear to
perpetuate status distinctions based on gender (Gingrich 1999; Weber 1968).
Weber (1968) described authority as a legitimate form of domination, implying
that authority was considered to be legitimate by followers and subordinates. He outlined
three major types of legitimate domination: traditional, charismatic, and legal or rational
(Weber 1968). Weber did acknowledge that these three types are not all-inclusive though
they do offer insight into the reasons why he felt it was possible for some people to
exercise power over others. Authority serves to extend and maintain power and
demonstrates how people can come to accept domination as a normal and structured
aspect of society (Weber 1968).
Weber (1968) considered charisma to be a driving and creative force in social
mobilization, noting its ability to supersede traditional authority and established rules.
He observed that “the sole basis of charismatic authority is the recognition or acceptance
of the claims of the leader by the followers; while it is irrational in that it is not
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calculable or systematic, it can be revolutionary, breaking traditional rule and often
challenging legal authority” (Weber 1968, 241-242).
Leaders quite often are found to possess characteristics atypical (or at least
unusual) when compared to those of the general populace. Though each trait on its own
may not be so unique, leaders tend to possess a package of these special characteristics.
These elements typically relate to a gift for public speaking, charisma, verbal or written
eloquence. Ritzer (2008) asserted that "although Weber did not deny that a charismatic
leader may have outstanding characteristics, his sense of charisma was more dependent
on the group of disciples and the way that they define the charismatic leader….To put
Weber's position bluntly, if the disciples define a leader as charismatic, then he or she is
likely to be a charismatic leader irrespective of whether he or she actually possesses any
outstanding traits" (Ritzer 2008, 134). The realization of this phenomenon is often
demonstrated in cults. Cult leaders such as David Koresh, Marshall Applewhite and Jim
Jones arguably serve as practical examples of this self-fulfilling prophecy.
For Weber, traditional authority was a means by which inequality was created and
preserved, and--where no challenge to the authority of the traditional leader or group was
made-- the leader was likely to remain dominant (1968). Gingrich (1999) opined that:
“Marx would have argued that there were economic reasons for such dominance, but
Weber would be more likely to have claimed that commonly accepted customs or
religion constituted the underlying source of such authority. Status honor was accorded to
those with traditional forms of power and this status helped maintain dominance”
(Gingrich 1999). Weber (1968) also held that traditional authority blocked the
development of rational or legal forms of authority.
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Griffin (1991) observed that, in Weberian terms, populist ultra-nationalism
rejected the principles of absolutism and a pluralist representative government.
Therefore, it thus repudiated “both 'traditional' and 'legal/rational' forms of politics in
favor of prevalently 'charismatic' ones in which the cohesion and dynamics of
movements depend almost exclusively on the capacity of their leaders to inspire loyalty
and action” (Griffin 1991, 37). Chamorro-Premuzic (2012) argued that there were “only
three ways to influence others: force, reason or charm.” He wrote:
Whereas force and reason are rational (even when we are ‘forced’ to do
something, we obey for a good reason) charm is not. Charm is based on emotional
manipulation and, as such, it has the ability to trump any rational assessment and
bias our views. Charismatic leaders influence by charm rather than reason and
when they run out of charm they tend to revert to force. (Chamorro-Premuzic
2012)
When applied to euroscepticism, such perspective does ring true to a certain
extent, though the employment of force lends itself more to tyranny or dictatorship. The
vast majority of the mainstream eurosceptic groups have not crossed that line.
Weber's theory of charismatic leadership is particularly applicable to traditional
fascism, especially Hitler and Mussolini. Arendt (1966, 23) observed that Mussolini
“was probably the first party leader who consciously rejected a formal program and
replaced it with inspired leadership and action alone.” In 2013, Griffin asserted that:
Fascism was a charismatic form of politics that asserted the extraordinary
capabilities of the party and its leader. The main tool for the ‘Fascistization’
(conversion to Fascism) of the masses and the creation of the new Fascist man
was “not propaganda, censorship, education, or terror, or even the large fascist
social and military organizations; instead, the Fascists relied on the extensive use
of a ritualized, theatrical style of politics designed create a sense of a new
historical era that abolished the politics of the past. (Griffin 2013, 17)
From this viewpoint, social mobilization depended on a charismatic leader.
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However, Weber’s theory fails when one considers the decidedly uncharismatic
leadership of leaders such as Francisco Franco and the Falange and in many modern
Eurosceptic groups in which the leader may or may not be strong, it is ultimately the
group’s strength as a whole that gives it a much greater level of power and recognition.
His concept of status groups proves more enduring as it relates to traditional fascism,
particularly as it pertains to seeking control.
The classic theorists offer insight into fascism, certainly, with varying threads of
relevancy to euroscepticism and populism. Weber and Marx agreed that economic
factors are integral to understanding the social system, though Weber believed that
Marx’s reductionist concept of a single economic cause was too simplistic. In the case of
euroscepticism, Weber’s perspective is the more germane as euroscepticism is a product
various strains both within and apart from the economic realm. The concept of alienation
and anomie was a focal point in Marx, Weber and Durkheim’s work. The three theorists
shared the notion of man’s disconnection to society and the natural state. However, Marx
viewed this disconnect as a result of class struggle, Durkheim as a loss of touch to society
leading to a loss of values (anomie), and Weber as the iron cage created by the
bureaucracy. Though each perspective offers insight into the current political
environment in Europe, Weber’s idea of an iron cage that limits individual human
potential is perhaps most applicable when juxtaposed with the confines of the European
system in which Eurosceptic groups have found themselves imprisoned. Quite astutely,
Weber (1904/1930, 182) observed: "No one knows who will live in this cage in the
future, or whether at the end of tremendous development entirely new prophets will
arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals or, if neither.”
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Modern Social Movement Theory
It is important to recognize that though euroscepticism (and the proposed concept
of millennial eurosceptic populism) may be cut from the same cloth as traditional
fascism, its emergence and success cannot rest on classical theory in the vein of Marx,
Durkheim and Weber. Though classic theory can provide some explanation for its rise, it
is necessary to consider modern social movement theories that should ostensibly provide
greater explanatory power for fascism in the new millennium.
At this juncture, it bears noting that elements of the classic theories do offer
significant insight into many fascist, neo-fascist and neo-Nazi groups. Indeed, many
groups and/or causes have emerged and been successful based almost entirely on
charismatic leadership, such as Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara; labor leader and civil
rights activist Cesar Chavez; former South African President, anti-apartheid
revolutionary, and philanthropist Nelson Mandela; or former Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom Winston Churchill. Others can trace their rise to Durkheim's concept of
anomie and collective conscience. Still others can attribute their rise to the Marxian
concept of class struggle. Classic theory serves to offer a piecemeal explanation of the
emergence and success of euroscepticism, but fails to offer an over-arching explanation
applicable to the current state of political and social affairs. Noted Gentile (2000, 302):
“Modernity is an important generator of myths and political beliefs aimed at the
construction of the future. I believe that fascism, in its proper and essential traits as a
form of totalitarian modernism, belongs to a completely surpassed historical situation.”
With euroscepticism, the opportunity exists to explain a modern form of fascism
with one modern theory, at once neatly packaging its concept and explaining its need for
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separation and differentiation. Its emergence and rise superficially appears to be
connected with the political, economic and social environment. A deeper examination
into which aspects within the environment will lead to a common thread between the
groups reveals a significant relationship with opportunity and timing. In researching
euroscepticism and eurosceptic groups, the modern theories of resource mobilization,
political opportunity, protest cycles, and political process possess elements that seem
most pertinent.
Resource Mobilization Theory (RM). In 1978, Tilly described social movements
as “rational, purposeful and organized actions.” He asserted that these actions are
comprised of a calculation of costs and benefits, all of which are influenced by the
presence of resources. In turn, this creates a hospitable environment conducive to
collective action. As its name implies, RM emphasizes the importance of resources in
developing a successful social movement or political party. Resources include money,
labor, knowledge, solidarity, legitimacy, and internal/external support from the ‘power
elite.’ These ‘power elite,’ as described by Mills (1956, 286), are the decision-makers, the
highest echelons of society. They are not “men who are merely doing their duty. They
are the ones who determine their duty, as well as the duties of those beneath them. They
are not merely following orders: they give the orders. They are not merely ‘bureaucrats’:
they command bureaucracies” (Mills 1956, 286).
The key concept of RM is the ability of people with shared grievances to mobilize
sufficient resources to enable action. Cragun, et al. (2006) observed that this emphasis on
resources offered an explanation as to why some aggrieved individuals are able to
organize while others are not.
50

Resource mobilization theory was typified by Charles Tilly (1978) and, as Pirie
(2007) observed, runs contrary to popular belief which maintains collective action is
irrational and the result of a malfunction in the social system (see also Olson 1965). RM
is considered by many scholars to have developed as a counter to social strain theory.
Social strain theorists such as Smelser (1963), believed people joined a movement due to
social strain and dislocation resulting from rapid social change. Indeed, the development
of the resource mobilization perspective represented a major paradigm shift in traditional
social movement thought, a field which previously explained mass protest as an irrational
response to social turmoil (Smelser 1963).
Tilly (1978) postulated that “collective movements are simply an extension of
conventional political behaviour.” Hence, as noted by Pirie (2007, iii), it is stressed that
“social movements act in a more or less organized way to mobilise resources; it is also
possible to identify individuals with expertise and organising or campaigning skills –
what some call ‘movement entrepreneurs’ who play a key role in social movements.”
Though there are a variety of premises of the theory and its associated
components, there are a few integral assumptions. Snow and Benford [1988, 1992]
enumerated some of the key assumptions of the theory: first, they noted, “there will
always be grounds for protest in modern, politically pluralistic societies because there is
constant discontent (i.e., grievances or deprivation);” second, “actors are rational players
whom weigh the costs and benefits of participation;” third, “members are recruited
through networks-- commitment is maintained by building a collective identity and
continuing to nurture interpersonal relationships;” fourth, “movement organization is
contingent upon aggregating resources;” finally, “continuity of leadership and sufficient
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resources are essential elements of a social movement as each serves as the impetus to
transform discontent” (in Cragun et al. 2006, 232).
Pirie (2007) discussed the utility of the resource mobilization approach, noting
that it involves careful scrutiny of obstacles as well as incentives, networks, costs and
benefits, and in what way established political institutions react to the challenges created
by active social movements. Such analysis concurs with Olson’s concept of collective
action as logical; however, this idea also leads to some of the main arguments against the
theory.
McCarthy and Zald (1977) asserted that RM emphasized both societal support
and constraint of social movement phenomena. It also examined the variety of resources
needed for mobilization, connections to other groups, reliance on other movements for
support, and tactics authorities utilize to control movements. Piven and Cloward (1992,
302) observed that resource mobilization (RM) theorists “normalize the political impact
of collective protest, as if the processes of influence set in motion by collective protest
are no different than those set in motion by conventional political activities.” Other
critics point to the normalizing tendency of resource mobilization proponents when
rational behavior dictates it is not normal to join such movements. Piven and Cloward
(1992, 302) also noted that “protest is often treated by RM analysts as more organized
than it is, as if conventional modes of formal organization also typify the organizational
forms taken by protest.” Pirie (2007) concurred, observing that such an approach falls
victim to the contrasting criticism of the collective behavior approach: “is it not the case
that not all collective action is rational, or only rational - what is the part played by the
emotions in collective behavior?”
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A core tenet of RM posits that the availability of resources and the ability to
assemble and coordinate them for use (mobilization), influences the likelihood of social
movements forming and their outcomes. Two key elements of RM, state capacity and
state crisis, are also critical components of political process theory and political
opportunity structures. The theory is certainly relevant to euroscepticism and eurosceptic
groups, especially in terms of capability and ability to form and emerge. However, can
resource mobilization alone account for the emergence and relative success of millennial
eurosceptic populism? Access to and an ability to employ resources fail to account for the
mass appeal and growing recognition of millennial eurosceptic fascism.
Political Opportunity Structures. In 1973, Eisinger presented the first
conceptualized use of the political opportunity framework in his research on rioting
during the 1960s. Eisinger focused on the open versus closed nature of government and
its reception to public input. Meyer (2004, 128) noted that the “approach implicitly
assumed constant pressures across urban America and treated the most proximate
institutional arrangements as the key factors influencing the way political dissent
emerged.” In 1978, Tilly expanded on Eisinger’s work, offering a broader approach with
a wider range of variables (Meyer 2004). Asserted Meyer (2004, 126): “the key
recognition in the political opportunity perspective is that activists’ prospects for
advancing particular claims, mobilizing supporters, and affecting influence are contextdependent.”
Kitschelt (1986, 59) argued that “political opportunity structures function “as
‘filters’ between the mobilization of the movement and its choice of strategies and its
capacity to change the social environment… The crucial dimensions of these structures
53

are the ‘openness’ or ‘closedness’ of states to input from non-established actors and the
strength or weakness of their capacity to deliver the effective implementation of policies
once they are decided” (Kitschelt 1986, 59).
Political opportunity focuses on exogenous factors and the role played by the
strategies, protest tactics, and resources of non-elite groups for the sustained expansion of
social movements (Ayres 1996). Meyer (2004) observed that changes in demography,
repression, migration, and political economy contribute to a climate conducive to
organizing collective action, and issues would be more readily received by at least some
governmental institutions (Meyer 2004, 129).
Meyer and Minkoff (2004, 1457) observed that “the political opportunity
structure, applied to the world outside a social protest movement, has been the
appropriate focus of much recent theory and research on political protest.” They highlight
the basic premise that “exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization,
for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of
influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics
and policy” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1458). They note that longitudinal studies of
single movements focusing on a movement’s trajectory have examined temporal and
sectoral variations in political opportunity (Meyer and Minkoff 2004).
Tarrow posited that opportunities are associated not only with state crisis but also
with state capacity. Indeed, Tarrow (1998) contended that revolution occurs when the
state collapses. He believed that a state’s threshold for enduring challenges could
actually serve as "a double-edged sword," depriving challengers of the opportunity to
confront hostile authorities and to play upon the sympathies of the larger public audience
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(Tarrow 1998). In the last chapter of Contentious Europeans, Tarrow turned to early state
building to shed light on the political opportunity structure of a composite polity:
European state building was not simply a process of insistent national pressure
from above and ultimately futile resistance from local rulers and ordinary people.
Out of this triangular structure of relations among nationalizing prince, local
rulers, and ordinary people, a variety of alignments and conflict structures
developed among actors whose strategies and success varied with the context and
the strength of the pressure from their opponents. (Tarrow 2001, 246)
Hooghe (2011) noted that the concept of the political opportunity structure has
become a powerful and flexible tool for understanding transnational as well as national
contention. Marks and McAdam (1996, 1999) used a typology of political opportunities
to assess the European constraints on labor, regional, environmental, and anti-nuclear
movements, and Imig and Tarrow (2000) distinguished four types of European protest to
examine how the EU opportunity structure affected their incidence.
However compelling, the approach has its share of critics. Noted Meyer (2004,
126): “the diversity of understandings of political opportunity has led friendly critics to
warn, ‘the concept of political opportunity structure is ... in danger of becoming a sponge
that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” (Meyer 2004, 126).
Further, opportunity could account for the emergence of euroscepticism, but alone cannot
explain its success.
Protest Cycles
If cycles of protest are such watersheds of social and political change,
then why is it that... we have so few studies of such cycles? (Tarrow
1991, 11)
Frank and Fuentes (1992) keenly observed that Tarrow was able to answer his
own question when he noted that “because they are a moving target, they interweave with
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institutions,” and “there are problems with the way they have been conceived and
studied" (Tarrow 1991, 11). Indeed, many scholars now incorporate the concept of
protest cycles into Political Process Theory (PPT) as one of its components. Tarrow’s
political process approach traced a “cycle of protest,” by considering institutional politics
along with social protest and disorder (Tarrow 1989).
Tarrow (1989, 14) defined protest cycles as "a phase of heightened conflict
across the social system" with "intensified interactions between challengers and
authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution.” He stated in
1989 that “protest becomes a protest cycle when it is diffused to several sectors of the
population, is highly organized, and is widely used as the instrument to put forward
demands” (Tarrow 1989, 14-15).
Scholars refer to these protest cycles alternatively as cycles of contention and
protest waves (Karstedt-Henke 1980; Koopmans 2004; Tarrow 1995). Della Porta and
Tarrow (1986, 607-632) contended that although "cycles of protest and their implications
for change … do not coincide with economic cycles in any way, protest movements
appear to cluster in identifiable periods, and to be associated with substantial policy
innovation during such periods." Brand (1987, 23-42) also discussed the cyclical nature
of social movements, but concluded that "these movement waves coincide not with longterm economic cycles but with recurring waves of tendencies critical of modern
civilization." Paxton (2004, 220) concurred, noting that fascism’s momentum as it
advances toward power is a difficult trend to predict as “determining the appropriate
responses to fascist gains is not easy, since its cycle is not likely to repeat itself blindly.”
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Many scholars suggest that repertoires develop during times of societal crisis,
when innovation is a product of struggle (McAdam, Tilly, and Wood 2001; Tarrow 1995;
and Tilly 1995). Tarrow (1995, 286) ascribed such formation as a part of the cyclic
model in which ‘new forms of collective action develop within the experimental context
of cycles of protest.’ The most ‘successful, transferable tactics’ are then adopted as part
of a movement’s repertoire for use during what Tarrow referred to as the ‘quieter times’
(Tarrow 1995, 286). The 1970s serve as an example of Tarrow’s “quieter” times as they
encompass periods of time between war and protest, a relative lull between heightened
periods of activity.
In 1986, Tilly coined the phrase ‘repertoire of contention’ as a means to
describe “the whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different kinds on
different individuals or groups” (Tilly 1986, 4). Not only did he contend that a variety of
strategies and tactics were an inherent part of the repertoire’s available tools, he also
believed it served to limit the players, as “people generally turn to familiar routines and
innovate within them, even when in principle some unfamiliar form of action would serve
their interests much better” (Tilly 1986, 4).
Tarrow prophetically observed that there was a transnational opportunity
structure: “a triangular structure of relations among states, non-state actors, and
international institutions” (Tarrow 2005, 20). He contended that “states created
international practices, regimes and institutions to solve their collective action problems
and monitor one another’s behavior. But, once formed, new norms, identities and
interests developed around these venues, attracting the attention of groups of states, nonstate actors, and other international actors” (Tarrow 2005, 20). Further, there exists a
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class of entrepreneurs with identities and social networks that equip them to build bridges
between the local, national, and global. The entrepreneurs are considered ‘rooted
cosmopolitans.’ Observed Della Porta and Tarrow (2005, 238): “they are cosmopolitan
because they have ‘multiple belongings, flexible identities’ ...they are rooted because
national communities motivate them. Italian, French, or Canadian transnational activists
confront similar problems in nationally specific ways.”
Additionally, it was Meyer in 2004 whom observed that scholars who studied
political protest in the 1950s, generally had a tendency to write with fascism in mind (and
Nazism in particular). As such, when these scholars defined movements in their research,
it was with attributes like “dysfunctional, irrational and inherently undesirable” and
observations of the member who joined as “disconnected from intermediate associations
that would link them with more productive and less disruptive social pursuits” (Meyer
2004, 126).
In 2014, Almeida made the observation that cycles of protest occurred “when
multiple social movements or social groups engage in sustained protest, clustered in time
and span, across a wide geographical boundary.” He recognized that during cycles of
protest, multiple segments of society would participate and employ increasingly
confrontational tactics (Almeida 2014).
These observations are particularly relevant in considering the rise and success
of euroscepticism. Indeed, the concept of protest cycles as a whole superficially appears
to provide exceptional explanatory power for the rise and emergence of what will, in this
dissertation, be termed “Millennial Eurosceptic Populism” and the euroscepticism
embodying it. The idea of waves of activity in conjunction with a strategic seizure of
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opportunities goes far in explaining this turn of the century timeframe flurry of activity
from so many fascist groups.
Political Process Theory (PPT). The political process framework is a school of
thought that evolved to serve as an umbrella, incorporating the ideas of political
opportunity and protest among other concepts such as resource mobilization. It
originated in the works of Michael Lipsky (1970), who focused on the need to analyze a
system of characteristics open to specific groups at different times and places, and in
Peter Eisinger’s (1973) research which focused on formal institutional rules to explain the
frequency of a particular behavior (Meyer 2004). Meyer (2004, 128) noted that Tilly
(1978) built upon Eisinger’s (1973) work, ultimately laying the foundation for a more
comprehensive theory which suggested making national comparisons, recognizing
changes in opportunities over time, and arguing that opportunities would explain the
more general process of choosing tactics from a spectrum of possibilities within a
“repertoire of contention.”
There are, in fact, various conceptualizations and derivatives of PPT, each
consisting of different elements central to its argument. Scholars differ in their views of
which elements and aspects of structure are most relevant, leading to many schools of
thought within one framework. Among these variations are four developmental shifts
within the framework that have a solid scholarly following: Discursive Opportunities,
Specific Opportunities, Perceived Opportunities, and From Conditions to Mechanisms
(Giugni 2009).
Caren (2007) discussed three noteworthy precursors to PPT: first, Olson's (1965)
analysis of collection behavior turned old notions about the irrationality of protestors on
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its head, exploring the rational and deliberate choices that individuals made before
joining a movement. Second, McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) found that the availability
of resources to the movement, rather than the degree of oppression, served to explain the
variation in the level of mobilization. This resource mobilization perspective counted
more than just material goods as resources, including aspects such as organizational
strength and the presence of elite allies. Third, Piven and Cloward (1977) observed that
only during periods of crisis, such as the Depression, were movements able to extract
concessions from elites.
PPT developed from the concept of political opportunity but also incorporated the
idea of protest cycles, mobilizing structures, framing processes, and contentious
repertoires. Scholars of social revolutions and political scientists contributed their
insights to the framework including Tarrow with his concept of protest cycles (1989,
1991). It is often considered the standard explanation for social movement mobilization.
The basic premise of the theory is that exogenous factors enhance or inhibit
prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than
others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect
mainstream institutional politics and policy (Meyer 2004; and Meyer and Minkoff 2004).
Meyer and Whittier (1994, 279) observed that the approach defined a social movement as
“a sustained challenge to state policy that has observable origins, peaks, and declines in
activity, and uses a combination of conventional and non-conventional collective action”
(Meyer and Whittier 1994; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1991; Tilly 1978, 1983). PPT
focuses on the interaction between the various attributes to include organizational
structure, and the broader economic and political context (Caren 2007).
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In 1988, Tarrow distinguished five main variables of political opportunity: “the
degree of openness or closedness of the polity, stability or instability of political
alignments, presence or absence of allies or support groups, divisions within the elite and
its tolerance or intolerance of protest, and the policy-making capacity of the government”
(Tarrow 1988, 429). Despite the importance of each variable and that each is an
important aspect to the outcome of protest, Tarrow acknowledged that only the first was
genuinely structural; the others are all “essentially contingent” (1988).
Kitschelt (1986, 59) argued that political opportunity structures function “as
filters between the mobilization of the movement and its choice of strategies and its
capacity to change the social environment.” Indeed, in 2001, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly
(considered the primary developers of PPT) moved toward a more dynamic approach of
PPT with the study of contentious politics rather than general causal arguments. In place
of opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes, they spoke of
environmental, relational and cognitive mechanisms. The emphasis was now not so much
on asserting that all three are causally necessary, but on identifying the specific
mechanisms within each that can be found across multiple movements (McAdam, Tarrow
and Tilly 2001). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly offered as examples of such mechanisms:
brokerage- the linking of previously unconnected units; category formation- the creation
of identities; and certification- a target recognition of a movement, its tactics or its claims
(Caren 2012).
Tarrow (1998) asserted that many of the elements of PPT occur as a result of one
another or in concert with one another. As an example, contentious politics “is produced
when political opportunities broaden, when they demonstrate the potential for alliances,
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and when they reveal the opponents' vulnerability” (Tarrow 1998, 23). Tarrow declared
that:
Contention crystallizes into a social movement when it taps embedded
social networks and connective structures and produces collective action
frames and supportive identities able to sustain contention with powerful
opponents. By mounting familiar forms of contention, movements become
the focal points that transform external opportunities into resources.
Repertoires of contention, social networks, and cultural frames lower the
costs of bringing people into collective action, induce confidence that they
are not alone, and give broader meaning to their claims. Together, these
factors trigger the dynamic processes that have made social movements
historically central to political and social change. (Tarrow 1998, 23)

The concept of seizing opportunity is highly relevant in explaining millennial
eurosceptic populism. As a framework, PPT seems to hold significant explanatory power
though its elements and principles can be so broadly applied it appears more difficult to
prove a lack of correlation.
Political Process Model (PP)5. In 1982, McAdam presented a different version of
PPT in conjunction with his study on the development of black insurgency. McAdam
believed that changes in demography, repression, migration, and political economy
contributed to a climate in which African Americans could organize collective action,
and claims about racial justice would be more readily received by at least some
governmental institutions (Meyer 2004). McAdam’s model centered on three primary
factors: indigenous organizational strength, expanding political opportunities, and
cognitive liberation (McAdam 1982). He concluded that it was the unison of political
opportunities, a heightened sense of political efficacy, and the institutional strength of the

5

For purposes of clarification within this paper, PPT shall refer to Political Process
Theory. PP shall refer to McAdam’s Political Process model.
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black churches, black colleges, and Southern chapters of the NAACP that played a
central role in shaping the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982).
Duijvelaar (1996, 2.3) observed that McAdam “built upon the resource
mobilization approach by integrating macro-, meso- and micro-approaches.” In contrast
with RM, McAdam felt it vital to incorporate the indigenous organizational capabilities
of movements (Duijvelaar 1996, 2.3; Kitschelt 1986, 327; van Noort 1988, 37).
PP asserts that social movements are established as a result of shared ideas
(cognitive liberation) and develop as a result of the strength of its members and the
structure they have created (indigenous organizational strength). Continued development
is facilitated by a favorable political environment (expanding political opportunities)
(McAdam 1982). What set McAdam’s work apart from that of other PP and PPT scholars
was McAdam’s concentration on a longitudinal study focusing on the rise and decline of
a social movement. This was in contrast to the work of other scholars in the field who
chose to focus on movements as a snapshot in time, such as Kitschelt’s (1986) study of
antinuclear movements in four democracies- France, Sweden, the United States, and
West Germany; and Eisinger's (1973) study on the frequency of riots (Meyer 2004).
Though critics fault McAdam’s model as too reductionist, it is precisely its concise nature
which I believe lends the model to a more specific identification of explanatory elements.
A New Theory for a New Concept: Organizational/Opportunity Theory (OO).
Critics of PPT argue that scholars in the field utilize exceedingly broad definitions that
vary widely based on the historical context of the social movement. Another source of
criticism focuses on the emphasis scholars place on the role of social movements while
ignoring the cultural and social structures that allowed the movements to form.
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Organizational/Opportunity Theory (OO) is introduced as an alternate theory and will be
discussed in detail in Chapter IV, Phase Two.
OO offers a different theoretical explanation for the emergence and success of
social movement organizations and groups/political parties. The theory contains two
essential elements: opportunity borne from exogenous factors triggered by a large-scale
event, and internal organizational elements. It is built on the concept of organizational
aptitude and capacity existing concurrently with external opportunities, set into motion as
a result of a specific event. The proposition of a new model is not intended to imply fault
with PP, though this dissertation asserts that PP’s open ended framework does not serve
those researches seeking specific causal conditions. Indeed, this characteristic is both a
strength and a weakness of PP as it lends itself to wider application, allowing it to explain
many things. Noted Whelan (2008), many scholars have presented sound critiques of the
“overly structural bias and neglect of strategic analysis of much political process theory.”
OO is hypothesized to offer significant explanatory power in the success of MEPGs.
The next chapter will discuss in detail the concept of millennial eurosceptic
populism. It will be the first of two chapters to collect data. Chapter IV will begin
theoretical testing of the efficacy of the PP and OO models.
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CHAPTER III
FASCISM REVISITED OR EUROSCEPTIC POPULISM?
In 1995, Tarrow indicated that two scholarly specialisms— European
integration and the study of social movements— needed to come together to help
understand whether, and how, a European conflict structure is emerging (Tarrow 1995).
This prescient comment captures the essence of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism-- the
idea behind Eurosceptic populism as fascism in the 21st century. As discussed in Chapter
II, the intersection of fascism and euroscepticism has led to significant changes in Europe
that, in turn, have led to a surge in what were once only moderately successful fringe
groups.
This chapter will consist of two sections. The first section will serve to define
millennial eurosceptic populism and establish the necessary criteria for a party’s
inclusion and classification as a MEPG. This process will include examination of the
characteristics of fascism and its two 20th century iterations: neo-fascism and neoNazism. Key aspects of each of these groups will be identified, as will the primary
aspects of the proposed category of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism. Definitions of each
group will be established based on existing literature. As will be discussed, the lack of
research into European integration, fascism, and social movements as related
phenomenon leaves a void in the literature, thus opening the door for study into the
proposed concept of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism which bridges this gap.
Section Two will utilize these definitions of fascism, neo-fascism, neo-Nazism,
and Millennial Eurosceptic Populism (as established in section one) to categorize a
selection of modern-day groups. Based on the criteria developed in Section One, which
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will distinguish between categories, a determination will be made as to whether a group
meets the necessary criteria and qualifies as a MEPG. The following groups were chosen
from active fringe groups in Europe, and will be researched and analyzed utilizing a set
of variable requirements:
•

Alternative for Germany-AfD (Germany)

•

Ataka (Bulgaria)

•

Congress of the New Right (Poland)

•

Danish People’s Party –DF (Denmark)

•

Dutch Freedom Party-PVV (Netherlands)

•

EDL (England)

•

Fascism and Freedom Movement-National Socialist Party (Italy)

•

Finns Party aka Perussuomalaiset (formerly True Finns)-PS (Finland)

•

Freedom Party of Austria -FPO

•

Front National (France)

•

Golden Dawn (Greece)

•

Jobbik (Hungary)

•

LAOS (Greece)

•

Lega Nord (Italy)

•

National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)

•

Party of the Swedes (Sweden)

•

Pegida (Germany)

•

Podemos (Spain)

•

Republican People's Party -Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP (Turkey)
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•

Right Sector (Ukraine)

•

Slovak National Party –SNS (Slovakia)

•

Svoboda (Ukraine)

•

Swedish Democrats (Sweden)

•

Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland)

•

SYRIZA (Greece)

•

UKIP (England)

•

Vlaams Belang aka Flemish Interest (Belgium)
Following the research and classification process, the groups meeting the

requirements of a MEPG will then be utilized for theoretical testing in Chapter IV. To
begin this process, let us first build the case for Millennial Eurosceptic Fascism.
Section One: The Case for Millennial Eurosceptic Populism
As discussed in Chapter II, fascism and euroscepticism have been, and continue to
be, studied as separate ideologies. As Vasilopoulou (2011, 224) observed: “The issue of
radical right EU attitudes remains under-researched in terms of content as well as
underlying argumentation.” This dissertation argues that merging the two fields allows
for more foundationally sound study and improved research in causal and explanatory
factors. Renton asserted in 1999, that “any model of fascism must ask which factors
within the societies in which fascism emerged enabled the fascist parties to grow… The
success of Le Pen… and Haider… suggests that fascism is again a threat” (Renton 1999,
4). Not only does this dissertation concur with his assessment, it contends that fascism
has evolved into a modern idiom, enveloping and embodying the concept of
euroscepticism.
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A review of voting trends and media mentions confirm the increase in popularity
of far-right and Eurosceptic groups. Google Trends data visualization (Figure 3.1) shows
a steady increase in interest of far-right groups over time from 2005 through 2015
(Ramswell 2015). The info graphic (Figure 3.2) from Europe by Numbers (2014) shows
the significant percentage of votes for strong right-wing parties in national elections from
2008-2013. As a case example, Stockemer (2012) graphed a comparison of citizen group
support for the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in the years 1995 and 2007 (Figure 3.3). The
increase in support more than doubled in three of the four categories, with the fourth just
slightly less than double. Further, Udland’s 2015 research (Figure 3.4) on the right-wing
highlighted the “real tail risk” of the increasing right-wing political power.

Figure 3.1. Interest in Far Right Over Time. The graph shows the increase in interest in
Far Right groups over time.
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Figure 3.2. % of Votes in National Elections. The percentage of votes for strong rightwing parties in national elections from 2008-2013 is demonstrated. Source: Europe By
Numbers 2014.

Figure 3.3. SVP’s Mobilization of its base. This graph compares citizen group support
for the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in the years 1995 and 2007. Source: Stockemer 2012.
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Figure 3.4. Right-wing populism: the real tail risk in Europe. This bar graph indicates the
“real tail risk” of the increasing right-wing political power. Source: Udland 2015.
In 2013, Berntson noted that: “the scope of fascist studies expands as new insights
emerge, as more disciplines become involved, as new methods of inquiry are developed,
and as new sources of data become available, such as archives in Russia and Eastern
Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union.” He also acknowledged “many scholars are
preoccupied by the possibility of fascism’s return in today’s extreme right in Europe”
(Berntson 2013).
Such preoccupation neatly meshes with Griffin’s frequently discussed “new
consensus” of fascism, which he argues emerged in the 1990s and “conceptualizes
fascism as a revolutionary form of ultra-nationalism that attempts to realize the myth of
the regenerated nation” (Griffin 2012, 1; 1998; 2003). Scholars in the field, including
Payne and Aristotle Kallis, concurred with Griffin’s theory, and Pinto (2011) observed
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that the “ ‘new consensus’ of the 1990s…has only been extended and/or modified in
specific ways and certainly not replaced.” By 2012, Griffin himself acknowledged the
growth of the new consensus of fascism, stating he “would go even further and argue that
by 2010 it has actually emerged and seems to have started spreading ‘contagiously’ to
Marxist academic circles” (Griffin 2012, 13).
In 1991, Griffin observed that ideological factors combined with historical
conditions often make fascism seem a viable choice. He contended that these factors,
coupled with ultra-nationalism and the political space for extra movements, further
opened the door for fascism to emerge (Griffin 1991). The new millennium was host to
these factors, making it quite hospitable to the formation of new parties. Of note, Griffin
(1991) posited that a major theme of contemporary fascism was a “Europe of Nations.”
Whether consciously or ironically, the European parliament political group comprised of
eurosceptics, co-chaired by Front National leader Marine Le Pen and Marcel de Graaff of
the Netherland’s Partij voor de Vrijheid, was christened the Europe of Nations and
Freedom Group when it launched on June 15, 2015.
Can one definitively assert that the groups emerging and finding success in
Europe today are the same as those whom have existed for centuries, merely sporting
new names or new leadership? Definitely not. There is much evidence to support that
these groups are an anomaly, a new generation of political ideology and methodology.
This study focuses on the contention that the groups rising and gaining power today are at
once unique and reborn from strains of traditional fascism. Millennial eurosceptic
populism is the result of the turn of the 21st century’s convergence of political
opportunity, populism, nationalism, and euroscepticism.
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En route to establishing a definition of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, it is
important to review and discuss traditional fascism and its derivatives. The reasons for
this are twofold: it is necessary to note similarities and potential differences between
Millennial Eurosceptic Populism and its predecessors; and it will serve as a foundation
for and springboard into the rationale for creating this new category of fascism.
Deconstructing Fascism and its Various Forms
Traditional Fascism. The term “fascism” is from the Latin ‘fascis’ and Italian
‘fascio,’ meaning bundle or political group. The term has become exceptionally difficult
to define as a result of the meanings ascribed to it and their evolution. Chapter II
discussed the difficulty scholars have in isolating a single definition of fascism as a result
of these connotations and associated historical influence. In 1996, Eatwell logically
argued that fascism “must be seen primarily as a series of ideas” (Renton 1999, 19).
There was, he argued, “no other way to interpret fascism.” Eatwell believed that “fascism
could not be viewed as a form of regime; moreover, fascism cannot be defined as a
species of political movement, because such movements ‘exhibit time and context
specific features’ which draw attention away from the decisive core of fascist ideas”
(Renton 1999, 19). Using the argument that fascism was primarily an ideology, Eatwell
(1996, 303-319) contended that fascism was best defined in these terms: “Generic
fascism, transcending place and time, is identified as ‘an ideology that strives to forge
social rebirth based on a holistic‐national radical Third Way, though in practice fascism
has tended to stress style, especially action and the charismatic leader, more than detailed
programme, and to engage in a Manichaean demonisation of its enemies.” Eatwell’s
description of an ideology that strived to forge ‘rebirth’ is particularly apropos with
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respect to euroscepticism, especially when juxtaposed with Griffin’s (1991) concept of
‘palingenetic ultranationalism’ (also a rebirth but on a national level) and his observation
that “fascism emerged when a nation perceived itself to be in crisis.” Indeed,
Vasilopolou and Halikiopoulou (2015) discussed this concept as it related to the far-right
Greek group “Golden Dawn:”
The success of Golden Dawn must be understood precisely within this
context: as dependent on the extent to which it was able to propose
plausible solutions to the three sets of crises – economic, political and
ideological – that befell Greece and culminated in an overall crisis of
democracy to which Golden Dawn offered a nationalist solution. This can
be shown by drawing upon the theories of fascism developed by authors
such as Michael Mann and Roger Griffin.
We argue that the nature of the Greek crisis and the fact that its economic,
political and ideological dimensions challenged the Greek nation-state at
its core, opened up a political opportunity for Golden Dawn to present
itself as the saviour of the nation and defender of the national mission.
Like fascist movements of the past, Golden Dawn puts forward “a
‘palingenetic myth’ of populist ultra-nationalism, seeking a nation rising
Phoenix-like from the ashes of an old decadent social order.”
(Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015)
Eatwell and Griffin’s explanations of fascism highlight its stark parallels to
euroscepticism. Further, the formation of movements with strategies and goals (Kitsikis
1988; Payne 1980), and the idea of a new generation of intellectuals rising against liberal
society (Sternhell 1995), give further pause. Noted Leonard, et al (2013):
The old explanation for euroscepticism was the alleged existence of a
democratic deficit within the EU. Decisions, critics said, were taken by
unaccountable institutions rather than elected national governments. But
the current crisis is born not of a clash between Brussels and the member
states but a clash between the democratic wills of citizens in northern and
southern Europe - the so-called centre and periphery. And both sides are
now using EU institutions to advance their interests. (Leonard, et al. 2013,
1)
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The similarities between fascism and euroscepticism cannot be ignored: nations in social
and political turmoil, a rebirth of nationalism, group formation and rise, and a new
generation in a state of revolt.
With such sweeping concepts and identifiers, it is easy to see how selecting one
overarching yet concise definition of fascism has proven problematic. Efforts to develop
a more succinct definition, therefore, have tended to focus on commonalities. For the
purposes of this study and, in part as determined by the definition of neo-fascism
discussed in the next section, fascism (and, more specifically, fascist groups) will simply
be defined as: any group exhibiting nationalism and unity by way of a desire to
transform, cleanse, and expand its personal community, AND that was under an
authoritarian leadership willing to use force and viewing itself as superior to others,
AND that existed pre-World War II.
Neo-Fascism. During the 20th century, fascism developed subcategories that
contained its central tenets, yet established identities of their own.

The subgroups ‘neo-

fascist’ and ‘neo-Nazi’ are the two most widely-accepted offshoots of their ideological
progenitor. Unfortunately, the difficulty in isolating a universally-accepted definition of
fascism has not been limited to the term ‘fascism.’ Selection of a unifying definition for
neo-fascism is only slightly less problematic, thanks in part to the parameters created by
selecting a date or timeframe as a dividing line.
The term neo-fascism has become quite generic, embracing many groups with
many different mantras. In its simplest form, and perhaps most widely accepted, neofascism is defined as a fascist group existing post-World War II. The Oxford Handbook
of Fascism (2009) noted that the term neo-fascism defines primarily “those political and
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ideological groups and parties that operated after 1945, especially in Europe, and which
were directly inspired by the experience of the inter-war fascist and Nazi regimes in
Germany, Italy, and other European countries.” Further, many such groups “held radical
and uncompromising views which emphasized the revolutionary nature of fascism rather
than its more ‘reassuring’ nationalist or statist version” (Oxford Handbook of Fascism
2009).
The Encyclopedia Britannica (2009) defined neo-fascism as “a political
philosophy and movement that arose in Europe in the decades following World War II,
advocating extreme nationalism, opposing liberal individualism, attacking Marxist and
other left-wing ideologies, indulging in racist and xenophobic scapegoating, and
promoting populist right-wing economic programs.” It was noted that the National Front
in France and the Liberal-Democratic Party in Russia were often cited as examples of
neo-fascist groups (Encyclopedia Britannica 2009).
The difficulty in defining neo-fascism lies in the inclusion or exclusion of the
hereto defined fascist groups, now whom must be further delineated based on ideology.
This characteristic already serves as a point of division amongst scholars of fascism,
some of whom contend fascism is not an ideology but a form of governance or a way of
life. In fact, noted Italian fascist theorist Giovanni Gentile believed that fascism was best
viewed as “authoritarian democracy.”
However, for purposes of this research, ideology will serve as the primary
qualifier distinguishing between neo-fascism and neo-Nazism—in itself a distinction
many scholars do not make (neo-Nazism will be discussed in the next section).
Succinctly, Griffin (1991) referred to neo-fascism as post-war fascism and applied the
75

term to parties inspired by traditional fascism. Accordingly, for this research, neofascism shall be defined as fascism (as defined above) occurring post World War II.
Nazism, in its purest form as characterized by Adolf Hitler, is considered part of
traditional fascism. However, as a post- WWII incarnation, there is a distinction between
fascism and Nazism. A group determined to meet the characteristics of neo-Nazism, as
determined in the next section, shall be included in that category rather than in neofascism. It is in this vein that a distinction between neo-fascism and millennial
eurosceptic populism will also be constructed.
Neo-Nazism. Griffin (1998) argued that fascism and Nazism were different from
one another though at the same time linked through a “common mythic core.” He
asserted that since 1945, many racially-motivated fascist organizations have been
inspired by Nazism and, further, that these new Nazi movements were referred to as neoNazis because they used Adolf Hitler’s Nazi movement as inspiration but modified
original Nazi ideological doctrine (Griffin 1991). Indeed, neo-Nazism could be
considered a sub-group of neo-fascism. This research distinguishes between neo-fascism
and neo-Nazism. Inclusion in the neo-Nazi category of fascism for this paper will require
a Nazi ideology/refrain with a stated tenet of ‘scientific racism’ and/or anti-Semitism.
Further, scientific racism will serve as a specific qualifier for this category. Garrod
(2006, 54) defined scientific racism as “a scientific tradition in which biology is used not
only to prove the existence of race, but also, to maintain existing social hierarchies.”
Explained Garrod (2006):
While science has the reputation of objectively testing theories using the
scientific method, scientific racism is the exact opposite. It seeks to create
definitions of race and culture based on opinion and extremely
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questionable evidence: ‘Supposed scientific evidence was marshalled, to
establish both the existence of different racial types, and their depiction
within a hierarchy of superior and inferior, where the Black was regarded
as inferior.’ (Garrod 2006, 55, citing Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992)
The parameters for neo-Nazism are, therefore, fairly straightforward. Neo-Nazi
groups shall henceforth be defined as groups adhering to the Nazi ideology, scientific
racism/anti-Semitism, AND existing post World War II.
Defining Millennial Eurosceptic Populism
The need to view this turn-of-the-century rise in extremist nationalism through a
different lens has three vocal proponents: experts who have clearly acknowledged a need
for combined study; the manifestation of political parties who have altered the political
atmosphere in Europe; and the undeniable similarities between euroscepticism and
fascism. This dissertation asserts that the proposed concept of millennial eurosceptic
populism serves as an effective response to this need.
The problems associated with creating a universally accepted definition can often
be found in the elements being used as descriptors, as the elements themselves are often
challenged by thinkers embracing different perspectives. Table 3.1 lists the defining
elements of fascism, neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, as well as for Millennial Eurosceptic
Fascism.
With any group, consideration of cultural, environmental and historical conditions
is important, but so are goals, methods and long-term strategic plans. Cunningham
(2012) acknowledged that the conceptualized categories and definitions of fascism prove
problematic. He asserted that “dismissing the need for a shared conceptual definition of
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fascism risks the overextension of the term to any national movement bearing vague
similarities” (Cunningham 2012, 379).
Also of import is recognizing that Millennial Eurosceptic Populism is a modern
view of fascism, fascism in the new millennium, a new perspective on a centuries-old
concept. One of the challenges in retaining the term “fascism” is overcoming its
pejorative reputation. BBC (10/20/09) reported that though it has been “more than six
decades since the end of World War II and the fall of Nazi Germany, those events remain
the prism through which the word ‘fascism’ is still viewed.” When describing the
difficulty faced in overcoming this negative connotation, Griffin (2012) eloquently
acknowledged that:
…many representatives of an older generation of scholars would doubtless
persist in seeing fascism as essentially nihilistic, barbaric, anti-modern,
and lacking an ideology apart from the cult of action, violence and
destruction, or, if they were Marxists, as basically (petty) bourgeois or
capitalist reaction. But I argued that within the emerging consensus it was
increasingly accepted that “like conservatism, anarchism, liberalism, or
ecologism, fascism is definable as an ideology with a specific ‘positive’,
utopian vision of the ideal state of society, a vision which can assume a
number of distinctive forms determined by local circumstances while
retaining a core matrix of axioms.” (Griffin 2012, 6)

Indeed, the concept of millennial eurosceptic populism is that it is at once the same as
and different from classic fascism; it retains symbolic strands of its predecessor while
exhibiting a pivotal distinction: widespread acclaim. In fact, Oxford English Dictionary
now offers several definitions of fascism including: “(loosely) a person of right-wing
authoritarian views” and “a person who advocates a particular viewpoint or practice in a
manner perceived as intolerant or authoritarian” (BBC 10/20/09).
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It is important to carefully delineate the “who, what, when, where, and why” en
route to establishing a complete profile and definition of Millennial Eurosceptic Fascism.
Part of this process is straightforward: the “when” is identified by virtue of the term
“millennial” (though a more specific date will be discussed during examination of
hypotheses); similarly, “where” (Europe) evolves from the title of this dissertation and
the inclusion of the term “Eurosceptic.” The “how” will be examined in detail in the
methodology section. Before taking a look at the “who” and the “what,” let us turn first to
the “why.”
The Why. Why is it important to study Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, and why
do MEPGs warrant a separate category of fascism? Primarily because the current and
potential effects are so significant. Evidence of the need to examine Millennial
Eurosceptic Populism became readily apparent in the aftermath of the 2014 European
elections, if not before. The election results lend themselves to an excellent starting point
in discussing the significance of these groups.
As discussed in Chapter II, the 2014 European Parliamentary elections resulted in
an influx of far-right and far-left eurosceptic and euroreject parties—a group which now
forms an estimated 27 percent of the assembly. The United Kingdom Independence
Party (UKIP) was the clear victor, marking the first time since 1906 that a party other
than the Labour Party or Conservative Party won the general election. Further, according
to Reuters (Osborn and Faulconbridge 2014) it was also “the first time a party other than
the Labour and Conservatives won the majority of seats in a national election since the
December 1910 general election.”
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In France, the far-right National Front party won a historic victory with 25% of
the French vote (compared to the 6% it garnered in 2009), besting more moderate pro-EU
parties whom had dominated the elections five prior (CNN 2014). In Greece, the rise of
the Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) has drawn many comparisons to the rise of the Nazi
regime in the 1930s (Fallon 2014). Observed Mansheim (2014): “Swept into popularity
by the current lack of faith in the EU among Greeks, the aggressively neo-fascist party is
now the third most popular political party in Greece, and is making inroads on its
mainstream opponents.” In May 2015, “the party received seven percent of the vote, and
6.9 percent in June, granting it 21 and 18 parliamentary seats out of 300 respectively;
they retained their support in the 2014 European Parliament Elections receiving 9.38 per
cent of the vote and hold the third greatest number of seats (17) in Greek Parliament”
(Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015).
Further, there are concerns about increased connections to Russia. Observed
Kreko (2014):
Russia supports increasingly popular anti-EU parties on the far left and far
right, hoping to have pro-Russian caucuses in the next Parliament to help
articulate Russian views, and to have an impact on decision-making
processes… Fifteen out of 25 major European far-right parties are vocal
and open supporters of Russia and Russian interests, while seven can be
classified as ‘open’ and only three as hostile towards Russia. (Kreko 2014)
Perhaps more alarming: “The Hungarian Jobbik party has supported Russia since it was
elected to the European Parliament in 2009. The party’s 2010 election program described
the establishment and maintenance of good relations with ‘an increasingly influential
Russia’ as vitally important” (Kreko 2014).
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Halikiopoulou, et al. (2012), rightfully observing that research has led scholars to
stress the compatibility of many aspects of nationalism with right-wing radicalism
(Breuilly 1993; Freeden 1998; Hechter 2000; and Kedourie 1960). Walsh (2014)
contended that “the vote for anti-EU populists and socialists, even for right-wing
extremists and assorted oddballs, is a rejection of high-handed governance that pays little
attention to people’s needs and desires.” In 2014, Gifford added, “populist eurosceptic
mobilizations have become an established response to the underlying crises of legitimacy
faced by both British mainstream parties. These have occurred when the weaknesses in
the British governing position on Europe has been particularly exposed, such as the
struggle for membership on acceptable terms and the failure of Conservative
governments to halt or influence the drive for Economic and Monetary Union.”
Jim Wolfreys, Senior Lecturer for contemporary French politics at King's College
London, used the example of the Front National to explain how far right parties manage
to be accepted by the electorate: "The founders of [the Front National] consciously
attempted to mask direct affiliation of fascism behind a language and an appearance that
courted respectability," (Schwab and Joyner 2015). The authors contended that “these
movements benefited from the dissatisfaction with mainstream parties, but they were also
helped by the fact that the right-wing parties of today are very different to those of
previous decades” (Schwab and Joyner 2015).
As Renton (1999, 43) observed: “fascism remains a force in European society,
and a theory of it is needed which grasps the processes and dynamism of fascism as it
continues to exist.” The impact of millennial eurosceptic populism is obvious.
Euroscepticism has made an ineradicable mark on society and in the European political
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landscape. With agendas and ideologies echoing the sentiments of fascism, and paths
that mimic the rise of the most notorious fascist groups in history, it is incumbent on
academics to explore the issue in unconventional and, perhaps, even new ways.
The Who and the What. In 1997, Lacqueur asserted that if fascist regimes were to
come into power in the future, they would not take their earlier form. Indeed, many
scholars left room for future delineation of fascism with expansive typologies and
consensus definitions. Millennial Eurosceptic Populism has been constructed as a
modern-day form of fascism. Its distinction from other types of fascism lies within the
unique elements that have allowed for its rise, acceptance and relative success among the
plethora of social movements throughout Europe. Acceptance of this concept serves to
eliminate Millennial Eurosceptic Populism from established categories, but, in what
ways? What aspects of these groups have allowed them to stand on their own?
Euroscepticism is held to be the primary characteristic of Millennial Eurosceptic
Populism, though the term itself has been met with an array of definitions. Many scholars
whom study euroscepticism have focused their research on categorizing the degree of
euroscepticism, developing typologies based on a variety of factors. It is my opinion that,
for purposes of classification and consideration as a millennial Eurosceptic populist
group, no further division is necessary. It was Paxton who, in 2005, pointed to the “latent
(but misleading) Darwinian convention that if we study the origins of something, we
grasp its inner blueprint” (2005, 53). This observation concurs with one of the key
premises of this dissertation: a need for a macro-level study into a theoretical explanation
for euroscepticism. Indeed, the aspects of euroscepticism utilized to further deconstruct
parties, such as exit strategy, primary source of euroscepticism and goal, do not take
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away from the core tenet held by them all- dissatisfaction with the EU and a desire to
change it. In fact, the degrees of euroscepticism presented by various scholars (hard,
soft, reject, phobe, enthusiast) are found comparable to factions within existing parties.
For example, in the United States, members of the Republican Party hold often very
divisive views depending on their stance as a conservative, moderate or libertarian.
Further, these positions are also often subdivided based on foundational leanings, leading
one to identify him/herself as, for example, a fiscally conservative or socially
conservative Republican. The bottom line remains- each person still identifies with and
considers himself a Republican. In fact, recent analyses of the Conservative party in
England have “identified a spectrum of Eurosceptic views ranging from outright
withdrawal to those who accept the status quo but object to further integration” (Lynch
and Whitaker 2012).
For purposes of this research, euroscepticism will be defined as Taggart (1998,
366) described it: “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating
outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.” Utilizing
this definition of euroscepticism as a foundation, this dissertation argues that Eurosceptic
groups are a social and political variant making an indelible mark on European society
analogous to fascism.
Several other traits are intrinsic to Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, such as
nationalism, populism, reformist, main-stream appeal, popular agendas, and right-wing.
This brings us to a decision point. In Europe and European Parliament, there are a
number of left-wing Eurosceptic parties who have gained notoriety, including Greece’s
SYRIZA. In fact, EP contains Eurosceptic groups from across the political spectrum,
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including the “European Conservatives and Reformists group, typified by center-right
parties such as the British Conservative Party (considered to be a soft Eurosceptic group),
and the European United Left–Nordic Green Left which is an alliance of left-wing
parties” (Szczerbiak 2008, 418). This gives pause, as the original conception of
Millennial Eurosceptic Populism was right-wing Eurosceptic groups.
In an effort to remain true to the original and successive forms of fascism, I
initially believed it important to continue the tradition of fascism as a purely right-wing
phenomenon. However, millennial eurosceptic populism is a new, modern interpretation
of a century-old concept. Deliberation led to a review of Mussolini’s intentions and
objectives as founder of the fascist party. In 1919, Mussolini famously described fascism
as “a movement that would strike against the backwardness of the right and the
destructiveness of the left," yet it is these words spoken in 1922 which served as the
tipping point in the debate:
Fascism, sitting on the right, could also have sat on the mountain of the
center ... These words in any case do not have a fixed and unchanged
meaning: they do have a variable subject to location, time and spirit. We
don't give a damn about these empty terminologies and we despise those
who are terrorized by these words. (Mussolini 1922)
Therefore, the decision was made to not automatically disqualify left-wing groups from a
Millennial Eurosceptic Populism classification.
In an effort to better quantify Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, it is necessary to
include disqualifiers-- traits which, if present, will serve to eliminate a group from
inclusion. Disqualifiers that serve to remove a group from the category of millennial
eurosceptic populism are: stated platform of anti-Semitism or scientific racism (as
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explained above), and violent acts/terrorism with the intention of forcing compliance or
surrender.
Utilizing the characteristics and disqualifiers described above, we can now define
millennial eurosceptic populism based on certain necessary criteria. In 2003, Griffin
wrote: “I believe any new theory of fascism should meet the challenge of being
summarized in a sentence if it is not to be a work of obfuscation rather than
clarification… the most recent offerings from Laqueur, Renton, and Gregor all failed this
test” (Griffin 2003, 8). In crafting a definition of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, I
believed it important to adhere to Griffin’s conception of a concise yet accurate
description. Therefore, the following definition was established:
A Millennial Eurosceptic Populist Group will be defined as a non-violent, nonanti-Semitic/racist/homophobic group, formed after the Cold War, exhibiting
euroscepticism, embracing populism, and promoting a nationalist/reformist agenda.
Section Two: Qualification as a Millennial Eurosceptic Populist Group
As discussed in Section One, Millennial Eurosceptic Populism is defined as
fascism occurring post-Cold War era, non-violent, non-anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic,
right or left-wing, Eurosceptic, with a nationalist, reformist agenda. This section
analyzes the previously identified potential parties and groups to determine whether they
meet the criteria necessary for inclusion in the category of Millennial Eurosceptic
Populism. Six variables have been determined based on the definition of Millennial
Populist Euroscepticism. Each potential group/party will be analyzed to determine
which, if any, of the six variables are applicable to that group. Groups that are identified
as meeting the qualifications of all six variables shall be determined to have met the
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requirements necessary for classification as a MEPG. By default, groups not meeting the
criteria for Millennial Eurosceptic Populism will then be categorized as neo-Nazi or neofascist. The variables for Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, their descriptions, and how a
qualification will be determined are outlined below:
Variables
A. Occurring post-Cold War. Identified as: formation or restructured ideology
occurring 1990 or later;
How determined: Review of group’s history, vision/ideology, official
website(s)/publications
B. Non-Violent. Identified as: strategy and ideology that does not promote
violence or terroristic acts;
How determined: Review of group’s mission, vision, official
website(s)/publications, media reports; non-promotion of nor participation in violence by
leadership or its members
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Identified as: mission and vision do not
specifically contain anti-Semitic, racist or homophobic ideology;
How determined: Review of group’s mission, vision, official
website(s)/publications, media/news reports
D. Right-wing/left-wing. Identified as: a group falling anywhere along the
political spectrum;
How determined: Political identification as stated on official
website(s)/publications or in media
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E. Eurosceptic. Identified as: contingent or qualified and outright and unqualified
opposition to the process of European integration, austerity measures, or the EU and
European project;
How determined: Review of group’s mission, vision, official
website(s)/publications, media/news reports
F. Nationalist/Reformist. Identified as: belief that the interests of the nation-state
are of primary importance; a desire to reform the policies of the EU;
How determined: Review of group’s mission, vision, official
website(s)/publications, media/news reports

At this juncture, I believe it important to provide a few points of clarification.
People have a tendency to misuse the word racist, particularly when discussing
Islamophobia, defined by Oxford English Dictionary as “the dislike of or prejudice
against Islam or Muslims, especially as a political force.” The media perpetuates this
misuse which has, in many cases, led to a party’s erroneous labelling as “racist.” The
Oxford English Dictionary defines race as “each of the major divisions of humankind,
having distinct physical characteristics,” and racism as “prejudice, discrimination, or
antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the belief that one’s
own race is superior.”
Some of the groups researched were found to promote anti-Islam/anti-Muslim
platforms. These groups were almost always referred to as “racist.” As delineated above
and underscored by The Religion of Peace (2015), “Race is the arbitrary classification of
individuals according to physical traits that presumably have a genetic pattern. Muslims
87

are not a race, as is often implied but if they were then it would make Islam the world's
most dangerous race-based supremacist ideology.”
Similarly, some groups studied are accused of xenophobia, which is also used
interchangeably with the term racism. According to Oxford English Dictionary,
xenophobia is the “intense or irrational dislike or fear of people from other countries.”
Again, xenophobia is different from racism. A person whom is xenophobic could very
well dislike someone of their own race simply because they are from a different country.
Xenophobia is a location-based fear, not a race-based fear.
Therefore, this dissertation will distinguish between racism, xenophobia and
religious prejudice. For Variable C, religious prejudice and xenophobia (absent racism),
will not disqualify a group from meeting the required conditions.
Analysis and Qualification
Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland - AfD), Germany
According to the BBC (Hill, 2015), “AfD was founded in 2013 by Bernd Lucke,
Alexander Gauland and Konrad Adam to oppose German-backed bailouts for poorer
Southern European countries… The party became the first anti-euro party to win seats in
a German regional parliament, receiving almost 10% of the vote in the eastern German
state of Saxony in 2014, and has gone on to win seats in other states” (Hill, 2015). “The
party had seven MEPs elected in the 2014 European elections and is currently part of the
European Conservatives and Reformists Group” (Hill, 2015).
Frauke Petry replaced Lucke as party leader following his departure in early July
2015, arguing that AfD had become increasingly xenophobic (Hill, 2015). The party has
been called the “Party of Professors” (due to the high percentage of members holding
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doctorates- including founder Lucke) and the German Tea Party by various media
including the BBC, Deutsche Welle, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, and
UK’s Guardian.
A. Occurring post-Cold War. AfD was founded in 2013. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. AfD carefully screens its membership for evidence of rightwing extremism or radicalism. The group is not considered violent nor a perpetrator of
violence. Rather, the party has been the target of several acts of violence by others.
Reported Spiegel (Heine, 2013): “AfD campaigners have received threatening phone
calls, been subjected to verbal abuse and -- in some cases -- physical attacks… Though
the AfD has complained of such incidents in a number of cities including Berlin, Lübeck
and Nuremberg, the party points to a particularly brutal confrontation at a campaign stand
in the eastern town of Göttingen [in 2013].” Party leader Lucke has warned against the
opposition’s tendency toward attribution error: “A violent crime committed by two
extremists should not be attributed to an entire religious community, the majority of
which consists of peaceful, respectable people,” (Sagener et al, 2015). Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The Economist (2/23/2015) noted that
AFD is a group that “calls for dissolving the euro and which often uses anti-immigrant
and homophobic innuendo in its campaigns.” However, once again, anti-immigrant is a
term many use in response to a nationalist platform. Innnuendo is subjective and not
factual. In fact, the Guardian (Oltermann, 2014) reported that AfD “MEP Beatrix von
Storch, who is considered one of the leading voices of party's conservative faction,
frequently asserts that she sees the AfD as founded on a ‘Christian view of
humanity’…Von Storch has described support networks for young gay people at German
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schools as "forced sexualisation." However, Von Storch (2011) clarified her comments,
stating that “I condemn not, there are people who live differently than oneself or as you
would expect. That's not what it is about. It's about the government mission statement.” 6
AfD has been the target of accusations of anti-Semitism. However, in 2014,
AfD-state board unanimously launched party exclusion proceedings against the
Uckermark district chairman and designated MEP Jan-Ulrich Weiss after he posted an
anti-Semitic cartoon on his Facebook page. The caricature was considered reminiscent of
the Nazi paper Der Stuermer (Dvorin, 2014). Ultimately, speculation abounds but AfD
does not promote an anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic agenda. Condition met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. “Though the party intentionally avoids labelling itself as
left- or right-wing, the German media has in recent months taken to portraying it as one
of several right-wing populist parties eating into the voter base of conservative
Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats” (Heine, 2013). EurActiv refers to the
group as “right-wing populist” (Sagener et al, 2015). Condition: met..
E. Eurosceptic. Party spokesman Alexander Gauland acknowledged that "there
are differences between being euro-critical, EU-critical, and Europe-critical. We are
critical of the euro and the EU, but we are pro-European," (Knight and Goebel, 2014).
EurActiv (Sagener et al, 2015) classified the group as “the Eurosceptic Alternative for
Germany (AfD).” Condition: met.

Original German text, translation is my own: “Ich verurteile das nicht, es gibt
Menschen, die leben anders als man selbst oder als man es gewohnt ist. Darum geht es
nicht. Es geht um das staatliche Leitbild” from «Die Gesellschaft kann nicht das leisten,
was eine Familie leistet» Interview mit Beatrix von Storch, Vorsitzende der Zivilen
Koalition e. V. (Von Storch Interview 2011)
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F. Nationalist/Reformist. AfD is classified as a nationalist conservative party
(Bundeswahlleiter, 2015). Observed Lochocki(2015): “The AfD’s party platform largely
follows the formula of classic European right-wing populists, positioning itself as for the
nation and against the existing political establishment.” Condition: met.
AfD: ALL CONDITIONS MET

ATAKA (Aтака), Bulgaria
ATAKA, or “attack,” is a Bulgarian party which has gained increasing notoriety
since its formation in 2005. The party touted a concise platform of 20 Principles which,
“in June 2005, catapulted them into the 40th parliament (2005-2009) with 8.94% of the
popular vote and 21 seats” (ATAKA, 2015). The group’s mantra “Let’s regain Bulgaria
for the Bulgarians!” is one that resounds with many Bulgarians. Its founder and leader,
Volen Siderov, is a former journalist whose television program was also called ‘Ataka.’
Siderov was one of the first who started anti- EU campaigning because of the
closure of four blocs of “Koslodui” nuclear power plant. He also “was the first who
openly gave an ethnic adjective to the criminal [in Bulgaria]... In [sic] the same time he
accused the Government, the EU and the Roma organisations for money laundering [sic]
and redirecting of that money to private pockets, on [sic] expense of Bulgarians”
(Novaković 2008, 53).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. The ATAKA party was established by Siderov in
2005 as “a patriotic formation to stand up against globalization” (Feffer 2013).
Condition: met.
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B. Non-Violent. In 2011, a violent protest by supporters of the far-right party
Ataka led party leader Siderov to state that he had “never incited ethnic or religious
hatred... and that the people who clashed with Muslims at the mosque are not members of
his party,” (Dzhambazova 2011). In a 2011 Human Rights Report, it was noted that
“despite the widespread condemnation of Ataka for the incident and the prosecuting
authorities opening of pre-trial proceedings against several assailants arrested on the
scene, it merits mention that the proceedings define the ultra-nationalists’ actions as
‘hooliganism’ rather than discriminatory violence on the grounds of religion.”
“Hooliganism, as defined by the Criminal Code of Bulgaria (Article 325), constitutes acts
against ‘public order’” (Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2011). Condition: met
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. In 2013, leaders of the party distributed
pamphlets detailing the group’s manifesto which highlighted the fact that: “ATAKA is
neither a racist nor xenophobic party and this can be seen by every objective observer
who reads our pragramme [sic] and gets familiar with our activities,” noted ATAKA MP
Magdalena Tasheva (www.ataka.bg).
This position seemingly contradicts actions of the group in its early years:
“ATAKA, which employed racist and discriminatory rhetoric during the 2005 and 2006
electoral campaigns, published anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim material in its newspaper,
on its Web site, and on its cable television mouthpiece Skat” (US Department of State,
2008). In a 2013 interview, Volen Siderov, leader of Ataka, stated, “We do not have the
difference between blacks and whites here. Racism was never an issue in Bulgaria.
However, when crime rates rise, and all this crime originates in these ethnic groups,
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people start having negative sentiments. So there is not a single village in Bulgaria that
has not been robbed by the Gypsy groups,” (Feffer, 2013).
Further, in 2014, Siderov proposed “amendments to Bulgaria’s Penal Code …
that would have imposed jail and huge fines for “public manifestations of homosexuality”
such as taking part in gay parades” (Leviev-Sawyer, 2014). Thus, unless ATAKA is
splitting hairs and viewing a racist ideology as different from an anti-Semitic/anti-Roma
ideology, the group is clearly misrepresenting their beliefs. In this instance, an official
stance is overruled by action and circuitous statements. Condition: unmet.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. Noted Foreign Policy in Focus, “The platform of
Bulgaria’s ATAKA mixes a left-wing critique of globalization with a frankly nationalist
approach to minority policy,” (Feffer 2013). Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. Interestingly, according to Euractiv.com: “Bulgarians are broadly
pro-European, largely because they trust EU institutions more than those of their own
country. The latest Eurobarometer poll shows that Bulgaria is among the countries that is
the most positive about the future of the EU, at 61%, with 27% pessimistic… The EU
average is 53% optimist, versus 40% pessimist” (Euractiv.com, 2014). Nonetheless,
Ataka is considered “the key progenitor of the Eurosceptic undercurrent” (Dandalov,
2014). Accordingly, Number 16 of Ataka’s “20 Principles” states: “Reconsideration of
the closed chapters in the accession negotiations with the EU; renegotiation of all
unfavourable clauses, damaging Bulgaria’s interest. Cancellation of any agreements,
accords or memoranda implying or demanding the decommissioning of the Kozlodui
NPP,” (ATAKA 2015). The party affirmed their stance in 2013, stating “Yes, we are a
Eurosceptic and anti-globalist party” (ATAKA, 2015). Condition: met
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F. Nationalist/Reformist. The group is often characterized in the media as ultranationalist (Yahoo, BBC, The Guardian). Party leader Siderov has stated that “the
struggle of our party is to make the Bulgarian nationality a category of prestige, so that
the inhabitant of a ghetto would be proud to call himself Bulgarian,” (Feffer, 2013). The
party’s official website notes one goal of the party as “Every Bulgarian investor,
entrepreneur, and/or manufacturer shall have precedence over any foreign one, up until
Bulgaria’s living standards reach the average European level. Bulgaria’s production,
commerce, banks and all other means of production should be in Bulgarian hands,”
(ATAKA, 2015). In fact, the group’s #1 stated goal is: “Bulgaria is a unitary, monolith
state, not liable to secession on neither religious, ethnic, cultural, or any other basis.
Differences by origin or faith shall have no priority over nationality. Whoever violates
this principle, detaches oneself off from the Bulgarian nation and the Bulgarian state and
shall not be eligible to lay any claims to both of them,” (ATAKA, 2015). Condition: met.
ATAKA: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, Nowa Prawica-KNP), Poland
KNP was founded on 25 March 2011 by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, the 4th place
finished in Poland’s the 2010 presidential election. KNP was “a result of a merger of the
Freedom and Lawfulness (WiP) with several members of the Real Politics Union (UPR)”
(Dutch News, 6/19/14). It was considered a radical libertarian party and sought
decriminalization of the use and production of all drugs (Dutch News, 6/19/14). The
Democratic Society (5/13/2014) noted that Korwin-Mikke has conservative views on
women and homosexuality and has previously suggested that women should not have the
vote. In the 2014 KNP Election Programme, Korwin-Mikke claimed that “KNP is the
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only anti-EU party in Poland, consistently and without compromise. Our goal is to
dissolve the EU by reducing this artificial, statist, fiscal, and ideological construct to a
free trade zone – the original European Economic Community, which was the source of
the economic success and prosperity of the West after World War II.” The 2014 election
resulted in KNP garnering 7.06% of the vote, finishing 4th in the national poll and
earning four MEPs (Lesniak, 2014). KNP joined the Europe of Freedom and Direct
Democracy group in 2014. In January 2015, Korwin-Mikke was ousted from KNP and
created a splinter party called Korwin. Since that time, Korwin holds two seats and KNP
the other two (KNP, 2015).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. KNP was founded in March 2011 by Janusz
Korwin-Mikke. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. “If someone gives money to an unemployed person he should
have his hand cut off because he is destroying the morale of the people,” Korwin-Mikke
said, adding “Europeans were very aggressive and now the boys are taught not to be
aggressive … Give them the pistol, give them a sword” (Graham-Harrison 2014). In
2014, it was widely reported that Korwin-Mikke “slapped a leftwing Polish politician in
the face” (Graham-Harrison, 2014). As noted in Bachrynowski (2015), Korwin-Mikke is
even unwilling to condemn China for cruel acts of violence towards citizens, if those
actions work to the economic benefit of the country. Condition: unmet
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. In his 2014 electoral interview to the EU
parliament, Korwin Mikke expressed his belief that there is no proof that Hitler did know
anything about Jews' extermination which is a reference to the assertion of British
historian David Irving (Open Europe, 2014).
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According to the Jewish Chronicle (Tzur, 10/21/2014), “While Korwin-Mikke
claimed he was “against any restrictions on minorities”, he explained this by saying: “For
us there are no minorities, there are only Polish citizens. We are against special rights for
minorities. The same with Jews.” Further, Tzur (2014) stated: “Korwin-Mikke said that
Jews’ efforts to win back property stolen during the Second World War often amounted
to a “Holocaust industry”…and that the only Jews left in Poland were “Jewish
communists”, adding: “Jews are very talented people, and therefore are our worst
enemies, because they are talented communists. “This is why the Poles have a specific
image of Jews. They don’t know the real Jews, only the Communists ones who stayed
here.” KNP also opposes gay marriage and advocates for the disfranchisement of women
because they are “not as clever as men (Bachrynowski, 2015). Condition: unmet.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. KNP is right-wing conservative with a blend of
libertarian and conservative views. The Huffington Post refers to the group as a rightwing political party (Lesniak 2014). Sabin (2014) refers to KNP’s EP as the “right-wing
MEP.” Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. As noted above, Korwin-Mikke boasted that “KNP is the only
anti-EU party in Poland” (KNP 2014). According to Open Europe (2014), KorwinMikke commented in 2014 that "We are going to the European Parliament to show what
a nonsensical institution it is. It's not possible to achieve anything sensible there."
Further, Open Europe (2014) reported that Korwin-Mikke declared that “the party would
go into the parliament in order to detonate a bomb inside it, while one of his MEP
candidates claimed that the European Parliament is a brothel, a role for which it is ideally
suited” (Open Europe 2014).
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Lesniak (2014) noted that KNP is “against adopting euro as polish official
currency and strongly discourage from further integration within the European Union.”
Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. Party founder Korwin-Mikke is a well-known Polish
nationalist with a long history of activism on behalf of Poland. Korwin-Mikke
“advocates national self-interest and the instrumentalisation of political” (BBC 28 April
2014). Lesniak (2014) noted that KNP “embraces the standpoint of disbanding minimal
wage and privileges of labour unions. The party also demands constitutional amendment
imposing on future governments to balance national budget (preventing incurring debts).”
Condition: met.
KNP: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF), Denmark
According to the party’s website, the Danish People's Party (DF, though
alternatively abbreviated DPP in English) was founded at Christiansborg on October 6,
1995, with co-founder Pia Kjærsgaard unanimously elected as party chairman (DF 2015).
The party is viewed as populist, nationalist and Eurosceptic, and has been led by Kristian
Thulesen Dahl since 2012. In 2001, the party won 12% of the vote and 22 seats; by
2007, it had claimed 13.9% and 25 seats. In 2015, DF “jumped to 21.1% from 12.3% in
2011” (Economist 6/19/15). DF is a member of the Europe of Freedom and
Democracy group in the European Parliament.
A. Occurring post-Cold War.

The party was formed in 1995 when its

founders separated from the Progress Party (DF 2015). Condition: met.
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B. Non-Violent. The DF opposes violence and favors stricter laws on crime. The
party’s website notes “Preservation of law and order is of great importance in a society
founded on the rule of law, and therefore there must be coherence between crime and
punishment” (DF 2015). Counterpoint (2014) rated the group as a low danger for
violence. Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. In 2003, Pia Kjærsgaard “lost a 2003
libel action against a political opponent who accused the party of having ‘racist policies’”
(Europhobia 2009). The courtroom loss resulted in many opponents labeling the group as
an officially racist organization (Europhobia 2009). Pfisterer (2011) noted that “The DF
rejects multiculturalism and…demands increasingly stronger rules for immigrants: last
year DF party leader Pia Kjærsgaard even proposed banning satellite dishes in order to
prevent people living in Denmark from watching ‘anti-western’ TV channels such as AlJazeera and Al-Arabia.”
Despite accusations and speculation, research indicates DF does not propagate a
platform of racism, anti-Semitism, or homophobia. Condition: met
D. Right-wing/left-wing. The Economist (6/19/15) describes the DF as “hardright,” as do other media. The Wall Street Journal refers to the group as “the right-wing
populist Danish People's Party” (Bomsdorf 2014). Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. The Economist (6/19/15) described the party as an “antiEuropean Union, anti-immigration party.” Further, DF “calls for the re-establishment of
border controls, and opposes scrapping Denmark’s current opt-out from EU judicial cooperation” (Economist 6/19/15). “The Danish People's Party wishes friendly and dynamic
cooperation with all the democratic and freedom-loving peoples of the world, but we will
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not allow Denmark to surrender its sovereignty. As a consequence, the Danish People's
Party opposes the European Union” (DF 2015). Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. On the party’s official website, Dahl proclaims “The
aim of the Danish People's Party is to assert Denmark's independence, to guarantee the
freedom of the Danish people in their own country, and to preserve and promote
representative government and the monarchy” (DF 2015). Further, “the essence of the
party program is a warm and strong love of our country… Denmark belongs to the Danes
and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law,
which develops along the lines of Danish culture.” Following the 2014 EP elections, DF
joined the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (European Parliament 2015).
Condition: met.
DF: ALL CONDITIONS MET
Dutch Freedom Party- (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV), Netherlands
In 2004, Geert Wilders left the right-wing party “Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en
Democratie (VVD), angered in part by the party’s support for Turkish membership in the
European Union” (de Jong 2015). Two years later, Wilders formed the Partij voor de
Vrijheid (PVV). Wilders and, by extension, the PVV, believe “Muslims should be
subjected to other, more oppressive laws and regulations than people in the ‘in-group’;
their holy book should be banned, there should be a special tax for wearing head-scarves,
unlike other religious groups they should not be allowed to organize their own schools,
and recently the party called for closing all mosques in the Netherlands… The PVV
doesn’t have members, branches or other publications than a website” (de Jong 2015).
Terry (2014) noted that: “Under Dutch law, a political party must have at least two
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members. Hence, “the PVV has exactly two members: Geert Wilders, and the Geert
Wilders Foundation… PVV policy is set by Wilders. All the party’s candidates for office
are only accepted onto its lists after heavy vetting by Wilders personally” (Terry 2014).
The BBC (2009) observed that the PVV went “from winning nine seats in the
2006 election to 24 in 2010, taking a bigger share of the vote than the Christian
Democrats - the main party in the outgoing government.” According to the Netherlands
House of Representatives, in the 2012 election, the party only won 15 seats. The number
of seats they held in European Parliament remained at four following the 2014 elections.
A. Occurring post-Cold War. As noted above, Wilders formed PVV in 2006.
Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. In an interview with BBC (October 2009), Wilders proclaimed
“It's not my intention to have anything at all to do with violence…On the contrary, I
despise violence - I just want a debate." Counterpoint (2014) ranks the group as a low
danger for violence. Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. In the October 2009 BBC interview,
Wilders, whose wife is Hungarian, was adamant that he is not a racist. He told the BBC
his intention had only ever been "to have a debate about freedom of speech and the threat
of Islamisation of our Western societies" (BBC 2009).
"Our culture is based on Christianity, Judaism and humanism and (the Israelis)
are fighting our fight," Wilders told Reuters… "If Jerusalem falls, Amsterdam and New
York will be next" (Heneghan 2010). Noted the BBC (2009), “unlike other figures on the
fringes of European politics, he has never been accused of anti-Semitism.” Further,
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Wilders “styles himself as a promoter of gay rights, which he sees as in line with
traditional Dutch values” (Polyakova 2014).
Bahceli (9/16/15) reported that “In a September 2015 debate, Wilders called the
wave of refugees passing through Hungary and other countries ‘an Islamic invasion of
Europe, of the Netherlands….Masses of young men in their twenties with beards singing
Allahu Akbar across Europe. It's an invasion that threatens our prosperity, our security,
our culture and identity.’” Such rhetoric has been called racist, though, as noted above for
FPO, Islam is a religion not a race. Wilders words are certainly inflammatory,
particularly his reference to appearance, but are not directed at a particular race.
Similarly, in June 2014, Wilders asked his supporters: “Do you want more or
fewer Moroccans in this city and in the Netherlands?” The response came loud and clear:
“Fewer! Fewer! Fewer!” “We'll take care of that,” their leader replied. (McDonaldGibson 2014). Once, again, is this rhetoric directed at a race? Though his words were
certainly disparaging to Moroccans, Wilders obvious point was immigration. Condition:
met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. Wilders is not only right wing, he and his party are
widely considered to be far-right wing. Lesniak (2014) refers to the group as a “farright” party, as does Oudenampsen (2013) and multiple other sources. Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. Wilders has suggested that “the Netherlands take back
its national border and immigration control from the Shengen system of 26 European
countries that has enabled free transit for European recruits to join the Islamic State… He
has also suggested that any returning Dutch veterans of the ISIS be barred from entry and
deprived of Dutch citizenship” (New English Review 2015). Terry (2014) noted that
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“since 2011 Wilders has also increasingly positioned himself as an opponent of EU
austerity, but even his opposition to austerity is coached in nationalist terms. Since 2012
he was become an uncompromising advocate of total withdrawal from the EU.” The
Huffington Post (Robins-Early, 2015) reported “Wilder's PVV party is anti-European
Union, anti-euro, anti-Islam and anti-multiculturalist. The party wants the Netherlands to
leave the European Union so The Hague can independently decide on its immigration and
fiscal policies.” Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. “The party has a populist economic program, but is
socially conservative -- advocating the protection of Dutch tradition” (Robins-Early,
2015). Oudenampsen (2013) referred to the group as nationalist and populist.
Condition: met.
PVV: ALL CONDITIONS MET
English Defence League (EDL), England
According to the EDL official website, the English Defence League is a “human
rights organisation that was founded in the wake of the shocking actions of a small group
of Muslim extremists who, at a homecoming parade in Luton, openly mocked the
sacrifices of our service personnel without any fear of censure” (EDL 2015). Thus, as
Goodwin (2013) identified, the group is “a prime example of what Eatwell (2006)
described as ‘cumulative extremism,’ whereby the activities of one extremist group
trigger the formation of another manifestation, and possibly thereafter a spiral of countermobilization or even conflict.”
The group was formed in Luton in 2009 by cousins Kevin Carroll and Tommy
Robinson. Tommy Robinson is also known as Stephen Yaxley-Lennon and is a former
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British National Party (BNP) member. The EDL is vigorously anti-Islam and part of
what Goodwin (2013) terms the “counter-Jihad” wave of movements. The EDL believes
that “British Muslims should be able to safely demand reform of their religion, in order to
make it more relevant to the needs of the modern world” (EDL 2015).
Though the group was originally written-off as a band of violent hooligans and
street thugs, EDL has observed Goodwin (2013): “between 2009 and 2012 the EDL
organized over 50 street-based demonstrations that often mobilized between 1,000 and
3,000 activists…in only a short period, the EDL established a national media profile and
more than 80 local divisions, and attracted over 80,000 Facebook followers.”
A. Occurring post-Cold War. The EDL was created in 2009 in Luton, England.
Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. On the official EDL website, the group proclaims “We are an
inclusive movement dedicated to peacefully [emphasis my own] protesting against
Islamic extremism.” However, media such as the Independent has reported multiple
violent incidents involving EDL leadership and members, including: then-leader Tommy
Robinson head-butting a fellow member at an EDL march in Blackburn and 172 EDL
members arrested at one march on Whitehall in London (Rawlinson 2011).
The BBC reported in 2015 that 50 convictions had resulted from a 2013
“gathering of 2,000 EDL supporters in Centenary Square where missiles and bottles were
had been thrown at police,” and the Guardian has highlighted the EDL’s regular staging
of violent protests (Taylor 2010).
Channel 4 News (2013) reported that “EDL supporters are more likely to
believe that violence is justifiable - and inevitable: 72 per cent say that violence between
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different groups is ‘largely inevitable’, compared with an average of 46 per cent.”
Observed Goodwin (2013): “while most supporters say they would never personally
engage in violence (only five per cent would), the picture changes when violence is
framed as a response to other forms of extremism: 38 percent agree that ‘violence against
extremists is justified’, a figure significantly higher than the wider average of
21 per cent.” Further, "The vision that they offer to supporters is one in which different
ethnic, racial and religious groups are embroiled in communal violence, and where
violence may be called for (and justified) in order to protect the native group" (Goodwin
2013). Condition: unmet.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The court of public opinion holds the
EDL as racist and fascist. However, according to Goodwin (2013), the EDL has
“specifically sought to rally support among Jewish, Sikh and Pakistani Christian
communities, as well as lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual ones.” The EDL
acknowledged it is “keen to draw its support from people of all races, all faiths, all
political persuasions, and all lifestyle choices. Under its umbrella, all people in England,
whatever their background, or origin, can stand united in a desire to stop the imposition
of the rules of Islam on non-believers” (EDL 2015). They note, ironically, “The time for
tolerating intolerance has come to an end: it is time for the whole world to unite against a
truly Global Jihad” and “The EDL will continue to work to protect the inalienable rights
of all people to protest against radical Islam’s encroachment into the lives of nonMuslims” (EDL 2015).
The EDL notes that “There is a little understanding of what it is to be an
‘Islamic extremist’, and critics are all-too-often unfairly labelled as ‘racists’ or
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‘Islamophobes’, again without any real understanding of what the terms mean” (EDL
2015). Reported Goodwin (2013): “Only a minority of those who agree with the platform
of the EDL endorse classical or ‘biological’ racism. Few endorse open expressions of
racial supremacism: 58 per cent agreed that non-white citizens who were born in the
country are just as ‘British’ as white citizens, while 56 per cent said there is no difference
in intelligence between black and white citizens.”
Then-party leader Robinson told Channel 4 News (28 May 2013) that the EDL
“is not a fascist organisation.” “We oppose a fascist ideology. I hate Nazis as much as I
hate Islamists, but Nazism isn't a problem in this country." He also insisted that the EDL
is not racist: "The truth cannot be racist," adding "You can be any colour, but you can be
a terrorist Muslim" (Channel 4 News, 2013).
Thus, once again, we have a group with an anti-Islam/Muslim agenda,
(specifically, an anti-Islamic extremist agenda) and we face the question of racism vs
religious prejudice. As in the prior cases, it is determined that the two are not
synonymous. Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. The group is widely recognized as radical right-wing.
In fact, the Jewish Chronicle has characterized the group as extreme right-wing (2010),
though the Guardian reported that “Metropolitan police say English Defence League is
'not extreme' (Dodd and Taylor 2011). Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. The EDL is considered to be Eurosceptic because of their antiimmigration stance. In 2013, EDL leader Robinson endorsed UKIP, stating “They are
saying exactly what we say, just in a different way” (Stanley 2013). UKIP, as examined
above, has “one key policy - to leave the European Union” (BBC 21 Nov 2014).
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However, as EDL has no seats in EP and has no official EU position, they cannot be
determined to meet the required conditions to be considered Eurosceptic. Condition:
unmet.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. Goodwin (2013) noted that the EDL has garnered
support by “framing the religion as a fundamental threat to the national way of life and to
Europe generally.” Channel 4 News (28 May 2013) noted that the EDL “sees itself as a
defender of British values, which includes the army.” EDL is widely recognized as a
nationalist and even ultra-nationalist group. Condition: met.
EDL: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Fascism and Freedom Movement-National Socialist Party (Movimento Fascismo e
Libertà – Partito Socialista Nazionale, MFL–PSN), Italy
The Fascism and Freedom Movement-National Socialist Party was formed on 25
July 1991 by Senator Giorgio Pisanò with the motto “L'unico movimento del e per il
popolo italiano!” or “the only movement of and for the people of Italy” (Freebase 2015).
The group’s leader has been Carlo Gariglio since December of 2001. The group
embraces fascism and Benito Mussolini’s political thought, and is the only group in Italy
to incorporate the fascist symbol in its logo (Milesi et al. 2006). The party is most often
referred to as, simply, the Fascism and Freedom Movement. Note: Information on this
group was exceptionally difficult to find. As a result, most references are from the
party’s official website (in Italian and translated to English for this research).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. The party was formed in 1989 as a political
movement within the Italian Social Movement, becoming its own party in 1991 (Freebase
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2015). In 2009, it added the “National Socialist Party” (NSP) to its name (Cyclopaedia
2015). Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. No explicit references to the group either condemning or
condoning violence could be located. There are various reports of members in attendance
during protests or public addresses which turned violent, but no definitive links. As such,
it is concluded that the group will meet the condition. Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The party adheres to an ideology of
anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism, and it outspokenly, unapologetically fascist. It is
widely in the media as neo-Nazi and neo-fascist (Cyclopaedia 2015). Acknowledges the
party, “The MFL-PSN favors adherence to the ideals of fascism over skin color,
nationality and religious belief: for us a Fascist of color and who is Islamic is worth a
thousand times more than a non-fascist who is white and Catholic.”7
Interestingly, the party states on its website that “Il MFL-PSN, infatti, chiarisce
subito di non essere razzista,” which translates to “the MFL-PSN, in fact, makes it clear
that it is not racist” (Fascismo e Liberta 2015).
The party does not specifically reference homosexuality though, by it strict
adherence to fascist principles, it follows that MFL-PSN would echo classic Italian
fascist beliefs. Wrote Quine (1995): “Fascist Italy considered homosexuality a social
disease…it condemned pornography, most forms of birth control and contraceptive

Original Italian text: “Il MFL-PSN privilegia l’adesione agli ideali del Fascismo al
colore della pelle, alla nazionalità ed al credo religioso: per noi un Fascista di colore ed
islamico vale mille volte più di un antifascista bianco e cattolico”
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devices (with the exception of the condom), homosexuality, and prostitution as deviant
sexual behaviour.”
Further, because of its status as a fascist party, it would be disqualified from
consideration as a MEPG, and categorized as a neo-fascist party. Condition: unmet.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. According to the group’s website (Fascismo e
Liberta, 2015) as well as Google Freebase, the party “refuses agreements and / or
alliances, stressing categorically not to be classified as a right-wing party.” The party
website states that it is not a right-wing movement, rather it is “avowedly fascist”
and, therefore, has nothing to do with the right and can be moderate, extreme, socialist or
whatever.8 Freebase (2009) noted the group’s “stressing categorically not to be classified
as a right-wing party.” Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. The party’s official website asserts that the MFL-PSN knows
that the enemy is not the refugee, stowaway or immigrant (call it what you will) but the
SYSTEM that allows a foreigner to enter Italy undisturbed… In fact, the system that
favors unrestricted immigration (as well as the introduction of gay marriage, the gender
theory and the Jobs Act) is a capitalist system (translated by the author from Italian).9
Condition: met.

The original Italian text is as follows: “Il MFL-PSN non è un movimento di destra, ma
dichiaratamente Fascista; pertanto, non ha nulla a che fare con la destra, sia essa
moderata, estrema, sociale e quant’altro.” (http://fascismoeliberta.info/chi-siamo/)
9
The original Italian text is as follows: Tuttavia MFL-PSN sa bene che il nemico non è il
profugo o il clandestino o l'immigrato (chiamiamolo come vogliamo) bensì il SISTEMA
che permette allo straniero di entrare in Italia indisturbato… In realtà il sistema che
favorisce l'immigrazione selvaggia (così come l'introduzione del matrimonio gay, la
teoria del gender e il Jobs Act) è un sistema capitalista
(http://fascismoeliberta.info/page/2/).
108
8

F. Nationalist/Reformist. The party “makes explicit reference to the ideals of
the Italian Social Republic as corporatism, the socialization of the economy, taxation and
monetary nationalism (Freebase 2015). Their website notes that “We believe that fascism
is, in its essential and fundamental purpose (defense identity, exaltation of the concept of
national sovereignty, nationalization of enterprises, defense of the community with a
great attention to social issues and weaker sectors of the population) the solution to
problems facing an Italy which, thanks to this class of politicians has become only
poorer, more insecure, weaker economically, socially and in relations with other states”10
(Fascismo e Liberta 2015). Condition: met
MFL-PSN: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Finns Party formerly True Finns (Perussuomalaiset- PS), Finland
The Finns Party claims that it is “both the youngest – established in 1995 – and
one of the oldest – with roots going back to the 19th century” party in Finland (PS 2015).
The party has experienced multiple iterations and name changes. Observed the BBC
(Sundberg, 2015), “The party's origins lie in a split in the Centre Party (then known as the
Agrarian League) in 1959, when charismatic former cabinet minister Veikko Vennamo
resigned in protest at what he saw as Finland's too-friendly relations with the Soviet
Union.”

10

The original Italian text is as follows: Riteniamo che il Fascismo sia, nei suoi propositi
essenziali e fondamentali (difesa dell'identità, esaltazione del concetto di sovranità
nazionale, socializzazione delle imprese, difesa della collettività con una grande
attenzione al sociale e ai ceti più deboli della popolazione) la soluzione ai problemi che
affliggono un'Italia la quale, grazie a questa classe di politici è diventata solo più povera,
più insicura, più debole economicamente, socialmente e nei rapporti con gli altri Stati
(http://fascismoeliberta.info/page/2/).
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After a period of instability and several name changes, he established the Rural
Party in 1966, which also splintered years later.” The party dwindled away and “by 1995,
the party was in ruins, and the True Finns Party was established from its ashes”… with
Timo Soini taking over as chairman in 1997 (Sundberg 2015).
As noted on the party website, the Finns Party “according to a Finnish
Broadcasting poll in September, 2013, is the second most popular party in Finland. It is,
from the general election of 2011, the third largest party in the national parliament
(Eduskunta) – and the largest party in opposition... The party has one MEP in the
European Parliament as well as representatives in significant international organisations
such as the Council of Europe, OSCE, Arctic Council, Inter-Parliamentary Union, and
Nordic Council” (PS 2015).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. Though it has origins as far back as 1959, the
party in its current form and revised agenda was established in 1995 (PS 2015).
Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. In an August 2015 speech, Party Chairman Soini emphasized:
“No violence or hate speech against anyone, not even against the Finns Party,” he stated,
demanding that the actions of both the far-right and far-left be condemned (Helsinki
Times 10 August 2015). Soini further declared that “Such ideas and actions have no place
in the Finns Party” (Helsinki Times 10 August 2015). The party’s 2015 manifesto asserts
that “enforcement and punishment related to laws should be applied equally to all – with
no consideration given to different economic and political standing of those violating
laws” (PS 2015). Counterpoint (2015) ranks the group as a low danger for violence.
Condition: met.
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C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. As discussed previously, most
oppositionist groups are quick to be labelled racist, homophobic and xenophobic,
particular when they embrace restrictions on immigration. Such labels proliferate when
comments are taken out of context, are lost in translation, or are the comments of one
member or associate and are wrongly attributed to the organization as a whole. As the
Finnish Department of Ministry (Finland.fi 2015) acknowledges, “To be sure, individual
extremist voices are often heard from the party’s rank-and-file.”
As an example, on July 25, 2015, “a True Finn’s Member of Parliament, Olli
Immonen, released a Facebook update where he openly declared to be against a
multicultural Finland. The text was posted in English and it is included below in its
original form: I’m dreaming of a strong, brave nation that will defeat this nightmare
called multiculturalism” (Joukahainen 2015). As expected, adversaries pointed to the
comment as evidence of the party’s racism.
However, the party’s manifesto clearly stipulates: “‘Justice for all’ is a concern
that permeates the Party’s whole platform and policy… the basic foundation of the Party
is a recognition of the Progressive traditions of equality of opportunity for all,” and their
2011 manifesto declared that “Hate crime is not to be tolerated and legislation is needed”
(PS 2015). Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. The party does not label itself as left or right wing,
noting: “The Party has support from all sectors of the political spectrum so it defies being
put into any traditional left-right pigeon hole. One unifying aspect is the attempt of the
Party to approach matters with rational solutions with emphasis on activism and
creativity while maintaining respect for both social and individual responsibility” (PS
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2015). In 2011, EU Business reported that the “far-right party” had become Finland's
second-largest group. Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. The BBC characterizes the Finns Party as a populist and
Eurosceptic party (Sundberg 2015). Indeed, the Finns Party makes no secret of their
disdain for the EU: “The Finns Party is a leading EU-skeptic party in Finland. The Party
argues that the European Union is working far below its capability and much could be
done for improvement. Its opinion is that the EU meddles too much into citizens’ every
day affairs and is creating excessive central governance in Brussels” (PS 2015).
Further, the party presented a list of five main concerns ahead of the Finnish
Parliamentary elections in 2015. Among these concerns was a desire to stop bullying,
particularly as it related to “Termination of detrimental EU-bureaucracy” (PS 2015).
Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. The party presented an elaborate manifesto of reforms
ahead of the 2015 elections. As part of their economic platform (PS, 2015), the Finns
Party “believes the most important function of government is assuring the security and
welfare of the ordinary Finnish citizen -thus budget cuts must come from decreasing
migration – support and foreign development aid as well as other 'make a better world' type spending.” This priority is revisited during the presentation of ‘Five Main Concerns.
Further, the party website proclaims that “The Finns Party does not accept
outsiders setting up standards for how people judge themselves” (PS 2015). Sundberg
(2015 observed that: “Beneath the strong Euroscepticism lies a brand of Finnish
nationalism that targets refugees, immigrants and the Swedish population in Finland.”
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The party has also established a language policy: “The Finns Party believes that
the Finnish language supports, nurtures and unifies Finnish citizens and their society.
Promotion of proficiency in the Finnish language and its protection and development
should be incorporated into national legislation. Such policy includes requirements such
as “Satisfaction competency in Finnish must be shown for extension of residency
permission” (PS 2015). Condition: met.
FINNS PARTY: ALL CONDITIONS MET
Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ), Austria
The US Library of Congress reported that “the Freedom Party of Austria
(Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs--FPÖ) was founded in 1956 by Anton Reinthaller, who
had served in the Seyss-Inquart national socialist government formed in collaboration
with Hitler after the Anschluss in 1938” (Solsten 1994). During an FPÖ convention in
spring of 1986, Jörg Haider, leader of the Carinthian branch of the party, launched a
successful coup against leader Norbert Steger and became the new chairman (Solsten
1994). The Encyclopedia Britannica (2015) stated that:
In 1999–2000 a series of electoral successes…created a storm of controversy and
produced widespread protests in Austria and abroad, largely because of
perceptions that the leadership of the party, including Haider himself, was
sympathetic to Nazism. Haider, whose father had been a leading member of the
Austrian Nazi Party before and during World War II, became notorious for his
praise of Hitler’s employment policies and his remark, made to a group of
Austrian veterans of World War II, that the Waffen-SS deserved ‘honour and
respect.’ Arguing for stricter controls on immigration, he warned against the
‘over-foreignization’ of Austrian society, pointedly borrowing a term—
Überfremdung—used by Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s minister of propaganda.
(Encyclopedia Britannica 2015)
Today, the Freedom Party is a self-proclaimed Eurosceptic group whom has
campaigned under an anti-immigrant platform and slogans such as "Too much EU is
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dumb” (Bell, 2014). The party is part of EP’s newly formed Europe of Nations and
Freedom party, a bloc of right-wing, Eurosceptic nationalist parties.
A. Occurring post-Cold War. The Freedom Party was originally founded in
1958. Because this pre-dates the end of the cold war, the FPÖ is disqualified from
consideration as a MEPG unless the party underwent an ideology change when Haider’s
assumed leadership. Morris, et al. (2014) noted that Haider succeeded in “transforming
the FPÖ into a radical right-wing protest party that positioned itself against the
mainstream.” Indeed, 1993 served as a transformational year for the FPÖ.
According to Meret (2010), “In 1993, the FPÖ launched a popular initiative on
the topic of immigration called ‘Austria First!’. The aim was to collect signatures in
favour of a popular referendum on … restrictions and control in relation to immigration.
The initiative was considered very controversial and provoked the exit of five party MPs,
among them Heide Schmidt, who later launched the new party Liberal Forum (LiF). In
the same year, relations between FPÖ and the Liberal International group – of which the
party was a member since 1979 – became more difficult. In 1993, the Liberal
International executive recommended the expulsion of the FPÖ from its ranks, but the
measure was preceded by the decision of the FPÖ to withdraw its membership.”
Thus, as a result of the pivotal changes in platform, rhetoric and ideology
during the early 1990s, FPÖ will be determined to meet the condition of restructured
ideology. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. An article in Reuters acknowledged that the FPÖ “continues to
attract a neo-Nazi fringe which has no other party to join and warns continually of an
‘Islamicisation’ of Catholic Austria… There is, however, no evidence of any association
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with anti- foreigner violence, which remains rare in Austria” (Prodhan, 2013). Similarly,
reports of violence by members are spotty and circumstantial. Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Freedom House (2013) reported that “the
far-right FPÖ has been accused of anti-Semitic rhetoric in recent years… Additionally,
the FPÖ has been criticized for fueling anti-Muslim feelings in Austria through
controversial ad campaigns.” FPÖ believes “that the influence of the outsiders must be
reduced or eliminated” (Morris, et al. 2014). The Anti-Defamation League reported in
2004 that “Haider has fended off accusations of anti-Semitism since the 1980's, but his
insensitivity to Nazi brutality and a refusal to appreciate the suffering endured by those
who lived under Nazi rule is well documented.”
Current party leader Heinz Christian Strache has taken strides to dispel party
links with anti-Semitism. During a visit to Israel with Rene Stadtkewitz) leader of the
German Freedom Party), Kent Ekeroth (Sweden Democrat MP), and Filip Dewinter
(head of Belgium's Vlaams Belang), “denied they were stoking Islamophobia with their
statement of support for Jerusalem,” noting that Israel faced "an Islamic terror threat that
aims right for the heart of our society," (Heneghan 2010).
However, in a 2008 interview with Britain’s Telegraph, Strache stated "It is not
about keeping Austria white, just about protecting its traditional community... We see
Europe as Christian, and we believe it's at risk of Islamization"(McHugh 2015).
Obviously, Islam is a religion and not a race/ethnicity.
Many analysts point to the FPO’s definition of family as a sign of the party’s
homophobic leanings since the party defines family as “a partnership between a man and
woman with common children.” They offer as further evidence the party’s opposition to
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crosswalk signals depicting same-sex couples. However, in “November 1996, when the
reform of three anti-homosexual provisions in the Austrian penal code was on the agenda
of the Parliament, the FPÖ voted in favour of repealing the ban on gay and lesbian
organisations (Article 221)…and also proposed to lower the age of consent for gay men
to 16” (Hosi Wien 2015).
As with Front National, the FPÖ asserts that any accusations of racism and antiSemitism stem from a misinterpretation of their tough immigration stance or isolated
statements made by party members rather than official rhetoric. Coupled with the
philosophically different leadership of Strache, a leader without close ties to the Nazi
party, and the waters are muddied even further.
However, in the absence of a stated platform of homophobia, racism or antiSemitism and attributed statements extrapolatory, it is determined that FPÖ will be
deemed to have met this condition. Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. The FPÖ is unapologetically right wing. In June 2015,
FPÖ MEPs joined with France’s FN, the Dutch PVV, Belgium’s Vlaams Belang, and
Italy’s Lega Nord, among other right and far-right parties to form the European
Parliamentary bloc Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) (European Parliament, 2015).
Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. FPÖ’s platform holds that international institutions like the EU
have no right to intrude excessively in Austria’s affairs (Morris, et al. 2014). The FPÖ
has adopted a critical position of the European Union and the enlargement in particular.
In campaign materials, the party utilized the slogan “EU critics vote blue. The FPÖ
stands for an Austria without ifs and buts” (Meret 2010). Condition: met.
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F. Nationalist/Reformist. FPÖ embraces several key core institutions held to be
extremely valuable: the family, the nation (or “fatherland”), and the welfare state (Morris
et al. 2014). Further, FPÖ is “committed to protecting our homeland of Austria, our
national identity and autonomy as well as our natural livelihood” (Morris, et al. 2014).
Freedom House (2015) categorizes the party as “the country’s far-right, nationalist, and
anti-immigration” party. Condition: met
FPÖ: ALL CONDITIONS MET
Front National- FN, France
Front National (FN) has been one of the “success” stories of euroscepticism.
Originally founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, FN is considered to be the Europe’s
oldest political far-right party (Ivaldi 2012). Le Pen earned the nickname “Devil of the
Republic” as a result of his extreme right-wing views; his daughter, Marine Le Pen, has
subsequently been referred to as “the devil’s daughter.” Craw (2015) wrote that under
Jean-Marie Le Pen, FN “vehemently opposed to immigration, the European Union and
same-sex marriage and in favour of the death penalty and promoting anti-globalisation in
traditional values — views which saw him targeted by a car bomb outside their home
when Marine was eight years old.” Marine Le Pen assumed leadership of the party in
2011, having already made significant strides in reframing and redefining the party’s
tenets and vision. Her efforts to “normalize” the party are the result of a softer line that
have increased political acceptance (Ivaldi 2012).
In his 2013 study on the ideological changes within Front National, Almeida
observed that “Academic analyses of the French radical right tend to converge in their
assessment that, since Marine Le Pen took over the campaign management of the 2007
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presidential election and succeeded her father as party president, the Front National has
undergone a path of image change and ideological deradicalization or, at least, that most
radical and polemic stances have been toned down.” Ivaldi (2012) concurred, writing
that “criticism of Islam has been tactically reframed into a pseudo-liberal agenda of
tolerance or gender equality, borrowed in part from France’s tradition of laïcité
(secularity)” though the “concept of ‘national priority’ remains cornerstone to the party’s
ideology.” Indeed, many of the ideas of FN resonate throughout Europe. In January 2015,
Le Pen formed the new anti-EU bloc Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) after
recruiting enough MEPs to meet a requirement that political groups have members from
at least seven different EU countries (de la Baume 2015).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. FN was founded in 1972 which would disqualify it
from meeting the conditions of this variable. However, FN has had a significant change
in ideology and political stance, underscored by a change in leadership in 2011. This
philosophical overhaul and subsequent softer, more appealing approach is widely
documented and recognized by mainstream media world-wide such as the BBC, the
Economist, and the Guardian. Marine Le Pen’s incarnation of FN serves as a reinvention
of the party, thus allowing for the post-Cold War condition to be met. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. Since Marine Le Pen assumed leadership of FN, none of the
group’s official press/website has promoted or encouraged violence. In a 2011 statement,
Le Pen noted her party’s determination to fight mercilessly against all forms of violence
and barbarity (Front National 2015). Counterpoint (2014) rates FN in the category of
lowest risk of violence.
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Although there is a fine line between not discouraging and encouraging,
because the group does not condone acts of violence this condition is determined to have
been met. Condition: met.
C. Non-anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Under Jean-Marie Le Pen, antiSemitism was rife. Jean-Marie has been described as “a political provocateur convicted
multiple times for hate speech and Holocaust denial” (Liphshiz 2014). However, the new
FN under Marine Le Pen repeatedly has “condemned anti-Semitism and punished a party
official who made anti-Semitic statements. In 2011, Le Pen dispatched her life partner
and National Front Vice President Louis Alliot on a bridge-building mission to Israel”
(Liphshiz 2014).
Though some people contend that the non-racist rhetoric is part of a rebranding
strategy, Marine Le Pen has continually stated that FN is not racist (BBC News 2014).
Since Marine Le Pen assumed leadership of FN, none of the group’s official
press/website has promoted racism or anti-Semitism, focusing instead on immigration.
Counterpoint (2014) rates FN as lowest possibility for anti-Semitism, and moderate risk
for homophobia and racism. Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. Freedom House (2015b) categorizes FN as “far-right,
anti-immigration, and anti–European Union.” Yet despite widespread labeling of FN as
right wing (and quite often extreme right wing), in 2013, Party leader Marine Le Pen
claimed it was “unfair for the party founded by her father Jean-Marie Le Pen to be
lumped together with the likes of Norwegian mass killer Anders Behring Breivik and
Greece's New Dawn party” (The Local 2013). "We are absolutely not a party of the right,
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those who think that are making a total analytical error," stated Marine Le Pen (The
Local 2013).
Regardless of how Le Pen chooses to self-identify, millennial eurosceptic
populism does not require a group to be either right or left-wing. Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. FN is unapologetically Eurosceptic. In a 2014 interview, Le
Pen stated: “I want to destroy the EU, not Europe! I believe in a Europe of nation-states. I
believe in Airbus and Ariane, in a Europe based on cooperation. But I don't want this
European Soviet Union… The EU is deeply harmful, it is an anti-democratic monster. I
want to prevent it from becoming fatter, from continuing to breathe, from grabbing
everything with its paws and from extending its tentacles into all areas of our legislation.”
(Spiegel 2014).
Further, Le Pen has readily acknowledged her party’s anti-immigration stance,
adding that it is not because of a hatred of foreigners, rather it is because of an inability of
the government to assist those already in France. “We have millions of unemployed and
cannot afford any more immigration…we support putting a stop to immigration” (Speigel
2014).
Lesniak (2014) noted of FN that “since the 1990s, its stance on the European
Union has grown increasingly Eurosceptic. The party's opposition to immigration is
focused on non-European immigration, and includes support for deporting illegal,
criminal, and unemployed immigrants.” Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. Marine Le Pen asserted in 2014: “We want to
represent all the French people with ideas that are neither left nor right: patriotism,
defense of the identity and sovereignty of the people. If a person like me is described as
120

being extreme-left and extreme-right at the same time, then that isn't far off the mark,”
(Spiegel, 2014). Lesniak (2014) observed that “the party's ideology has been broadly
described by scholars such as Shields as authoritarian, nationalist, and populist.”
Condition: met.
FRONT NATIONAL: ALL CONDITIONS MET

Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή), Greece
In 2015, the London School of Economics reported that “Golden Dawn is an
extreme, ultra-nationalist and racist party. Among current far-right parties in Europe, it is
the one that most resembles fascism, and in particular Nazism, in its outright espousal of
National Socialism: the endorsement of what it terms the ‘third biggest ideology in
history’, i.e. nationalism, combined with support for an all-powerful state premised on
‘popular sovereignty,’” (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015).
The UK’s Telegraph has noted that the group’s founder and leader,
mathematician Nikos Michaloliakos, is “a former nationalist youth leader, who was close
to the army dictators who ruled the country from 1967 to 1974…. In 2010, he caused
controversy by giving fascist salutes in the city council in a taunt to a Left-wing councilor
who had called him a fascist.”
Further, it was noted that, in 2012, “the party exploited widespread anger over
immigration and austerity reforms imposed by the EU and IMF and won 18 seats in
parliament” (Squires 2015). In 2015, scores of Golden Dawn supporters went to trial on
charges ranging from murder to participation in a criminal organization (Squires 2015).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. Golden Dawn was borne from ideas generated
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from Nikolaos Michaloliakos in the 1980s, though it wouldn’t be until 1993 that the
group would formalize and register as a political party. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. In 2013, the BBC profile on Golden Dawn reported that in
2012, “most of the 154 recorded racist attacks in Greece were attributed to Golden Dawn
members, as were most of the 104” attacks reported through mid-2013. The BBC (2013)
reported that in 2012, “party spokesman Ilias Kasidiaris, caused outrage last year when
he attacked two female left-wing politicians during a live TV debate, slapping one and
throwing water over another.”
Unfortunately, such incidents pale in comparison to charges against members
that include murder. In 2015, 69 alleged members of Golden dawn are on trial for charges
that include a variety of serious charges, including murder. “Golden Dawn has already
taken the line that even if some of its members are indeed guilty of the crimes of which
they are accused, this has nothing to do with the party itself. The wrongdoers, the claim
goes, are bad eggs, members gone rogue, or caught up in the wrong moment. If this claim
is successful then the party itself is politically exonerated and ducks a blow that might
irreversibly undermine its continued existence” (Melissaris 2015).
In the face of such diametric positions, the argument becomes one of whether
those involved in these heinous acts are merely supporters and “wanna-bes” or active
members; further, if they are found to be members are they acting on their volition or at
the behest and encouragement of the Golden Dawn leadership. The BBC (2015) reported
that: “Police say they found evidence linking the killer of Pavlos Fyssas to the Golden
Dawn leadership. In the homes of MPs arrested, they said they uncovered photos of
Adolf Hitler and swastika flags. Witness testimony told of a ‘Fuehrer-like’ party
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structure, commanding hit squads that drove through Athens attacking migrants” (Lowen
2013).
Ultimately, there is too much evidence pointing to, at the least, an attitude of
turning the other cheek if not outright acceptance of violence as a permissible method to
achieve the group’s goals. Condition: unmet.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Golden Dawn does not openly tout a
racist platform. However, they are widely regarded as racist, homophobic, and antiSemite. Lesniak (2014) noted that “according to academic sources, the group is racist
and xenophobic.” Reported the BBC in October 2013, “Golden Dawn may officially
deny being a neo-Nazi movement but its badge resembles a swastika and some of its
senior members have praised Adolf Hitler… Mr. Michaloliakos himself has denied the
existence of gas chambers and crematoria at the site of the Auschwitz death camp.”
Further, In 2014, Golden Dawn MP Ilias Panagiotaros extolled “the virtues of a
"one-race nation, and lashed out at the minorities the party considers deviant in the 60
Minutes interview, describing Muslim immigrants as jihadists and gays as ‘faggots’”
(Smith 2014). He further stated that "until 1997, [the] international association of
doctors, and I don't know what, considered homosexuality a sickness, illness, which it is"
(Smith 2014). Condition: unmet.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. Another aspect of the group that is perhaps
undisputed is its status as right-wing. The only potential argument would be the group’s
degree of “far-rightedness,” as the party is described as ultra-right (Euractiv.com), farright (BBC, the Guardian, Reuters), and extreme right (AP). Condition: met.
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E. Eurosceptic. The party was, and remains, adamantly opposed to the EU. At
the exit polls in 2014, party spokesman Ilias Kasidiaris delivered a message from
Michaloliakos stating: “I congratulate you for managing to resist the government’s
terrorism and for not believing their lies…We are the only political power that actually
stands up against our state being run by foreign powers” (Govan 2014). Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. The Golden Dawn website (Golden Dawn 2015)
states “GOLDEN DAWN is a Popular and Nationalist Movement, with structures,
principles and positions… nationalism is the only absolute and true revolution because it
seeks the birth of new ethical, spiritual, social and mental values. The right and left
solutions supposedly fighting each other, are just a fake theater of two partners who
perpetuate the dominance of cosmopolitan internationalists, anti-national and anti-social
forces.” Lesniak (2014) affirmed that “the party's leader has openly identified it as
nationalist and racist.”
The group’s nationalist platform is one aspect of the party in which nearly
everyone can agree. Condition: met.
GOLDEN DAWN: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Jobbik- Hungary
According to its website, the Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary formed as
a party in October 2003, from a movement of the same name (Jobbik 2015). Its founders
were primarily Christian university students. Jobbik is a “principled, conservative and
radically patriotic Christian party. Its fundamental purpose is protecting Hungarian
values and interests” (jobbik.com).
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The group has seen its popularity continue to rise. Notes its website: “At the
2009 European parliamentary elections, Jobbik won 3 seats with 15% of the votes and in
doing so came close to beating the ruling Hungarian Socialists into third place. Hungary's
2010 parliamentary elections saw Jobbik cement its position as the nation's 3rd largest
party, doubling the vote it had received in the previous year and getting just 3 seats short
of the previous ruling party. Jobbik reached nearly 18% of the votes and delegated 47
deputies into the Hungarian Parliament” (Jobbik 2015).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. The group was formed in October 2003 (Jobbik
2015). Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. In a letter sent by Jobbik leadership to Reuters in 2014, the
group proclaimed “Jobbik condemns violence, and its members cannot be linked to such
acts either," (Business Insider 2014). Counterpoint (2014) rated Jobbik as a medium
danger for violence, contending “that the party is connected with violent groups and/or
party leaders have made comments encouraging violence, although there is little evidence
that members of the party leadership are themselves violent.” They noted that Jobbik
was “connected to the banned paramilitary group Magyar Garda, but party leaders have
denounced violence” (Counterpoint 2014). Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Jobbik (2015) states “what everyone
knows but is silenced by: “political correctness”– that “phenomenon of “gypsy crime” is
real.” It is a unique form of delinquency, different from the crimes of the majority in
nature and force” (Jobbik 2015). In an official statement on its website, the party states
“Jobbik has never denied the holocaust, and persistently refutes as absurd the idea that it
is anti-Semitic….(we) maintain that the charge is a completely invalid one, because the
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religious adherence or not of any of the parties involved, has absolutely no bearing or
relevance whatsoever to these matters, only the facts, and people's actions do.”
However, perhaps Germany’s Spiegel stated it best, noting that deputy
parliamentary floor leader Márton Gyöngyösi regularly devolves “into tiring marathons
of relativization… He's not an anti-Semite, he insists, but the Jews… he's not against the
Roma, but the Gypsies …” (Speigel 2012).
Counterpoint (2014) rated Jobbik as a high danger of homophobia, antiSemitism and racism. They noted that “there is clear evidence – either from the party
manifesto or comments by the party leadership – that the party discriminates against
people on the basis of race or ethnic group, stokes fears of Jews, and discriminates
against gay people” (Counterpoint 2014). Condition: unmet.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. In discussing its reputation for far-right extremism, the
Jobbik website states “as for Right-Wing political extremism, all the fundamental
constitutional changes that Jobbik proposes are marked out by the desire to give less
power to a centralised political elite, by giving more power to the people. Almost every
major measure we propose, has an established contemporary precedent in one or more
other European countries” (Jobbik 2015). News outlets worldwide including the BBC (3
October 2014) categorize Jobbik as far-right. Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. Jobbik (2015) states that “Jobbik rejects the Lisbon treaty
accepted by each party in the Hungarian Parliament and renounces the cynical tactics of
the political elite to force the EU Constitution upon the peoples of Europe, despite it
failing to ratify in France and the Netherlands… we endorse the Europe of Nations
concept instead of the United States of Europe agenda.” Jobbik is openly eurosceptic and
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regarded as such by media outlets worldwide (BBC, Washington Post, The Guardian,
etc). Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. Jobbik’s fundamental purpose, as asserted on its
website, is “protecting Hungarian values and interests…the party considers the
protection, replenishment and expansion of the national resources crucial. These include
the physical and mental condition of the nation, patriotic togetherness and solidarity”
(Jobbik 2015). Freedom House (2015c) referred to the group as “the radical-nationalist
and Euroskeptic” Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik). Condition: met.
JOBBIK: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
LAOS Popular Orthodox Rally (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός – LAOS), Greece
“LAOS is the Greek name for the Popular Orthodox Rally (also translated as
the Popular Orthodox Alarm), an extreme right-wing party in Greece” (JTA 2014).
Founded on 14 September 2000 by Georgios Karatzaferis, the party began as a split from
New Democracy (Project Gutenberg 2015). In 2007, “LAOS won 10 of the 300 seats in
Greek Parliament, making it the first extreme-right party in Greek Parliament since 1974”
(JTA 2014). Since 2009, the party has been a member of the EP group “Europe of
Freedom and Democracy.”
A. Occurring post-Cold War. LAOS was founded in September 2000 (Project
Gutenberg 2015). Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. LAOS is not regarded as a violent group. Violence amongst
Greek groups has been relegated other groups in Greece, most notably Golden Dawn.
Observed Roushas (2013): “Golden Dawn –in contrast to LAOS– has been explicitly
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violent throughout its political career.” In fact, LAOS offices were attacked in 2009 and
2001 (Michaletos, 2015). Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Multiple sources including the AntiDefamation League and the Huffington Post, cite a history of anti-Semitic statements
made by leader, Karatzaferis (Tzilivakis 2013; Mionis 2012). The Jewish Chronicle
(Elgot 2011) reported that: “The party has been condemned by the American Jewish
Committee…one party member Adonis Georgiadis, has publicly endorsed a book called
Jews: The Whole Truth on a television show, on a TV channel owned by the party.” The
book “has been described by the Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece as a
‘defamatory, anti-Semitic book in which Jews are called 'subhuman' and are directly
threatened with annihilation’” (Elgot 2011).
The United States Department of State also reported in Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2011 that “LAOS Party leader Georgios Karatzaferis had
made numerous anti-Semitic statements in the past, insinuating that Jews planned the
September 11 attacks and denying the existence of the Holocaust” (US State Department
2011). Condition: unmet
D. Right-wing/left-wing. According to the Popular Orthodox Rally website
(LAOS 2015, and Project Gutenberg 2015), party leader Karatzaferis proclaims the
Popular Orthodox Rally as "a profoundly democratic party… consisting of everything
from a ‘pre-dictatorship Right’ to a merger of Left and Right to a ‘Popular Liberalism’ in
official party literature.” The U.S. State Department (2011) categorizes LAOS as
“extreme right-wing.” Condition: met.
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E. Eurosceptic. Vasilopoulou (2010) contended that the LAOS perspective is
‘soft Eurosceptic:’ “LAOS sustains that the future of Greece is linked to a great extent to
the European Union. The party supports the incorporation of all the European states into
a viable Union, that is it is in favour enlarging the EU. However, it argues that ‘this can
only occur within the context of a Confederation where there would be recognition and
protection of the historic, cultural and ethnic roots as well as the ethnic characteristics of
the European peoples.’” (LAOS website as documented in Vasilopoulou 2010).11 Such
identification qualifies LAOS as contingent or qualified Eurosceptic. Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. Al Jazeera (Bollier 2012) reported that LAOS
“describes itself as ‘hellenocentric’ - opposes illegal immigration, and suggests deporting
all undocumented immigrants.” Commented party leader Giorgis Karatzaferis: "I don't
want them to become a majority" (Bollier 2012). The U.S. State Department (2011)
described LAOS as a “small, extreme right-wing party (that) supports virulent
nationalism.” Condition: met.
LAOS: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Lega Nord (Northern League-LN), Italy
Lega Nord per l'Indipendenza della Padania is a Italian political party
better known as Lega Nord, Lega or Carroccio. The party was founded as a regional party
in 1991 by Umberto Bossi. In 1996, Lega Nord declared its full name as the

Original document no longer online. Original Greek text per Vasilopoulou: ‘θεωρούµε
όµως ότι κάτι τέτοιο είναι δυνατόν να επιτευχθεί µόνο στα πλαίσια µιας Συνοµοσπονδίας
όπου θα αναγνωρίζονται και θα προστατεύονται οι ιστορικές τόσο οι πολιτισµικές και οι
εθνικές ρίζες όσο και τα ιδιαίτερα εθνικά χαρακτηριστικά των Ευρωπαϊκών λαών.’
11
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“Independent Republic of Padania” (Brambilla 2012). The party “advocates federalism
and transfer of control of resources to regional governments” and is a fierce opponent of
immigration (European Election and Referendum Database 2015). LN has an ultimate of
realizing the secession of Padania (the northern region of Italy) and creating a new panEuropean state that would include Northern Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Bavaria and
Savoy (Brambilla 2012).
Paxton (2004) observed that: “In the parliamentary elections of 1992, the Lega
Nord won almost 19 percent of the northern vote (8.6 percent nationally) by playing on
northern small businessmen’s resentment of the social burden of the Italian south,
expressed in terms approaching racism.” Lega Nord currently holds 60 seats in
parliament (European Election and Referendum Database 2015).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. Lega Nord was created in 1989 as a result of a
merger of seven regional leagues, including Alleanza Nord, Lega Lombarda and Liga
Veneta (Caramani and Mény 2005). It was officially established in February 1991 with
Umberto Bossi serving as chairman. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. LN condemns violence, instead advocating for civil
disobedience. As Zaslove (2011) notes, “Lega has not been directly involved in any acts
of violence other than small skirmishes and some acts of civil disobedience.”
Counterpoint (2014) concurred, rating the group as a “low danger” of violence.
Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Research from Counterpoint (2014)
indicated “little or no evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments by the
party leadership – that the party stokes fears of Jews” or that “the party discriminates
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against people on the basis of race or ethnic group.” However, Counterpoint (2014)
found “there is mixed evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments by the
party leadership – that the party discriminates against gay people.” The Democratic
Society (4/22/2014) reported that “some of the party’s local councils have banned kebab
shops ‘to preserve real local foods’... The party is widely considered to be Italy’s most
strongly anti-immigrant party. The party has often been labelled as Islamophobic, and has
sometimes been accused of racist rhetoric.”
In 2014, Lega Nord’s Gianluca Buonanno “dirtied his face with makeup to
illustrate the point that Italians ‘needed to be a little bit darker’ if they were going to get
welfare benefits. During a discussion in Italy's parliament last year on gay issues, he
produced a bulb of fennel — whose name in Italian is a homosexual slur — to taunt two
openly gay lawmakers. That particularly nicety came on the heels of a radio interview in
which he said that, if confronted by a homosexual, he would ‘kick him in the balls’”
(Faiola 2014).
Davies (2012) recounted a 2013 incident in which “Roberto Calderoli, a former
minister under Silvio Berlusconi and senate vice-president of the Northern League, told a
rally in the northern town of Treviglio that Kyenge would be better off working as a
minister ‘in her country.’” Calderoli also suggested “the country's first black government
minister had the features of an orangutan” stating: “I love animals, but when I see her, I
can't help but think of an orangutan" (Davies 2013). Calderoli himself claimed that what
he had said was a "little joke" and that it was "not racist" (Foot 2013). Foot (2013)
opined that:
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The Lega has always been a racist party, fanning the flames of ethnic and
religious conflict whenever it has been able to. You could compile an
encyclopedia of the League's racist comments and activities. There was, for
example, the mayor of a major Italian city who argued that immigrants should be
dressed as animals and hunted down, or the League politician who recently
claimed to be happy on hearing of the death of immigrants trying to arrive by
sea… (Foot 2013)

One of the problems is that there is disagreement over what racism actually is.
Calderoli thinks that comparing a black woman to an orangutan is a ‘little joke,’ or even a
‘funny joke.’ When [Italian footballer] Mario Balotelli was depicted as King Kong in a
cartoon, many people didn't see any problem at all. (Foot 2013)
Smythe (2013) provided provocative insight: “when you have Italians in the
South not considered Italians because of their skin colour or the lack of industry,
oblivious to the fact that Italians worldwide have been considered people of colour until
only recently. Italy does not need an awareness campaign of the Other. Italy needs first to
recognise who the Other is, and it should start with a mirror.”
Are these examples of ignorance, insensitivity or racism? It is best to revisit the
original qualifiers/disqualifiers set forth at the beginning of this chapter: mission and
vision do not specifically contain anti-Semitic, racist or homophobic ideology with
information gathered from a review of group’s mission, vision, official
website(s)/publications, and/or media/news reports. In the case of LN, the party was
founded with the guiding principle of separatism and creating a distinction between
northern Italy and southern Italy. Can one be racist against his/her own race? Could such
sentiment be better described as elitism?
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In 1993, Putnam acknowledged the long-standing dichotomy between southern
and northern Italy, and pointed to the level of civic engagement as an explanation.
Putnam (1993) contends that this concept of social capital was largely absent in southern
Italy but present in northern Italy and led to the north’s prosperity. This disparity is the
foundation of LN’s argument and the foundation of their separatist ideology.
The final word comes in the form of an opinion rendered by the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). In 2002, the ECRI denounced the
party, asserting that "members of Lega Nord made a particularly intense use of racist and
xenophobic propaganda". Yet the racist hate speech continued despite the party’s 2013
creation of a new “anti-racist committee” to defend Italians from Roma. The 2015 report
found that “from January 2013 to March 2015 the ERRC has documented the following
in relation to hate speech: 35 cases of hate speech by public figures, including two
demonstrations. Most of the hate speech (15 cases) came from the Lega Nord (Northern
League), a political party” (ERRC 2015). Condition: unmet.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. Paxton (2004) characterized LN as a far-right separatist
group. The Democratic Society (4/22/2014) noted that: “While the party was initially a
rather catch-all party for Northern regionalism, it has become a right-wing populist beast
with tough stances on crime and immigration.” News media such as the BBC utilize
headlines touting the group as right-wing” (Squires 2013). Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. LN argues that “the European institutions are not close to the
European citizens and that integration should mean the respect of the traditions and
cultures of the European peoples, which is not currently the case. However, it
argues that ‘we must construct a Europe that is founded on the respect of national and
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territorial realities, giving the European Union only a limited degree of sovereignty,
delimiting its competences and the fields of its intervention avoiding ambiguities’” (LN
website as documented in Vasilopoulou 2010).12
Further, “as a consequence of Italy's integration in the EMU in 1998, the Lega
Nord shifted from a pro-European to a Eurosceptic position. The Lega's Eurosceptic
vision combines a strong identification with Europe with a hostile attitude towards the
institutions of the EU” (Huysseune 2010). LN’s new party secretary, Matteo Salvini, has
recently “described the European Union as a ‘monster’ that needs to be ‘slaughtered’ and
has called the Euro a ‘crime against humanity’ (Squires 2013). Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. LN advocates for the creation of a new, independent
state that would better serve the people of northern Italy. The Democratic Society
(4/22/2014) observed that: “The party has wavered between separatism for the North and
a federal Italy. At its most separatist the Lega claims that the North of Italy is a forgotten
nation called ‘Padania’. In the late 1990s the Lega went as far as to arrange elections to a
‘Padanian parliament’, a Padanian football team and even a ‘Miss Padania’ beauty
contest in order to lay claim to a ‘Padanian’ nationhood.”
The Democratic Society (April 2014) reported that the group touts a “Padanian
nationalist stance and stronger anti-immigrant stances.” Condition: met.
LEGA NORD: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

Original document no longer online. Original Italian text per Vasilopoulou (2010): “si
deve cercare di costruire un’Europa fondata sul rispetto delle realtà nazionali e
territoriali, cedendo all’Unione Europea solo una limitata parte di sovranità,delimitando
chiaramente le proprie competenze; vanno delimitati con precisione gli ambiti di
intervento dell’Unione Europea, evitando norme ambigue ed indefinite.”
12
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National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei DeutschlandsNPD)
An official NPD website states that NPD: “is Germany's oldest nationalist party
since 1945 and one of the few patriotic organizations not yet banned by the government.
It was formed on November 28, 1964, by leading members of the disbanded Deutsche
Reichspartei and several smaller patriotic groups” (NPD 2015). The party has been the
target of much scrutiny due to alleged ties with neo-Nazism, racism, anti-Semitism, and
homophobia. The party website notes that “in 2004 the NPD attained 9,2% of the
electorate and won factional strength in state parliament in the southeastern State of
Saxony and only two years later 7,3% in the northeastern State of MecklenburgVorpommern where a second faction in a state parliament was established with Udo
Pastörs as leader. This was a real shock for the system-parties in Germany. Besides these
victories, the NPD also made good progress in municipal and local elections with over
21% of the votes in some districts” (NPD 2015). The party is viewed as extreme-right
wing with racist tendencies and there are ongoing attempts to ban the group.
A. Occurring post-Cold War. According to the NPD website, beginning at the
end of the 1970s then-chairman, Martin Mussgnug, “began a restructuring which
combined the dropping of much of the early conservative political rhetoric with an
emphasis on the ideological education of members. Thereafter the party began
concentrating upon building a strong organizational infrastructure, rather than upon shortterm electioneering. Consequently, after the partial reunification of Germany in 1990, the
NPD was able to gain considerable strength in the eastern part of the country: the former
German Democratic Republic” (NPD 2015).
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Thus, despite some waxing and waning, because the party was founded in the
1960’s and has held to a similar agenda throughout, the party will not meet the condition
of occurring post-Cold War. Condition: unmet.
B. Non-Violent. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (Lee 2015):
“The German government asked the country's highest court to ban the NPD, claiming it
has ties to neo-Nazi Skinhead gangs involved in a surge of violent attacks against
foreigners and other minorities.”
Further, “Describing the NPD as the ideological seedbed for neo-Nazi
aggression, German officials accuse the party of fomenting racist violence throughout the
country… [In 1998] NPD candidate Manfred Roeder called for the violent overthrow of
the German government” (Lee 2015). Borrud (2015) has noted that many people “have
witnessed first-hand the violence that groups like the NPD are able to bring about.”
Condition: unmet.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Ralf Jäger, Interior minister of North
Rhine Westphalia, contended that "the NPD provides the basis for neo-Nazi violence and
spreads hatred against foreigners" (Borrud 2015). In the past few years, there have been
numerous attempts to have the party banned. Deutsche Welle has reported that the
primary problem in having the party (or any party) prohibited (Borrud 2015) is mounting
sufficient evidence: “Explicit proof that the party not only condones - but also takes an
active part in - unconstitutional actions such as the propagation of racism and xenophobia
must be successfully demonstrated before the country's leading justices. The case is to be
made by the leaders of Germany's 16 federal states, who comprise the Bundesrat, or the
upper house of federal parliament.” Indeed, following an unsuccessful attempt in 2003 to
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ban the party, it was determined that NPD executives had provided much of the evidence
(Borrud 2015). Additionally, the NPD Party Programme states that ‘homosexual couples
are not family and may not be promoted. Children need a mother and father for a healthy
development.’ 13
As reported by Reuters (Chambers 2012): “Germany's domestic intelligence
service has described the NPD as ‘racist, anti-Semitic and revisionist’ and says it aims to
abolish democracy.” Further, noted Chambers (2012): “The party calls the German
constitution a ‘diktat’ imposed by victorious Western powers after 1945.” Condition:
unmet.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. The party is unapologetically right-wing and even
described as extreme and radical right-wing by multiple news agencies. Condition:
met.
E. Eurosceptic. The NPD Party Programme (NPD 2015) explicitly declares
that “We reject all ‘multicultural’ societal models as inhuman, because they alienate both
German and non-German community order.”14 The EU Observer reported that “NPD is
in favour of a breakup of the eurozone and a return to national currencies, and demands a
‘rapid dismantling of the European Stability Mechanism’ – the eurozone bailout fund”
(Pop 2014). Condition: met.

Original German text, translation my own: “Homosexuelle Lebenspartnerschaften
bilden keine Familie und dürfen nicht gefördert werden. Kinder brauchen Mutter und
Vater für eine gesunde Entwicklung.”
14
Original German text, translation my own: “Wir lehnen alle ‘multikulturellen“
Gesellschaftsmodelle als unmenschlich ab, weil sie Deutsche und Nichtdeutsche
gleichermaßen der nationalen Gemeinschaftsordnung entfremden”
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F. Nationalist/Reformist. As proclaimed in the Party Programme, NPD is the
home of the social party of Germans, is committed to human rights and is therefore
working consistently for national identity, national sovereignty and national solidarity as
a means of livelihood of our people.15 Condition: met.
NPD: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Party of the Swedes (Svenskarnas parti –SVP), Sweden
The party disbanded in May 2015 following highly disappointing national
election results in 2014.
PARTY OF THE SWEDES: N/A
Pegida -Germany
Pegida is far-right radical group which has taken Germany by storm during its
short existence. The Economist (2/23/2015) reported that “the movement was founded
last autumn [2014] in Dresden… Its first organiser was Lutz Bachmann, an owner of an
ad agency who had repeatedly fallen afoul of the law and who once fled to South Africa
to avoid going to prison.” Germany’s Spiegel expanded, noting that, “on Oct. 10, 2014,
Lutz Bachmann posted a video on YouTube showing a Dresden rally in support of
Kurdish fighters battling Islamic State. One day later, he founded a Facebook group
called ‘Peaceful Europeans against the Islamization of the West,’ which ultimately turned
into Pegida” (Popp and Wassermann 1/12/2015). Explained the Economist (2/23/15):

Original German text, translation is my own: “Die Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschlands ist die soziale Heimatpartei der Deutschen, bekennt sich zu einem
lebensrichtigen Menschenbild und setzt sich deshalb konsequent für nationale Identität,
nationale Souveränität und nationale Solidarität als Lebensgrundlagen unseres Volkes
ein.”
15
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“Pegida is a German acronym for ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamicisation of the
Occident.’” The Economist (2/23/2015) also observed that “the sudden and spontaneous
rise of Pegida has caused much soul-searching in German society and has shaken its
political system.” The group holds well-attended demonstrations every Monday known as
‘Monday marches.’ Time Magazine (Shuster 2015) noted that a survey taken in
December 2014 “found that 30% of respondents had ‘full and total’ sympathy for
Pegida’s cause, the same level of support that Merkel’s political party got in the German
elections to the European Parliament last year.”
A. Occurring post-Cold War. Pegida was founded in the fall of 2014 by Lutz
Bachmann. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. Shuster (2015) reported in Time Magazine that Bachmann
publicly renounces extremist violence of any kind. In July 2015, a town hall in Freital,
Germany, to discuss housing of refugees turned into chaos as opposing sides argued and
fights ensued. When Deutsche Welle asked Bachmann for comment on the violent nature
of the meeting, he replied: "In principle we support any protests that are directed against
economic migrants. We're behind those. But we do not support protests directly against
homes where there are definite war refugees" (Knight 2015).
Such a comment is thinly veiled support of violence. Condition: unmet.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The Economist (2/23/15) calls Pegida
“a German movement with an explicitly anti-Islamist and implicitly xenophobic
message” and perceive Muslims as a threat to German culture. Indeed, Pegida member
Siegfried Däbritz has stated, "We want to gather to oppose the advancing Islamization of
our country. We don't want terrorist, Islamist powers to fight their religious war on our
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streets. We are against IS, PKK, al-Qaida and all the others," (Popp and Wassermann
1/12/2015). Further, Bachmann added: "It is clear that people will accuse us of being
Nazis. But why should we make it easy for them rather than being clear about where we
stand from the beginning: PATRIOTIC and not Nazi!"
In January 2015, Bachmann “abruptly stepped down after pictures of him
posing as Hitler on his Facebook page became public. A march on January 19th was
cancelled by police after they obtained information concerning a possible plan to
assassinate Mr Bachmann…” (Economist 2/23/2015). Bachmann, however, reassumed
his leadership of Pegida by February 2015.
In a January 2015 interview with YNet News, Christian Mayerhoff, a
spokesperson for PEGIDA, asserted "We are no Nazis. Personally I was active in leftwing human rights movements in my youth during the early 1990s. After 9/11 I started
learning about Islam and Islamism and this changed my opinion about multiculturalism
and political correctness. In PEGIDA there are leftists, centrists and conservatives. In the
city of Kassel our committee includes a Croatian, a Jew and a secularized Muslim…”
As with PVV and others, there is a definite prejudice against Islam but
prejudice is, arguably, not racism and Islam is a religion not a race. Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. BBC News (January 2015) has reported that Pegida is
an “umbrella group” for the German right-wing. The group embraces their right-wing
status, but desires the public to view right-wing parties in a different light: “We want to
emphasize that this here is not to become a collection of right-wing crazies, neo-Nazis or
the like but is the first step for a Germany and a Europe where people can once again say
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what they want, where patriotism is no longer a crime," (Popp and Wassermann 2015).
Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. The Economist (2/23/2015) wrote that “supporters seem
troubled by the perceived threat to German culture posed by immigrants and asylumseekers.” In January 2015, the group presented a 19-point manifesto with a “six-point
plan demanding clear immigration rules, an end to “absurd” EU controls and direct
democracy in Germany through referenda” (Scally 2015). Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. Pegida presented their six-point highly nationalistic and
reformative political platform in January 2015: “First: qualitative rather than quantitative
immigration; second: compulsory integration for foreigners; third: no entry visas for
jihadis; fourth: referendums; fifth: a good relationship with Russia; sixth: more money for
the police” (Schulze 2015).
Thran and Boehnke (2015) analyzed Pegida’s nationalist views, noting “the
xenophobic logic of Pegida's value-based nationalism.” Condition: met.
PEGIDA: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Podemos (We Can), Spain
Frayer (2015) reported that Podemos was founded by Pablo Iglesias (also known
as El Coleta “the ponytailed one”) and Miguel Urbán of the radical left party “Izquierda
Anticapitalista” in January 2014, with pretensions of breaking the two-party hegemony in
Spanish politics. Iglesias (2015) noted that” after the May 2014 elections, Podemos had
five MEPs, although it still lacked a formal political leadership and an organized
territorial and sectoral structure across regions, as well as formal mechanisms for
decision-making.” McHugh (2015) observed that: “By May 2015, Podemos had swept
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many local elections, winning important mayoral seats in major cities like Barcelona and
destabilizing parties that had held positions since the 1980s.”
Noted Duarte and Tadeo (2015): “At the center of the Podemos’s platform is a
plan to force a restructuring of Spain’s 1 trillion euros ($1.1 trillion) of government debt
in what would be the biggest sovereign reorganization in history. The proposal has helped
Podemos top 10 opinion polls in Spain since November.” McHugh (2015) observed that
Podemos “built its platform in opposition to the austerity policies adopted by most debtstricken European nations, which included budget cuts and higher taxes in exchange for
debt-relief loans from European lenders.” Many people in the political arena voice
concern regarding Iglesias’ close relationship with Greek Syriza leader Tsipras,
wondering how it might impact or even steer Podemos.
A. Occurring post-Cold War. Iglesias officially announced the creation of
Podemos on January 17, 2014, at a small theatre in Lavapiés, a district in Madrid
(Tremlett 2015). Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. Podemos has virtually no connections with violence though, as
noted by Kassam (2014), “Others have taken aim at his words – he has been accused of
justifying terrorism at the hands of Eta after he said that the group's violence ‘had
political explanations’ that needed to be understood in order to find democratic
solutions.”
Observers note the party’s rise based on peaceful demonstrations: Podemos
“was forged on the back of the largely peaceful protests held across Spain by the M-15
anti-austerity movement during 2011 and 2012” (Nicholas 2014). Condition: met.
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C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. As outlined in the 2015 Podemos
electoral platform, ‘El Programa del Cambio” (Podemos, 2015), Podemos advocated for
gay rights, abortion rights, gender equality and civic liberties (Igualidad), and favored an
open and inclusive immigration policy (Migraciones). Zabala (2015) observed that:
“Contrary to Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement, which ruined its reputation in Italy by
joining Nigel Farage's racist Europe of Freedom and Democracy group, Podemos opted
for the European United Left/Nordic Green Left group, where Israel's occupation of
Palestinian territories as well as the CIA's torture programme are often condemned.”
Further, the Podemos platform specifically addressed racism noting that “we
will implement a plan to combat racism, xenophobia and other forms of discrimination
affecting both people of Spanish origin residing abroad as well as people of foreign origin
residing in Spain.” 16 Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. Podemos is widely considered a left-wing political
party, though “party leaders have often resisted the designation of ‘radical left,’ saying
the group exists too far outside of the mainstream to be right or left” (McHugh 2015). Al
Jazeera classifies the group as far-left (Zabala 2015). Noted Zabala (2015): “Even though
their manifesto and programme was clearly rooted in European radical left, they defined
it ‘a participatory method open to all citizens,’ that is, independent of ideological
preferences.” Condition: met.

Original Spanish text (translation my own): “Pondremos en marcha un plan de lucha
contra el racismo, la xenofobia y cualquier otra forma de discriminación que afecte tanto
a las personas de origen español que residen en el exterior como a las personas de origen
extranjero residentes en España” (Podemos, 2015).
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E. Eurosceptic. Frayer (2015) noted that “Iglesias argues that Spain's recovery
has come at the expense of the Spanish working-class, which continues to suffer from
slumping wages and persistently high unemployment — still 23%. He blames ruling
conservatives, Germany and the troika of the European Union, European Central Bank
and International Monetary Fund — and vows, if elected prime minister, to roll back the
austerity measures they support.” Iglesias contends one enemy of Spain is “Germany’s
chancellor Angela Merkel and the unelected officials who oversaw the euro from the
European Central Bank in Frankfurt. Iglesias did not want Spain to leave the European
Union, but he was not satisfied with it either” (Tremlett 2015). Such views are in line
with soft euroscepticism.
Stokes (2015) also pointed out that Podemos “has called for a renegotiation of
EU-demanded fiscal austerity measures and a curbing of EU powers.” Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. Above all, Iglesias has stated that “he wanted
Spaniards to recover ‘sovereignty’ (Tremlett 2015). As noted above in Duarte and Tadeo
(2015): Podemos sought “a plan to force a restructuring of Spain’s 1 trillion euros ($1.1
trillion) of government debt in what would be the biggest sovereign reorganization in
history.” The 2015 Podemos platform (Podemos 2015) explicitly states “El nuestro es
un programa ciudadano. De la ciudadanía y para la ciudadanía” (Ours is a national
program. Of the citizens and for the citizens). Condition: met.
PODEMOS: ALL CONDITIONS MET
Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP), Turkey
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The Republican People’s Party (CHP) was established in 1923 “and mostly ran a
single-party regime for the first quarter century of existence. It transformed Turkey from
a mostly pious Sultanate to a westward-looking country: political Islam was banned,
women were enfranchised, and a Latin alphabet replaced the old Arabic lexicon”
(JamesinTurkey.com 2015).
However, as part of a military coup on 12 September 1980, The National Security
Council (MGK), dissolved Parliament and the Government, and created adopted a
military-inspired constitution that banned political parties (Reuters 3 May 2010). The
Turkey Analyst (May 2008) noted that “when the ban on pre-1980 political parties was
lifted in 1992, Baykal immediately re-established the old CHP.”
In February 1995, CHP merged with SHP, then the main left-wing party, with
Baykal serving as leader until May 2010 (All About Turkey 2015). Reported All About
Turkey (2015):
Following the general elections of April 1999, CHP - which obtained only
8.7% of the votes - disappeared from the Parliament for the first time in its
history. During the elections of 2002, ex-leader Mr. Baykal re-gained his
seat and they were able to get 19.39% of the votes, thus became the
second and the main opposition party in the parliament.
In 2007 they joined their forces with DSP and got 20.88% of the votes.
After the elections, members from DSP have left the party and returned to
their original party. In 2011 they got 25.92% of the votes and thus hold
135 seats. In 2015 they got 25.13% of the votes and hold 132 seats. (All
About Turkey 2015)
In 2014, Today’s Zaman reported that “The main opposition Republican People's
Party (CHP) is undergoing a transformation and has, under the leadership of Kemal
Kılıçdaroğlu, nominated certain names in local and presidential elections who are
affiliated with the political center-right and who embrace a conservative ideology in
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consecutive elections in an effort to break the party's reputation of only appealing to a
limited part of society. The party has also signaled change in its policy direction on the
Kurdish problem, which has occupied the agenda of the country for decades” (Üstüntağ
9/6/2014).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. Though CHP was formed in 1923, it survived the
1980s ban on political parties to reemerge in a new Turkey in 1992. Through leadership
changes and party mergers, the party took various forms though it presented a new
ideology in 2014. Caliskan (2014) argued that CHP has experienced three
transformations- the first during the 1930s when CHP was the state; the second beginning
around 1971 under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit; and the third in the 2000s under
Kiliçdaroglu.
Kiliçdaroglu promised a fundamental change of course in the party’s political
practice with an initial goal of bridging the gap between CHP’s two ideological wings,
the Nationalists and Social Democrats (Caliskan 2014). Following an electoral loss in
2011, Kiliçdarogllu called for a party congress to change the dated party constitution. He
pushed for democracy and introduced positive discrimination for women and a 10%
youth quota (Caliskan 2014). In 2015, the success of the new party ideology was
apparent as CHP garnered 25% of the vote. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. CHP condemns violence. In 2014, Kılıçdaroğlu stated that "We
all need to know that terrorism is a humanity crime" (Daily Sabah 10/10/2014). Turkish
Weekly (2015) reported that Kılıçdaroğlu has spoken against violence: “Turning our
demonstrations into violent acts would only serve the terrorist organization. Let’s
denounce terrorism, let’s march against it with our flags in our hands.” Condition: met.
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C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Kulaoğlu (2015) reported that: “Faruk
Loğoğlu, deputy chairman of CHP, told Turkey’s Zaman that the CHP categorically
rejects any manifestation of anti-Semitic behavior and discourse, whether in Turkey or
elsewhere.” Loğoğlu stated that: “We strongly blame Erdoğan and his cohorts for hurting
the feelings of our citizens of Jewish origin and for endangering their well-being and
safety…no one should forget that that the family of nations views anti-Semitism as a
crime against humanity. The CHP stands in solidarity with our citizens of Jewish origin,"
(Arslan, 3/16/2014). Further, CHP has proposed homosexual candidates for elections and
has signed on to protect the rights of homosexuals (Kulaoğlu, 2015). Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. As noted above, the party is historically left-wing,
though under the leadership of Kiliçdaroglu it has seen movement toward the right (All
About Turkey 2015). TRTWorld (2015) classifies the group as left wing. Condition:
met.
E. Eurosceptic. Uzun and Kaleagasi (2015) noted that “CHP has consistently
been against censoring of media, for freedom of speech, and for further integration into
the European Union.” In 2015, “CHP announced plans to build a new mega city called
‘Central Turkey’ (Merkez Türkiye) to serve as a trade hub between Europe, Asia and
other continents” (CHP EU 2015). Condition: unmet.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. According to All About Turkey (2015), “CHP’s main
ideological source has always been Kemalism, which is the modernization paradigm of
Turkish Republic… [Kemalism] was meant to preserve the independence of the Republic
of Turkey and also to help the Republic's political development. It was a nationalism
which respected the right to independence of all other nations.”
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CHP is reported to be embracing ‘soft-nationalism.’ Mahçupyan (2012) opined
that as embraced by CHP, “nationalism represents a true alternative and is a postmodern
form of Kemalism.” Condition: met.
CHP: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Right Sector (Pravy Sektor/ Правий сектор), Ukraine
The Right Sector is a Ukrainian movement led by Dmitry Yarosh. According to
the group’s official website (http://pravyysektor.info), the movement originated during
the early events of Euromaidan in Kiev Square (Maidan) on November 28, 2013, as a
union of right-wing organizations and individual activists. Right Sector is considered a
far-right, ultranationalist, militant group.
A. Occurring post-Cold War. The group was formed in 2013, in Kiev.
Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. According to the BBC (28 April 2014), “activists claiming to be
Right Sector members were involved in Kiev's Maidan protests from late November, but
the group did not attract much attention until violent clashes with police in central Kiev
on 19 January, in which it played a leading role. By early February Mr Yarosh was
saying the Right Sector had 500 fighters on Independence Square and could mobilise up
to 5,000 nationwide.” Additionally, the BBC (28 April 2014) reported that Russia has
accused the Right Sector of “involvement in multiple acts of violence” including “against
pro-Moscow separatists in eastern Ukraine… The Right Sector denies this, but maintains
a barrage of anti-Russian rhetoric” (BBC 28 April 2014). Indeed, after a “Right Sector
activist wounded a number of people in central Kiev in 2014, the group was forced to
vacate its city headquarters, leaving all weapons behind” (BBC 28 April 2014).
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Peters (2015) reported that the Right Sector has threatened violence throughout
Ukraine, and on July 11, 2015, “the neo-fascist organization engaged in a gun battle in
the town of Mukacheve.” Condition: unmet.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Party leader Yarosh has rejected all
accusations of racism, asserting that “he regards anyone who fights for Ukraine as a
comrade. Right Sector leaders have recently assured the Israeli ambassador that they
reject anti-Semitism along with other forms of chauvinism and xenophobia” (BBC 28
April 2014). In April 2014, a representative of Right Sector “travelled to Odessa after
vandals defaced a Holocaust monument with Nazi symbols to show solidarity with the
local Jewish community” (International Business Times 2014). Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. Right Sector is widely regarded as extreme right wing
and far right wing (BBC 7/23/15). Peters (2015) notes that ‘the relationship between Kiev
and Right Sector is rooted in a shared political ideology—right-wing nationalism and
virulent anti-communism.” Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. BBC (28 April 2014) reported that Right Sector leading figure,
Andriy Tarasenko, has stated that the group aimed “not for closer ties with Europe but
rather to build a nationalist Ukrainian state and stage a nationalist revolution." Not only is
the group adamantly anti-Russia, they are also anti-Europe. The group “regards the EU
as an ‘oppressor’ of European nations” (BBC January 2014). Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. Right Sector’s official website states that it is an
organized movement that aims for Ukrainian national liberation from foreign and
domestic occupation and nation-building (Pravy Sektor 2015) The website further states
that the mission of the movement is gaining and development of an Independent
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Ukrainian State through a national revolution. The BBC (28 April 2014) refers to the
group as “ultra-nationalist.” Condition: met.
RIGHT SECTOR: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana-SNS), Slovakia
The Institute for European Policy (2013) noted that the Slovak National Party
claimed to be “the oldest Slovak political party, tracing its roots to the 19th century
Slovak National Party. However this historical SNS was rather an honorary
party representing all political groups nationally self-defined as Slovak… there is no
traceable continuity among these two subjects from 1938 to 1990.” The party in its
current form an iteration was founded in March 1990. The party has seen multiple
leadership changes and mergers/splits. A 1999 splinter of the party led to the creation of
Real Slovak National Party though both parties shared a principal ideology and policies
(Institute for European Policy 2013). Ultimately, the parties merged in 2003 naming Ján
Slota as chairman. By 2006, they had “gained 11% of the votes and became the third
biggest parliamentary faction and, after eight years, also part of the ruling coalition”
(Institute for European Policy 2013). In July 2011, “SNS signed a memorandum of
understanding with the Austrian Freedom Party to oppose Turkeys bid for EU
membership” (Lansford 2015). The SNS is a member of the EP group “Europe of
Freedom and Democracy.”
A. Occurring post-Cold War. The current iteration of SNS was established in
March 1990. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. No associations with violence were identified in conjunction
with SNS. Any accusations lobbied against SNS in regards to violence related to their
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agenda inciting violent behavior in others. Counterpoint (2014) concurs, discovering “no
evidence of violence within the party leadership.” Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The group is perceived as racist and
xenophobic, but is perception reality? In its manifesto for the general elections of 2010,
SNS “defined the nation in terms of values and culture” (Institute for European Policy
2013). It included ethnic minorities into the definition of national culture…” rather than
speaking about helping this community [Roma minority], the manifesto calls for control
of this ethnic group” (Institute for European Policy 2013). In the 2006 general election
SNS manifesto, the party acknowledged that “the nation was understood as the primary
value of reference. However the nation is not defined by race or blood but rather by
culture, shared history and most importantly by language and values” (Institute for
European Policy 2013).
However, Slota, the party’s former leader (Slota was removed as leader in
2013), “made many controversial statements, including threatening to role tanks into
Budapest, referred to medieval Hungarians as ‘Mongoloid types with crooked legs and
even more disgusting horses’ suggesting that they were ‘civilised’ by Slovaks. He has
referred to Hungarians as a ‘tumour in the body of the Slovakian nation.’ He stated that
70% of Roma were criminals and suggested the best policy for dealing with them was a
‘long whip in a small yard’” (Democratic Society 2014).
A 2009 report on Slovakia prepared by the European Commission Against
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and published in May 2009 by the Council of Europe
(Ivo.sk 2015), pointed out the “worrying increase ... in racist political discourse mainly
against the Hungarian minority as well as against, inter alia, Roma and Jewish people”
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since the coalition government comprising the Slovak National Party took power in 2006
(ECRI 2009). However, blaming an entire coalition’s behavior on one member seems
quite a stretch. Indeed as discussed by Mesežnikov (2009), “The SNS may be described
as the most relevant factor of radical though not anti-system) nationalism in Slovakia.
The party currently enjoys a strong position within the power system thanks to its ability
to capitalize on xenophobic and anti-minority (i.e. anti-Hungarian) sentiments of certain
population segments and due to coalition strategies applied by other populist parties.”
Ultimately, UK’s Counterpoint (2014) summarized it most succinctly: “there is
mixed evidence from the party’s history that the party promoted (or promotes) values
directly opposed to democracy and human rights… the roots of the Slovak National Party
(SNS) are in the campaign for Slovakian independence in the 1990s. It has had a
chequered past, with a number of splits and changes in approach. But the SNS has
claimed continuity with the historical Slovak National Party, which in turn had members
connected to the Nazi regime in Slovakia, and the party shown support for fascist leader
Jozef Tiso.”
Counterpoint (2014) rated the SNS as a high danger for racism and
homophobia, arguing that there is “clear evidence – either from the party manifesto or
comments by the party leadership – that the party discriminates against people on the
basis of race or ethnic group” and that the party discriminates against gay people.
Condition: unmet.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. SNS is characterized as ultra-nationalism and radical
right-wing by academics and media alike, ranging from Mesežnikov (2009), Minkenburg
(2015), International Business Times (2015), and Reuters (2012). Condition: met.
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E. Eurosceptic. According to the SNS manifesto, the party “advocated for a
Europe of sovereign nation states and criticized the bureaucracy of the European
institution” (Institute for European Policy 2013). The “Party explicitly refuses the liberal
immigrant policy produced by the EU…The EU is defined as an institution importing
liberal policy such as multiculturalism; but in fact, the EU misuses Slovakia while
ignoring national sovereignty and serving TNCs and global capitalism” (Institute for
European Policy 2013). Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. The primary objective of SNS, as stated repeatedly
in their 2010 manifesto, was “to establish a government composed only of Slovak
political parties, meaning without any party representing ethic minority interests… The
creation of this so called ‘Slovak government’ was necessary, according to SNS, because
Slovak national interests were in grave danger” (Institute for European Policy 2013).
Further, “SNS strongly condemns the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and
rejects any possibility to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state. The nation is more than
simply a summary of the citizens – it is an entity with its own, distinctive identity.”
Condition: met.
SNS: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Svoboda (Всеукраїнське об’єднання «Свобода), Ukraine
As detailed on the Svoboda website (Svoboda 2015), “the Svoboda Partyformerly the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU)- was formed as a merger of
several groups including: the Varta Rukhu (Rukh's Guards), the Studentske Bratstvo
(Students' Brotherhood), the Spadshchyna (Heritage) and the Ukrainian Veterans of
Afghanistan.” They note that “on 29 September 1991, a coordinating group session was
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held in Lviv, followed by a founding Convention on 13 October 1991 which announced
the creation of the SNPU” (Svoboda 2015). “At the 9th SNPU Convention on 14
February 2004, a new name was adopted for the party - the ‘All-Ukrainian Svoboda
Union,’ and elected Oleh Tiahnybok as Svoboda's leader” (Svoboda.org 2015).
The BBC (4/28/2014) reported that “the nationalist Svoboda party - also a
significant player in the Maidan protests - now has three powerful posts in the interim
government: acting chief prosecutor, deputy prime minister and chairman of the National
Security Council.” In the 2012 parliamentary election, 10.44% voted for Svoboda, lading
the party to claim 37 parliamentary seats. However, 2014 would be a resounding
disappointment. Svoboda failed to earn a seat in Parliament “falling only 0.3% short of
the required minimum of 5%” (Ishchenko 2014). However, The Guardian also noted that
“infamous extreme right politician from the Svoboda party Yuriy Mykhalchyshyn, who
once promoted Joseph Goebbels’ A Little ABC of National Socialism and the 25-point
NSDAP Program, will head up propaganda and analysis in the Security Service of
Ukraine” (Ishchenko 2014).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. SNPU was formed in 1991 and the name change
to Svoboda occurred in 2004. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. Yahoo News (8/31/2015) reported that “The Ukrainian
ultranationalist party Svoboda, blamed for clashes that killed one person and injured
dozens more outside parliament on Monday, has a long-established reputation for violent
confrontation.” The August 2015 incident outside Parliament involved an admitted
member of Svoboda and the Sich battalion who tossed a grenade at police officers and
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journalists -- its shrapnel killing a 24-year-old member of the National Guard (Yahoo
News 8/31/2015).
Additionally, “Svoboda lawmakers have been known to engage in physical
confrontations with pro-Russian parliamentarians” (Yahoo News 8/31/2015). On its
website, Svoboda has noted that 19 of its members have died in fighting with pro-Russian
separatists since April 2014 (Yahoo News 8/31/2015). Condition: unmet.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Olszański (2011) noted that “the party
advocated the social nationalist ideology by combining radical nationalism with equally
radical social rhetoric. Among the canons of its ideology there was: a vision of the nation
as a natural community, the primacy of the nation’s rights over human rights, the urge to
build an ‘ethnic economy’, but also an openly racist rhetoric concerning white
supremacy.”
Andrew Srulevitch, director of European Affairs for the Anti-Defamation League,
said: "Svoboda has been disciplined in its messaging regarding Jews since the Maidan
demonstrations started in November, but they have a history of anti-Semitic statements to
overcome, and a clear political program of ethnic nationalism that makes Jews nervous"
(Zawadzki, Hosenball and Grey 2014).
However, in 2004, concurring with the party name change to Svoboda, “the
radical neo-Nazi and racist groups were pushed out from the party” (Olszański 2011).
Ivan Katchanovski, an expert in comparative politics, contended that "Svoboda is
currently best described as a radical nationalist party, and not as fascist or neo-Nazi…It is
now not overtly anti-Semitic" (Zawadzki, Hosenball and Grey 2014). Additionally,
Zawadzki, Hosenball and Grey (2014) reported that a senior U.S. official observed that:
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"Since entering the Ukrainian Parliament in October 2012, the Svoboda leadership has
been working to take their party in a more moderate direction and to become a modern,
European mainstream political party…The leadership has been much more vigilant about
expelling or otherwise punishing individual members who engage in xenophobic
behavior or rhetoric." (Zawadzki, Hosenball and Grey 2014). Yahoo News (8/31/2015)
noted that “Svoboda has continued to adopt hugely controversial positions, staunchly
opposing gay pride parades and annual pilgrimages to the country by Hassidic Jews.”
This variable is difficult to call. However, news reports indicate strong past (and
potentially ongoing) connections with anti-Semitism and note “efforts” to change.
“Efforts” in this case are not strong enough on their own merit to overcome strong antiSemitic connections, particularly when they are unaccompanied by party leadership’s
promotion of Jews. Condition: unmet.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. Svoboda is widely considered the “major Ukrainian farright party” (Ishchenko 2014). The party refers to itself as a “rightist political party”
(Svoboda 2015). Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. In the 2008 Svoboda party manifesto, the party sought to
“terminate agreement with the EU on readmission. Conclude with other states, from
territories where illegal immigrants come to Ukraine, readmission agreements (return of
illegal immigrants) on favorable conditions for Ukraine” (Svoboda 2015).
Noted Olszański (2011), “The strategic direction of the state is to be ‘European
Ukraine-centrism’ which should guarantee Ukraine’s status as ‘not only geographical, but
also a geopolitical centre of Europe’. Ukraine is to leave the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and other post-Soviet structures, demand an explicit guarantee
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of accession to NATO within a set period of time, and to once again become a possessor
of tactical nuclear weapons. The European Union is not even mentioned in the
programme.” Indeed, the BBC reported in 2014 that Svoboda “supports EU integration an exception among Europe's far right” (BBC 7 March 2014). Condition: unmet.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. Katchanovski has said that "Svoboda is currently best
described as a radical nationalist party” (Zawadzki, Hosenball and Grey 2014). In fact,
Svoboda’s party manifesto contained an entire section devoted to its nationalist posture.
On their website, Svoboda (2015) described in the ‘Program for the Protection of
Ukrainians’ their desire to: Adopt a new Citizenship Act, under which citizenship will be
given only to those persons who were born in Ukraine or are ethnically Ukrainian, who
returned from abroad for permanent living and working in Ukraine. Allow people born in
Ukraine from foreigners or stateless persons to acquire Ukrainian citizenship upon
reaching age of majority only under the conditions of Ukrainian language fluency,
knowledge of Ukrainian history and content of the Constitution of Ukraine (Svoboda
2015). Condition: met.
SVOBODA: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET
Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna-SD), Sweden
The Swedish Democrats were founded in 1988 “to preserve Swedish values and
to reducing immigration to Sweden. Initially, the party was led by a number of people
linked to Nazi and right-wing extremist groups” (Radio Sweden 2014). Foreign Policy
(September 16, 2014), reported that the national elections resulted in “the Sweden
Democrats, which has turned xenophobia and anti-immigrant posturing into a political
growth industry, captured 12.9 percent of the vote. The election marks the end of the
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eight-year rule of the Moderate Party, which saw a huge number of its voters jump ship
and vote for a group that has been roundly denounced by Sweden’s political class as a
racist movement that has no place in the country’s politics.” Party MEPs joined the
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group.
A. Occurring post-Cold War. The party was founded in 1988. Noted Bengtsson
(2014), “the party lived in the political shadows and scored a few tenths of a percentage
point in the general elections. But in 2010 the party, after polishing its act for a
considerable time, entered parliament with six percent of the vote. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. The SD is widely reported and considered to condemn violence.
Reuters (Johnson 2014) reported that SD “rejects violence.” Indeed, the group is often the
target of violence. “A 2012 police study found that nearly half of the party’s politicians
reported threats or assaults in 2011. Some had been beaten with iron bars, some had
bombs detonated in their cars, and some had cans of tear gas emptied into their mouths in
front of their children” (Teitelbaum 2014). Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The BBC (2014) reported that one
local “party candidate stood down after a picture emerged of her wearing a swastika
armband” while another “was highlighted for posting racist and anti-immigrant
comments online.” Party leader Akesson has stated that "Islamism is the Nazism and
communism of our time. It has to be met with disgust and much stronger resistance than
has so far been the case."
The Independent (Sims 2015) reported that “While the party has sought to
distance itself from associations with Nazis, some of its founders were linked with Nazi
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groups and its secretary said in 2014 that Jews were not Swedish unless they abandoned
their ethnic identity.”
Al Jazeera (Bengtsson 2014), commented that although other parties have
related manifestos, “the Sweden Democrats' extremist roots, as well as its single-track
obsession with migration policy, makes it different…The main reason why the Sweden
Democrats stand out in this context is probably due to the strong consensus behind the
country's policy on immigration by the other Swedish political parties and the fact that
Sweden has a long tradition of viewing immigration favourably.”
Interestingly, the SD organized a gay-pride parade in July 2015, though their
motivations were called into question because the parade route passed through a Muslim
neighborhood. One commenter on PoliticsForum.org (2015) responded that “Since Islam
holds that gays should be executed, something like this is obviously an attack on
Muslims.”
The SD manifesto is certainly anti-immigrant but there are no racist, anti-Semitic
or homophobic declarations nor are there directives or statements from leadership
indicating such leanings. Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. The SD are resoundingly right-wing, though the
Washington Times (Pipes 2015) offered that “Sweden Democrats offer a populist — and
not, as usually described, a ‘far right’ — brew of policies.” Teitelbaum (2014) regards the
group as “far-right” and “nationalist, anti-immigrant.” Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. Radio Sweden (2014) reported that “immigration and asylum
policy are the core issues for the Sweden Democrats. This election [2014], the party is
pushing for a ninety percent reduction in immigration.” Tommy Nilsson, southern
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Sweden’s party manager, told the Telegraph in 2015 that “there’s too much immigration
and too many beggars from eastern Europe” (Orange 2015). Condition: met
F. Nationalist/Reformist. Akesson has “identified himself as a nationalist but
called for his party to show they were ‘broad and inclusive’” (BBC, 2014). Radio
Sweden (2014) noted that “the Sweden Democrats are a socially conservative party with
a nationalist foundation, who want to preserve Swedish traditions, increase punishments
for criminals and to invest more in care for the elderly.” Condition: met.
SD: ALL CONDITIONS MET
Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP), Switzerland
The Swiss People’s party was “originally founded in 1971 by the merger of the
Farmers, Artisans, and Citizens’ Party—generally known as the Agrarian Party—with the
Democratic Party” (Encyclopedia Britannica 2015). The party adopted “a more populist
agenda in the 1990s, particularly on immigration and social welfare,” and made
“substantial gains.” “In the 1999 elections it won the largest vote share and the second
greatest number of seats in the lower house of the parliament” (Encyclopaedia Britannica
2015). One writer for the London School of economics has contended that “the Swiss
People’s Party (SVP) has established itself as the most powerful radical right-wing party
in Western Europe” (Stockemer 2012).

A. Occurring post-Cold War. Stockemer (2012) reports: “Coinciding with the
rise of the party`s charismatic leader Christoph Blocher in the 1990s, the SVP began to
embrace initiatives to halt immigration, engaged in historical revisionism and spread
anxiety about globalization and Switzerland`s possible entry into the European Union.”
The party also “expanded enormously in the 1990s, increasing the number of cantonal
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sections from fourteen to twenty-six… The 1992 vote was also the starting point for the
electoral and political success of the SVP, which, with Christoph Blocher as a wealthy
and sedulous populist leader, had been the driving force in the campaign against EEA
membership” (Skenderovic 2013).
Rejection of membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) is one
example of the reformed ideology embraced by the new SVP, as is “the SVP’s new
‘winning formula’ which consists of linking nationalist and exclusionist demands in
immigration and foreign policy with neo-liberal and anti-state positions in economic and
taxation policy” (Skenderovic 2013).
The party does, however, consciously draw on its agrarian beginnings.
Observed Skenderovic (2013): “the party continues to refer in its narratives and political
iconography to peasantry and agrarian life. At party meetings, in public speeches and
political campaigns, the party likes to evoke the rural world and farmers as steadfast
representations of national authenticity and as a highly symbolic, historically tested
bulkhead in the fight against any kinds of foreign influence.”
Ultimately, though the party was originally founded in the 1970s, its welldocumented and publicized philosophical facelift, which addresses and focuses on postcold war issues, will be determined to have met the threshold for an ideological change so
great as to render it a “new’ group. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. Political violence in Switzerland is considered “exceptionally
rare” according to the Switzerland Business Law Handbook (2012). Indeed, violent acts
involving SVP appear to be not only rare, but incidental and in one case SVP members
were on the receiving end. This was the case in a 2009 incident concerning the ban of
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minarets when the “black bloc" damaged property at locations used by the SVP
(Switzerland Business Law Handbook 2012). Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. SVP is often labelled “racist” due to
its tough stance on immigration. In an October 2003 speech, SVP was accused of
“xenophobic appeals, including running a newspaper advertisement blaming ‘black
Africans’ for crime” (Piano 2005). SVP countered by noting that it “had nothing against
legal immigrants and was merely opposed to illegal immigration and abuse of the asylum
policy” (Piano 2005). Further, following a 2010 interview with Lesbenorganisation
Schweiz – LOS, the Council of Europe reported that a Swiss parliamentarian group for
LGB persons was been established within the SVP.
In 2007, the group was accused of racism after using campaign posters which
depicted three white sheep booting a black sheep out of the country (Swiss Info 2007).
Roman Jäggi, spokesman for the Swiss People's Party, described the poster campaign as
"completely fair,” and it had nothing to do with race, asserting that "It is not racist…We
have a big problem with violence and in particular youth violence, and foreign criminals
are a big factor," (Swiss Info 2007). Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. The SVP touts itself as “the only consistent centreright party in our country” (SVP 2015). The group is referred to as extreme right-wing
and radical right-wing by respected media ranging from the New York Times to the UK’s
Guardian. Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. The party “opposed Swiss membership in international bodies
such as the United Nations (which Switzerland joined in 2002) and the European Union”
(Britannica 2015). The SVP firmly supports imposing strict immigration quotas. "We
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identified this [immigration] problem before the others and the citizens know it," asserted
SVP Vice-President Claude-Alain Voiblet (RT.com 25 June 2015). Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. The Swiss People's Party electoral platform for 2015
- 2019 was expressed in the motto "SVP - the party for Switzerland" (SVP 2015).
Further, the group declared: “Our country must no longer be insidiously integrated into
international structures such as the EU” (SVP 2015). In 2014, the party authored a
referendum against mass-immigration. SVP head Toni Brunner stated: "We have created
the initiative because it's really become excessive" (Bleiker 2014). Skenderovic (2013)
also observed that SVP voters are primarily attracted to “its identity politics on questions
of preserving Swiss traditions and national sovereignty.” Condition: met.
SVP: ALL CONDITIONS MET
SYRIZA- Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás
(The Conference of the Coalition of the Radical Left), Greece
SYRIZA is an acronym meaning the "Radical Coalition of the Left." The BBC
(1/29/2015) reported that SYRIZA, “formed in 2004, is an umbrella group, with the party
Synaspismos – the Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology- as the key
component” (BBC 1/29/2015). Comprised of 16 ‘ideologically diverse’ left-wing
parties, SYRIZA includes ‘social democrats, radical ecologists, radical socialists,
Trotskyists, and even anarchists,’ according to SYRIZA supporter Matthaios Tsimitakis,
also an editor of the Greek Left Review (Bollier 2012). The party is led by Alexis
Tsipras, and boasts the motto: “Always struggling for unity among the Left, the now
united SYRIZA asserts a government of the Left with a new, broad and strong social
majority that will allow for the people's interests to be served” (Πρίφτη 2015).
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BBC reporter Paul Mason (2012) noted that, “under Tsipras' leadership,
SYRIZA grew the far left's vote from 3.3% to 5.6% in the 2007 election - giving it 14
MPs… [by 2012] SYRIZA massively scooped up the votes of leftist, progressive,
socially liberal young people, as well as the trade union voters, not specifically aligned
with the Communist Party, to gain 52 seats.” By 2015, claimed approximately “36% of
the vote, an eight-percentage-point lead over the New Democracy party of Antonis
Samaras, the outgoing prime minister. SYRIZA’s support leapt by nine percentage points
compared with the 2012 election result; ... SYRIZA fell just short of an absolute majority,
winning 149 seats in the 300-seat parliament” (The Economist 1/25/15). In 2015, Time
Magazine named Tsipras one of the 100 Most Influential People (Iglesias 2015b).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. SYRIZA was founded in 2004 when Greek leftwing political forces united. Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. Though SYRIZA has been accused of violence and is oftconsidered a violent party, the SYRIZA manifesto lists its adherence to “the principle of
the peaceful settlement of disputes” (SYRIZA 2015). In 2013, SYRIZA’s primary
opponent, the New Democratic Conservatives, released a video that appeared to show
“SYRIZA Member of Parliament Vangelis Diamantopoulos delivering a speech in which
he is seen to suggest that Greeks taking up guns is a justifiable response to the country’s
crushing economic crisis” (Dabilis 2013). However, “SYRIZA said New Democracy
was guilty of ‘forgery and a disgusting provocation’ because they had used a heavily
edited version that took comments out of context” (Dabilis 2013).
Spiegel (2015) noted concerns that the party, though perhaps not partaking in
violence itself, did not distance or disassociate itself from groups that did advocate for
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violence. Speaking of the 2008 street riots that resulted in the death of a teenager at the
hands of police, Nikos Voutsis, a leading SYRIZA MP, commented that: “Nobody [in the
party] was ever arrested for smashing up a shop, but there was a social upheaval and we
heard the voices…we’re not in favour of violence, but we like having people in the street
protesting” (Spiegel 2015).
In 2013, SYRIZA “refused to vote for a motion by the Parliament's ethics
committee that condemned violence, arguing that the text should refer to ‘racist violence’
and not just ‘violence,’” (van Versendaal 2013). A few months later, in response to the
bail-out agreement with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in
2013, Tsipras asserted that: “We condemn violence but we understand the frustration of
those who react violently to the violence of the memorandum,” (van Versendaal 2013).
Due to insipid and open-ended statements made by party leadership, SYRIZA
has certainly not disentangled itself from violent acts for the cause committed by the
hands of others. Ultimately, though the party seems to be comfortable with allowing
others to do their “dirty work,” it does not officially condone violence nor has leadership
been personally involved in violent acts. Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The symbol of the party is “the fivepointed star, a symbol of unity, along with three flags: a red one for the classic left, a
Greek one for the ecological movement and a purple one that represents other social
movements that SYRIZA embraces, such as feminism, migrant rights and gay rights”
(Πρίφτη 2015).
As stated in SYRIZA’s 2013 political resolutions: “We combat racist and
homophobic violence, all discriminations based on racial or national origin, religion,
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color of the skin, disability, age, sexual orientation or gender identity, which are endemic
in many aspects of social life and we guarantee the change of the legislative framework
that legalizes, directly or indirectly, such discriminations. In this context, we fully support
the right to self-determination in terms of sexual orientation and gender choice,
homosexual civil marriage with full and equal rights, and recognition of gender identity”
(SYRIZA 2015). Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. SYRIZA’s slogan is “For the first time, the Left in
government.” The SYRIZA website (SYRIZA 2015) notes: “SYRIZA has been
established as a unified, democratic, multi-tendency, mass party of the contemporary
Left.” Lesniak (2014) categorizes the party as “a coalition of left-wing and radical left
parties.” Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. In their Political Resolution of the 1st Congress of SYRIZA
(July 2013), SYRIZA (2015) claimed:
In Greece, very harsh measures that lead large parts of the population to a
humanitarian crisis are implemented by the troika of the European Union,
IMF, and European Central Bank, with Germany playing a dominant role
in the European strategy. National resources, public goods and companies
are put under privatization/sell-off. Production collapses, tens of thousands
of small and medium-sized companies close down, public services
dismantle, the welfare state is constantly shrinking, and large parts of the
population are deprived of health, education, pension, and social security.
(SYRIZA, 2015)
Bollier (2012) observed that “SYRIZA ultimately supports Greece's membership
in the European Union, but rejects the austerity measures required by the memorandum.”
Lesniak (2014) pointed to one of SYRIZA's main points their manifesto The Exit from
the Crisis Is on the Left: “The capitulation of our foreign policy to the desires of the U.S.
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and the powerful states of the European Union endangers the country's independence,
peace, and security.” Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. An article in Foreign Policy (Papadogiannis 2015)
noted the nationalist rhetoric employed by Tsipras. “Radical left-wing nationalism has
been both an enduring and a multifaceted phenomenon, and Syriza’s trajectory serves as
the most recent reminder. Riding on a wave of opposition to bailout packages and the
austerity measures that accompanied them, SYRIZA stressed the need to bring back hope
and defend the dignity of the Greek people. This rendered the party as an attractive
choice to more than a third of the voters this past January” (Papadogiannis 2015).
Lesniak (2014) wrote that Tsipras believed the party's win in 2014 sent “a clear message
against the budget-cutting austerity measures tied to Greece's 240 billion euro ($327
billion) bailout from the euro area and International Monetary Fund,” noting he
immediately called for national elections (Lesniak 2014). Condition: met.
SYRIZA: ALL CONDITIONS MET
UKIP (England)
UKIP, or the UK Independence Party, was “founded on 3 September 1993 at
the London School of Economics by members of the Anti-Federalist League, which was
founded by Dr. Alan Sked in November 1991, with the aim of running candidates
opposed to the Maastricht Treaty in the 1992 general election” (BBC 21 Nov 2014).
The party has seen a surge in popularity the past decade. The BBC reported:
“the party's initial successes were all in the proportional representation elections for the
European Parliament - winning its first three seats in 1999 with 7% of the vote. It built on
that in 2004, winning 12 seats and pushing the Lib Dems into fourth place. The 2009 poll
167

saw its total grow to 13 seats, pushing Labour into third place with 16% of the vote. And
in 2014's European election the party lived up to its confident promise to top the vote,
getting 27.5% of all those cast” (BBC 21 Nov 2014). The 2014 success was likely due in
part to shift in rhetoric, courtesy of party leader Nigel Farage. In March of 2014, Farage
stated that his “party has got rid of ‘old UKIP’ and now has a ‘huge’ opportunity to take
votes from Labour in future elections” (BBC 16 March 2014). Farage added: "New
UKIP is a lot more professional, a lot more smiley, a lot less angry, and it's going places"
(BBC 16 March 2014).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. UKIP was founded in 1993 (UKIP, 2015).
Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. UKIP has found itself the target of accusations of violence,
which the group repeatedly denies. News Channel 4 reported that, following a May 2015
incident involving a campaigner who said he was punched in the face by a man who
appeared to be one of the party’s supporters, a UKIP spokesman categorically stated “we
condemn any intimidation or violence towards anybody, whether involved in this election
or otherwise.”
In 2012, West observed that “Not all movements that occupy the far right-wing
are the same: whereas some, such as the British National Party (BNP), are associated
more strongly with ideological extremism, criminality and violence, other movements,
such as the more moderate UK Independence Party (UKIP), advocate similar policies in
many areas but would strongly reject any association with extremism and violence.” In
terms of likely engagement in violence, Counterpoint (2014) classified UKIP as low risk.
Condition: met.
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C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. News headlines often obscure the real
story, as in the case of one headline that proclaimed “UKIP is a Racist Party.” The
article explained that “Lord Heseltine, who advises the Coalition on economic growth,
told the BBC: ‘Of course it’s racist, who doubts that? Farage isn’t racist but his party is
very attractive to a racist agenda’” (Hope 2013). The quote tells a different story.
Party Leader Farage has made it perfectly clear that UKIP was strengthened as a
result of “reforms… getting rid of ‘old UKIP.’” (BBC 16 March 2014). He further
acknowledged that “aspiring UKIP candidates now have to declare that they have ‘never
engaged in, advocated or condoned racist, violent, criminal or anti-democratic activity’
and that there are no ‘skeletons in my cupboard' that may cause me or UKIP
embarrassment" (BBC 16 March 2014).
Counterpoint (2014) rated UKIP a moderate threat for racism and homophobia
noting that “there is mixed evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments by
the party leadership – that the party discriminates against people on the basis of race or
ethnic group” or sexual orientation. Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. UKIP is broadly considered to be a right-wing,
populist party, so it came as quite a surprise when party migration spokesman Steven
Woolfe was quoted stating UKIP was “not a "right-wing" organisation” (The Telegraph,
14 June 2015). Prompted for further explanation, he elaborated: “We’re a party uniquely
positioned to win votes from both Left and Right-wing parties, but not so supinely,
unoriginally centralist as to be run down in the middle of the political road.” Lesniak
(2014) categorizes UKIP as ‘a Eurosceptic right-wing populist party.” Condition: met.
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E. Eurosceptic. Quite simply, “the UK Independence Party has, as its name
implies, one key policy - to leave the European Union” (BBC 21 Nov 2014). Further, the
UKIP Manifesto states, “We can never control immigration while we continue to be
members of the European Union. Until we leave, we are forced to abide by the EU’s
founding, unshakable principle of the ‘free movement of people,’ meaning we cannot
prevent the flow of citizens from all EU member states into Britain” (UKIP 2015). It also
details exit strategies and legal options for leaving the EU.
Lesniak (2014) explained that “UKIP advocates leaving the European Union,
resulting in stopping payments to the EU and withdrawal from EU treaties, while
maintaining trading ties with other European countries.” Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. UKIP’s 2015 Manifesto states “immigration has
driven down wages and led to job losses for British workers…The sheer weight of
numbers, combined with rising birth rates (particularly to immigrant mothers) and an
ageing population, is pushing public services to breaking point. Our current immigration
rules ignore the wishes of the British people. They discriminate in favour of EU citizens
and against the rest of the world. The system is failing so badly that we cannot even
properly identify how many people enter and leave our country” (UKIP 2015).
UKIP’s nationalist policies pervade almost every aspect of its 2015 Manifesto,
with numerous references to returning Britain to its people. The Guardian noted “UKIP is
a ‘civic’ nationalist party, rejects ‘blood and soil’ nationalism and claims to be ‘open and
inclusive’ to anyone who wishes to identify with Britain, regardless of ethnic or religious
background" (The Guardian 14 April 2014). Condition: met.
UKIP: ALL CONDITIONS MET
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Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), Belgium
According to the Brussels Journal, the Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) is
Belgium’s largest party with a goal of an independent Flanders (Belien 2007). Until
2004, the Vlaams Belang was called the Vlaams Blok; the name change came as a result
of the party’s reformation following the government’s decision to force the party to
disband following their conviction as a criminal organization (Belien 2007). Its party
slogan was “Our own people first” (Belien 2007). Belien (2007) observed that it had not
lost a single election in 25 years (through 2007), “growing slowly but continuously from
3% of the vote in 1987, to 10.3% in 1991, 12.3% in 1995, 15,8% in 1999, 18.2% in 2003
to 24.1% in 2004, and is “the most successful of all the so-called ‘Euro-nationalist’
parties” (Belien 2007). However, the party has seen its popularity begin to decline. In
the 2014 Parliamentary elections in Belgium, the party, now chaired by Gerolf
Annemans, only garnered 3.69% of the vote and 3 seats (down 9) (Fondation Robert
Schuman 2014).
A. Occurring post-Cold War. Belien (2007) reported that: “Originally founded
in 1977 as a radical Flemish-secessionist break-away of the Flemish-nationalist party, in
the late 1980s the party transformed itself into a mainstream conservative party” (Belien
2007). Observed Coffé (2005): “While the far-right party had cut a radical profile in its
first years, throughout the 1990s its appeal was populist, as it presented itself ever more
as a right-conservative people’s party.” In 2004, following a government-ordered
disbandment, Vlaams Blok reemerged with a “new handle” as Vlaams Belang (Coffé
2005). “With its new statement of principles and platform, the Vlaams Belang –at least
on paper – has [had] cut the ties with its unsavoury past” (Coffé 2005). Condition: met.
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B. Non-Violent. Counterpoint (2014) found no evidence of violence, positing
that there was “no evidence of violence within the party leadership.” Media reports point,
ironically, to an incident in 2007 in which Vlaams Belang several members were
assaulted at a 9/11 tribute (Flemish Republic 2009). Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. In 2004, Vlaams Blok (as Vlaams
Belang was then known) was declared a criminal organization by the Supreme Court in
Brussels. According to Belien (2007):
In the 1990s in an effort to kill the party the Belgian Parliament changed
the Constitution and voted a series of new laws, including an Anti-Racism
Act and an Anti-Discrimination Act, which define ‘discrimination’ so
broadly that anyone and everyone is vulnerable to hate-crime
prosecutions. These new laws were used against the Vlaams Blok…
The party was convicted on the basis of an anthology of as few as 16 texts
published by various local Vlaams Blok chapters between 1996 and 2000.
Though many of these texts simply quoted official statistics on crime rates
and social welfare expenditure the court posited that they had been
published with ‘an intention to contribute to a campaign of hatred.’
(Belien 2007)
As part of its current (2015) manifesto, the party asserted: “Inspired by its
concern to defend and protect the cultural identity of the Flemish people, the Vlaams
Belang rejects the tenets of the multicultural ideology” (Flemish Republic 2015). This
verbiage supports the party’s strong anti-immigrant platform but does not necessarily
correlate to racism or anti-Semitism.
The party manifesto also noted that “The traditional family is at the heart of a
humane society. Its merit is acknowledged and safeguarded in the marriage between a
man and a woman. Policymakers should recognize the central role of families with
children in society. Their task is to protect the family instead of attempting to usurp its
functions. This is the only approach which can provide solutions for the urgent problem
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of the birth dearth” (Flemish Republic 2015). Because Vlaams Belang promotes family
and children and does not present a pro-gay or pro-gay marriage stance, it does not
necessarily follow that they are anti-gay or homophobic.
In 2005, the Vlaams Belang approved a Holocaust resolution, strongly
indicating that “it will not be equated in absolutely any circumstances with Holocaust
advocates and holocaust deniers of all kinds” (DeWinter 2005). Counterpoint (2014)
found that “there is little or no evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments
by the party leadership – that the party stokes fears of Jews, though there is mixed
evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments by the party leadership – that the
party discriminates against people on the basis of race or ethnic group” or sexual
orientation. Condition: met.
D. Right-wing/left-wing. The Vlaams Belang describes itself as “nationalist
party of the right" (Flemish Republic 2015). Erk (2005) described the group as “far-right”
and discussed the party’s desire to attract a wider voting base by becoming more
mainstream. Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. “The Vlaams Belang is also the only Eurosceptic party in
Belgium and the only one that rejects the official state ideology of multiculturalism”
asserted Belien (2007). “Vlaams Belang opposes Brussels and does not really
differentiate between Brussels as the capital of Belgium and Brussels as the capital of
Europe. It sees both Belgium and Europe – in other words Brussels and Brussels – as
enemies of Flanders and of the Flemish people, whose national identity these enemies
want to subvert and destroy” (Belien 2007). Condition: met.
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F. Nationalist/Reformist. “The Vlaams Belang strives for the secession of
Flanders from the artificial Belgian state. Our aim is to dissolve Belgium and establish an
independent Flemish state” (Flemish Republic 2015). Erk (2005) noted that as part of the
group’s name change, the party sought to rebrand “itself as a Flemish nationalist party on
the political right.” Condition: met.
VLAAMS BELANG: ALL CONDITIONS MET
In Sum
In accordance with the established definition of MEPG (a Eurosceptic, nonviolent, non- anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic group, formed after the Cold War, either
right or left-wing, with a nationalist agenda designed to transform, reform and serve their
community above all others), and following analysis and qualification, the below groups
have met all conditions for categorization as a MEPG:
 Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD)
 Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF)
 Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV)
 Front National
 True FINNS Party
 Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ)
 PodemosSwiss People’s Party, SVP
 Swedish Democrats
 Syriza
 UKIP
 Vlaams Belang
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Figure 3.5 reviews the results. These 12 groups will now serve as the subjects for
theoretical testing in Chapter IV to determine the explanatory power of PP vs. OO.
groups failing to meet the conditions for a MEPG are now classified as SMO, or neo
fascist, neo-Nazi, or independent.
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Figure 3.5. MEPG Qualification Results. Each of the groups tested is indicated along with each of the six
variables serving as criteria. The final column indicates where a group qualified as a MEPG.

CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, DATA COMPILATION
In Chapter III, analysis and qualification led to a subject group of 12 MEPGs for
theoretical testing: Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD); Danish
People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF); True FINNS Party; Freedom Party of Austria
(Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ); Front National- France; Podemos- Spain; Dutch
Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV); Swiss People’s Party, SVP; Swedish
Democrats; Syriza- Greece; UKIP-England; and Vlaams Belang- Belgium. Testing is
designed to determine the efficacy of the Political Process (PP) model and
theOrganization/Opportunity (OO) model in order to answer the research question: what
conditions allowed for the emergence and success of Millennial Eurosceptic Populist
Groups?
The unprecedented increase, emergence, and success of non-traditional parties
right and left-wing parties in Europe served as the genesis of millennial eurosceptic
populism. In an effort to explain this trajectory, testing was conducted to determine the
efficacy of the two theories. Phase I examined the explanatory power of the political
process model, while Phase II studied the explanatory power of the proposed
Organizational/Opportunity Theory (OO). Each phase began with a stated hypothesis, a
review and explanation of the variables, discussion of how each independent variable was
measured, and concluded with the analysis.
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Theoretical testing first focused on measuring and analyzing the independent
variables with data compiled from various sources including Eurobarometer17 and the
Open Government Index. Additional relevant data was gathered and analyzed such as
recent end of war, cohesion and subgroups, and cultural dimensions (Hofstede 2010).
The approach was mixed-method and included the case study approach outlined by
George and Bennett (2005) and Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)
designed by Rihoux and Ragin (2009) and detailed below.
QCA is an analytic technique pioneered by Charles Ragin which uses Boolean
algebra, crisp and fuzzy sets, and multi-variates to implement principles of comparison
used by scholars engaged in the qualitative study of macro social phenomena. QCA
permits a researcher to assess causation that is very complex, involving different
combinations of causal conditions capable of generating the same outcome. Ragin (2008)
notes that QCA is grounded in the analysis of set relations rather than correlations.
Because social theory is largely verbal and verbal formulations are largely theoretical in
nature, QCA provides a closer link to theory than is possible using conventional
quantitative methods. QCA evolved to utilize fuzzy numbers leading to a variation
known as Fuzzy Set QCA, or fsQCA. This also led to the use of the term csQCA (Crisp
Set QCA) in order to distinguish between methods.
Thiem and Dusa (2013) noted that QCA was considered one of “the most
influential recent innovations in social science methodology.” In line with Ragin’s own

Results from Eurobarometer are taken in polling “waves.” Countries are separated into
groups (or “waves”) and are surveyed on a rotating basis. The Eurobarometer data used
in this study utilized the most recent wave to include that country and specific question
examined.
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background, QCA was “initially employed only by a small number of political
sociologists (e.g. Amenta et al. 1992; Griffin et al. 1991; Wickham-Crowley 1991). It has
since expanded into the fields of political science and international relations (Thiem
2011; Vis 2009, Thiem and Dusa 2013).” Hudson and Kuhner (2013) recognized that
proponents of QCA techniques suggested they are better placed to “handle the diversity
of policy provision found in different spatial entities than standard linear quantitative
methods, while also able to allow for hypothesis testing based upon a fine grained
analysis that is more systematic in approach than the techniques typically employed in
standard qualitative analyses.”
Ragin and Rihoux (2009) acknowledged that “computer algorithms developed by
electrical engineers in the 1950s provide techniques for simplifying this type of data. The
data matrix is reformulated as a "truth table" and reduced in a way that parallels the
minimization of switching circuits (Ragin 2000; Rihoux and Ragin 2009)…These
minimization procedures mimic case-oriented comparative methods but accomplish the
most cognitively demanding task -- making multiple comparisons of configurations -through computer algorithms. The goal of the logical minimization is to represent -- in a
shorthand manner -- the information in the truth table regarding the different
combinations of conditions that produce a specific outcome” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009).
As noted on Ragin’s University of Arizona website, “qualitatively oriented
scholars tend to examine only a few cases at a time, but their analyses are both intensive - addressing many aspects of cases -- and integrative -- examining how the different parts
of a case fit together, both contextually and historically” (Ragin and Rubinson 2015).
Further, Ragin explained that:
179

By formalizing the logic of qualitative analysis, QCA makes it possible to bring
the logic and empirical intensity of qualitative approaches to studies that embrace
more than a handful of cases -- research situations that normally call for the use of
variable-oriented, quantitative methods. Boolean methods of logical comparison
represent each case as a combination of causal and outcome conditions. These
combinations can be compared with each other and then logically simplified
through a bottom-up process of paired comparison. (Ragin 2000)
In 2000, Ragin noted that QCA with fuzzy sets allowed cases to have varying
degrees of membership in sets, with assigned membership scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0.
As an example, a country could potentially have only partial membership in the set of
democratic countries depending on the perceived extent of democracy (Ragin 2000).
Membership scores greater than 0.5 indicate that a case is more in than out, scores
close to 1.0 indicate that a case is mostly in, scores close to 0.0 indicate that a case
is mostly out, and so on. Full membership (1.0) and full non-membership (0.0) are
understood as qualitative states, not arbitrary values (e.g., the highest and lowest
observed scores). Thus, the calibration of membership in a fuzzy set involves both
quantitative and qualitative assessment and must be grounded in theoretical and
substantive knowledge. (Ragin 2000)
Each MEPG was tested using the four applicable variables for that respective
model. Each variable (or “causal condition”) was assigned a membership score based on
certain qualifications. The process for each is described during the next section on
methodology, distinguished by Phase I and Phase II. Research will show which
conditions are necessary, which are merely sufficient, and which have no effect.
Phase I: Methodology and Data Compilation: Political Process Model
This dissertation argues that McAdam’s concept of PP provides explanatory
power for the emergence of MEPGs. In this section, the three elements of PP will be
evaluated to determine any relationship to the dependent variable, subsequently providing
an explanation for the emergence and success of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism and
MEPGs. As noted in Chapter II, McAdam’s model centered on three primary factors:
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indigenous organizational strength, expanding political opportunities, and cognitive
liberation (McAdam 1982). He concluded that it was the unison of political opportunities,
a heightened sense of political efficacy, and the institutional strength of the black
churches, black colleges, and Southern chapters of the NAACP that played a central role
in shaping the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982). It is theorized that this same
confluence of elements accounts for (on a macro level) the rise of Millennial Eurosceptic
Populism.
Hypothesis and Variables
For the testing of PP, it is hypothesized that:
H1: The elements of PP (political opportunities, indigenous organizational
strength, cognitive liberation) led to the emergence and success of MEPGs in Europe.
Dependent Variable: Emergence/Success of MEPG
Independent Variables: political opportunity, indigenous organizational strength,
cognitive liberation
MEPG SUCCESS= Political opportunity+ Indigenous Organizational Strength
+Cognitive Liberation
Political Opportunity
The significance of opportunity in the Millennial Eurosceptic Populism realm has
not gone unnoticed. According to Jens Rydgren (2004), some of the following political
opportunities need to be present for radical right-wing populist parties to emerge:
1) A niche, or a gap, between the voters’ opinions and their perceived position of
the parties.
2) Decreased trust in (established) political parties.
3) Politicisation of new issues, preferably immigration.
4) A high degree of convergence among the established parties.
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5) An open political system, where new parties have a good chance to enter.
6) Allying with established parties might render credibility, but being
controversial might also do the same.
7) The state’s capacity and propensity for repression.
8) A potent master frame (Rydgren 2004)
Accordingly, Gifford (2014) contended that from 2010-2013, “a constellation of
forces created the opportunities for a significant Eurosceptic challenge to the UK’s
Coalition government’s European strategy.” Gifford (2014) believed that the failure of
the Conservative party to win a clear victory in 2010 election weakened the Cameron
leadership coupled with the crisis in the Eurozone and the pro-integrationist response of
European leaders served to create a unique synthesis of opportunity.
Eisinger (1973) and Koopmans (1996) focused on the “openness” of government
as the key factor in opportunity. This research utilized the concept of openness of
government as the means of measurement of political opportunity by utilizing data from
the 2015 Index of Economic Freedom. The Index measured economic freedom based on
10 quantitative and qualitative factors, grouped into four broad categories, or “pillars,” of
economic freedom:
1. Rule of Law (property rights, freedom from corruption);
2. Limited Government (fiscal freedom, government spending);
3. Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom);
and
4. Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom).
(Index of Economic Freedom 2015)
The 2015 data covers the timeframe of the second half of 2013 through the first half of
2014 (Index of Economic Freedom 2015). Each of the ten economic freedoms within
these categories was graded on a scale of 0 to 100. The “Freedom from Corruption”
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percentages from the “Rule of Law” category were used as the data representing political
opportunity (Figure 4.1) and will be scaled between 0-1 for fsQCA.

Figure 4.1. Freedom From Corruption Data. This figure shows the Economic Freedom
data in 12 categories for each of the 12 countries represented by our MPEGs. The data
specific to this study, Freedom from Corruption is inside the box. Source: Index of
Economic Freedom 2015.
Data. These are the results for each group:
Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD)- Germany 73.8
Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF)- Denmark 76.3
Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ)-Austria 71.2
Front National-France 62.5
Podemos-Spain 67.6
Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV)-Netherlands 73.7
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Swiss People’s Party, SVP-Switzerland 80.5
Swedish Democrats-Sweden 72.7
Syriza-Greece 54.0
True FINNS-Finland 73.4
UKIP-England-United Kingdom 75.8
Vlaams Belang-Belgium 68.8
Indigenous Organizational Strength
Indigenous organizational strength, as explained by Kropczynski (2013), refers to
the resources that allow a marginalized population to exploit opportunities afforded to
them by changes in the political opportunity structure. Examples of these resources
include members who can be recruited as a group, respected leaders, a communications
network, and individual connections (Kropczynski 2013). McAdam (1982) believed that
the more organized a group was the greater the capacity of its members to act, and the
more likely it was to be successful. Oberschall (1973) concurred, assigning paramount
importance to the degree of organization within the group and its creation of strong
networks. The topic of structural strength and its importance was also recognized by
Griffin (Griffin 1991, 170). In his study of the success and failure of 53 social movement
organizations in the United States between 1800 and 1945, Gamson (1990) found that a
formalized structure increases a movement’s chance of success, and Cress and Snow
(2000) found the same in their study of homeless movement organizations in 12 cities. In
a 2012 study on party organizational strength, Tavits (2012) found that “strong
organization helps parties increase their vote share significantly and steadily, and that
organizational strength played a significant independent role in helping parties succeed
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electorally.” For this study, indigenous organizational strength will be measured in
terms of a group’s network-- its resources—in the form of members. A six-value fuzzy
set will be utilized: Place/Score: 1st=1.; 2nd-3rd =.9; 4th =.6; 5th-6th =.4; 7th-8th=.1; ≥9th=0.
Groups were ranked according to the size of their group as compared to other parties in
their respective country. Results are listed below by group with their rank, source, and
fsQCA corresponding score in parentheses.
Membership Size.
Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD): 7th (Fischer 2015);
(.1)
Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF): 3rd (Foght 2014); (.75)
Finns Party: 5th (Politiikka 2013); (.4)
Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ): 3rd (Briggs
2015); (.9)
Front National: 3rd (Clavel 2014); (.9)
Podemos: 2nd (Garcia 2014); (.9)
Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV): The Hague (2013) noted
that the PVV “does not have any members, but consists solely of delegates who represent
the party in local, provincial and national parliaments.” Because there are no membership
numbers to compare, data for this variable utilized Eurbarometer 71.1 survey results
asking respondents to name the party to which they felt an attachment: 7th
(Eurobarometer 71.1): (.1)
Swiss People’s Party, SVP: 3rd (Swiss Confederation 2010); (.9)
Swedish Democrats: 4th (Holmqvist 2014; Sverigedemokraterna 2015); (.6)
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Syriza: 4th (no membership numbers located- see PVV above; Eurobarometer
71.1); (.6)
UKIP: 5th in 2014 (Nardelli 2014); (.4)
Vlaams Belang: 5th in 2014 (Paelinck 2014); (.4)
Cognitive Liberation
McAdam (1982) posited that: “mediating between opportunity and action are
people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations.” Such meanings are the
basis of cognitive liberation or, shared ideas developed from an “injustice frame.”
McAdam (1982) suggested that cognitive liberation comes first from the subjective
interpretation of political opportunities or macro-level events (See Phase II for expansion
on the concept of macro-level study as it relates to this research).
In his study, Wessels (2007) found that “41 per cent of citizens across the EU-25
are neutral or negative with respect to European identity, of whom a third can be
described as hard-core Eurosceptics.” He concluded that “Euroscepticism has the
potential to become system-threatening” (Hooghe 2007). The impact of Euroscepticism
has only increased since Wessels’ study.
Brown (2009) suggested that cognitive liberation is based upon grounded
knowledge and social trust: as corruption and lawlessness increased in the post-transition
years, people’s sense of efficacy decreased. It was also Brown (2009, 21) whom asserted
that nationalism was “arguably the most important of these subterranean movements,
bearing the standard of environmental activism (Dawson 1996; Pryde 1991; Weiner
1999). Many of the break-away Soviet Republics were as concerned with the Russian
influence meddling in their native homeland as they were with the rivers and forests
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themselves” (Brown 2009, 21). Such perspective served as a guide in determining how to
best measure cognitive liberation. In this study, cognitive liberation was characterized in
terms of nationalism and euroscepticism.
Cognitive Liberation: Euroscepticism. The data utilized for euroscepticism was
compiled from Eurobarometer 83.3 (2015). For purposes of this research, Euroscepticism
was measured in terms of tendency to trust the European Union. Eurobarometer results
were based on the query “if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it” with regards to the
specific entity European Union. Figure 4.2 indicates the results of each of the 12 subject
groups’ countries with the exception of Switzerland, whose data was not included in
Eurobarometer.

As a result, data for Switzerland (Swiss People’s Party-SVP) was

compiled from the World Values Survey (2015).

Figure 4.2. Trust in the European Union. Trust in the EU is depicted for each of the 12
countries represented by the MPEGs. Source: Eurobarometer 83.3; May 2015.
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Five of the 11 countries had greater than a 50% response indicating a tendency
NOT to trust the EU. Greece scored the highest in this regard with 73% of respondents
tending to not trust the EU. Finland had the highest response rate of those who trusted
the EU (58%). This survey question also had a significant number of “don’t know”
responses. In France, 17%, and in the UK, 16%, of respondents replied they didn’t know
if they could trust the EU.
For Switzerland, data was compiled from the World Values Survey (2015)
question: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me
how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The European Union.” Data from
wave five, covering the years 2005-2009, was utilized. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 reveal that
59.6% in wave five had none to “not very much” confidence in the EU.

Figure 4.3. Confidence in the EU-Switzerland. Date from Wave Five (2005-2009)
indicates the amount of confidence in the EU as reported by Swiss respondents. Source:
World Values Survey 2015.
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Figure 4.4. Bar Graph of Confidence in the EU-Switzerland. Date from Wave Five
(2005-2009) indicates the amount of confidence in the EU as reported by Swiss
respondents. Source: World Values Survey 2015.
The percentages for “tendency not to trust” and “not very much” and “none at all” will be
used for statistical analysis purposes in QCA.
Cognitive Liberation: Nationalism. The data for the element of nationalism
followed the above utilized methodology for Euroscepticism, with data from Switzerland
gathered separately from the World Values Survey. The dataset for determining
nationalism was based on the query “Please tell me how attached you feel to…[OUR
COUNTRY].” Table 4.4 offers a visual of the results gathered from Eurobarometer 77.3
(May 2012).
France (91.2%) and Greece (93.7%) returned the highest percentages of people
“very attached” to their respective country. The Netherlands returned the lowest
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percentage at 69.6%. Because data from Germany was separated into east/west, the
percentages were averaged resulting in a percentage of 85.6% for Germany as a whole.
Table 4.1.
Attachment To Country
Not
Not at
very
all
attached attached

COUNTRY/SAMPLE ID
(SERIES STANDARD)

Very
attached

Fairly
attached

FR - France
BE - Belgium
NL - The Netherlands
DE-W - Germany - West
DK - Denmark
GB-GBN - Great Britain
GR - Greece
ES -Spain
DE-E Germany East
FI - Finland
SE - Sweden
AT - Austria

91.2
77.6
69.6
82
88
83.3
93.7
82.2
89.2
88.6
85
86.2

8.8
18.6
26.8
16.9
10.7
6.3
11.9
8.1
11.4
12.5
12.3

0
2.5
1.8
1.1
0
4.2
0
3
2.7
0
2.5
1.5

Total

86.5

10.1

2.4

Total

N=

0
1.2
1.8
0
1.3
0
0
3
0
0
0
0

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

147
161
56
89
75
24
63
101
37
35
40
65

1

100

2,929

Note. Data Compiled using Eurobarometer 77.3 (May 2012) Europe 2020, the Financial and Economic Crisis, European citizenship and
European values.

For Swiss data, results were utilized from the most recent wave including
Switzerland: Wave Five 2005-2009 (Figure 4.5). The question asked was “How proud
are you to be [nationality]?” Data indicated 31.1% were “very proud” of the Swiss
nationality, and another 43.9% were “quite proud.”
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Figure 4.5. How Proud of Nationality. Chart indicating level of pride in nationality
experienced by Swiss citizens. Source: World Values Survey 2015.
For QCA analysis, the percentages for “Very attached” and “Very proud” will be
used for membership degree data.
Phase ii: : Methodology and Data Compilation: Organizational Opportunity Model
As discussed in Chapter IITwo, Organizational/Opportunity Theory (OO) offers a
theoretical explanation for the rise and success of social movement organizations and
groups/political parties. As will be demonstrated in this dissertation, OO is hypothesized
to offer significant explanatory power in the case of Eurosceptic groups. OO is comprised
of two essential elements: opportunity borne from exogenous factors triggered by a largescale event, and internal organizational elements. It is built on the concept of
organizational aptitude and capacity existing concurrently with external opportunities, set
into motion as a result of a specific event.
OO utilizes organizational elements from Modern Structural Organizational
Theory. Observed Shafritz, Ott, and Jang (2011, 169): “Organizations are rational
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institutions whose primary purpose is to accomplish established objectives; rational
organizational behavior is achieved best through systems of defined rules and formal
authority.” It also incorporates elements of opportunity from PPT; it specifically utilizes
four aspects of opportunity, as identified by Tarrow (1991, 34-36): “the openness or
closedness of the polity, stability or instability of political alignments, presence or
absence of allies or support groups, divisions within the elite and its tolerance or
intolerance of protest. Optimum opportunity exists in conditions of openness, stability,
presence of allies/support groups, and tolerance of protest.”
It was Doug McAdam and William Sewell Jr. (2001) whom stressed the
importance of “crucial junctures” in the timing and frequency of contentious politics.
They noted the possibility of specific events or phases in EU development that triggered
peaks in European protest as well as the likelihood of more incremental and linear
development of European contention (McAdam and Sewell 2001). Observed Tarrow
(2005, 88): “We have seen that, at least through the late 1990s, there was a long-term
trend toward more Europe-directed collective action. But the more erratic inflections…
suggest that both processes were at work. A critical juncture marked the mid-to-late
1990s.”
The introduction of OO was not intended to imply fault with PP. Indeed, this
dissertation does not claim that PP fails to offer explanatory power. Rather, this research
posits that PP is too easily applicable. A strength and a weakness of PP is its macro-level
approach which lends itself to wider application, allowing it to explain many things.
Whelan (2008, 6) observed that Goodwin and Jasper (1999) and Morris (2000) presented
sound critiques of the “overly structural bias and neglect of strategic analysis of much
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political process theory.” Gamson (2011, 463) noted that “with cognitive liberation, the
basic problem is that the concept tends to conflate and blur different simultaneous but at
least partially independent processes.” Nepstad (1997, 471) concurred, arguing that the
concept of cognitive liberation tends to emphasize a state of consciousness rather than a
process or set of processes. “It conveys what people believe but not how they change
their beliefs” (Nepstad 1997, 471).
OO solves this problem by digging deeper into strategic analysis and better
isolating the variables determined to be causal conditions. Its isolation of two elements,
narrowed in scope, place focus on pivotal and essential components. Specifically, OO
focuses on opportunity created by a trigger event and organizational aptitiude. In 2004,
Meyer defined political opportunity as an event in an ongoing cycle of resource
mobilization. This concept is similar to the idea broached in this dissertation, though here
it is conceived as the genesis rather than part of the cycle.
As previously discussed, the element of opportunity in this model is exogenous
and spurred by a trigger event. This event must be large-scale and significant, meaning it
must be impactful and life-changing to a large population. The event leads to a change in
population dynamics and results in cultural change which, in turn, creates social-political
opportunity. The other essential element is organizational aptitude. While the aspect of
opportunity is based on exogenous factors, organizational aptitude is internal. An
organization’s indigenous strength stems from elements within its realm of control such
as efficacy and consistency in leadership, ideology, public outreach, and marketing.
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This dissertation holds that PP, as proposed by McAdam (1982), does provide
explanatory power. However, it is argued that the proposed Organizational/Opportunity
Theory provides greater explanatory power for the emergence and success of MEPG.
Hypothesis and Variables
For the testing of OO, it is hypothesized that:
H1: MEPG emergence was a result of opportunity borne from a trigger event- the
Fall of the Wall- that led to culture change in which the political and social environment
became conducive to the formation of MEPGs.
H1: Dependent variable: Emergence of MEPGs
H1: Independent variables: Fall of the Wall, new cultural norm
Fall of the Wall = Cultural Change + Political/Social environment conducive to
MEPG formation
H2: MEPG success is a result of internal organizational efficacy and capacity
(consistent leadership and ideology, public outreach, and marketing presence).
H2: Dependent variable: MEPG Success
H2: Independent variables: Consistent Leadership and Ideology, Marketing
Presence, and Public Outreach
Success= consistent leadership + consistent ideology + public outreach +
marketing presence
It is argued that OO provides the most explanatory power in explaining
emergence and success of MEPGs. Gifford (2014, 3) observed that: “Eurosceptic
mobilisations have not always successfully exploited opportunities and periods of
heightened Euroscepticism have been contained by political leaders.” He further noted
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the turn of the 21st century anomaly: “what became evident during the current wave was
the extent to which this was not the case. The speed and effectiveness of this mobilisation
quickly impacted on the governing position, shifting it in a harder Eurosceptic direction”
(Gifford 2014, 12).
H1 and H2 seek to explain this anomaly and better understand the conditions that
allowed for the emergence and success of MEPGs. H1 and H2 will utilize a set of
preconditions and conditions necessary to emergence and success, offering tangible
variables as predictors. Research will use the case study approach and analytic tools such
as the New York Times Chronicle. Compiled data will be analyzed using fsQCA.
Opportunity: H1 Emergence
Azmanova (2004, 18) observed that a “realignment is taking place between centre
and periphery between, on one hand, the centre-left and centre-right midpoint and, on the
other hand, the circumference of far-right and radical-left parties. In this new alignment,
the new centre…becomes one of the poles in the political axis, embracing the
‘opportunity’ side of the dilemma, while the farright and radical-left constitute the
opposite pole responding to societal fears of the hazards of the new economy of increased
competition and open borders.” In this vein, H1 asserts that the elements of opportunity
created an environment allowing for H2. OO posits that a trigger event, in this case the
end of the cold war, symbolized by the removal of the Berlin Wall (referred to as “the
Fall of the Wall”), led to a new cultural norm that created a political and social
environment conducive to the formation of MEPGs in Europe. These elements are held
to be necessary preconditions considered necessary for the rise and success of MEPGs
(H2).
195

Fall of the Wall. The Fall of the Wall (FOTW) concept is built on the premise of a
trigger event serving as the impetus for wide-scale change or reform. Examples of such
events are the onset/end of war; a catastrophic event such as 9/11; or a socio-political
event of international proportion like the fall of the Berlin Wall
As an example, the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 marked the end of
World War I, but it also signaled the beginning of Hitler’s rise to power. Within the
Treaty was an article (Article 231-now referred to as the War Guilt Clause), which not
only blamed Germany for World War I, but punished them for it as well. Hitler leveraged
and utilized the growing frustration and anger felt by the Germans over the conditions of
the Treaty, calling for its abrogation in his 1920 Nazi Programme (Yale University 2008).
The signing of the Treaty of Versailles served as a trigger event for the rise of Hitler and
the Nazi regime- a regime that would orchestrate one of the world’s most horrific and
notorious events- the holocaust.
Additionally, the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States by Al Qaeda
offer another example of a trigger event. The attacks, carried out that morning, led to the
formation of a “War Cabinet” by 9:30pm and a declaration of a “War on Terror” by
11:00 pm, the same day (Chossudovsky 2011). The effects of 9/11 continue to impact
the world today, culturally and politically, leading to altered way of life, a new
beauroratic structure, a new international alliance known as the “Global War on Terror.”
Perspectives changed to mindsets of “us vs. them” and illustrated Samuel Huntington’s
titular prophecy of a “Clash of Civilizations.”
This research’s symbolic event, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and
subsequent end of the Cold War in December 1991, led to significant changes throughout
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Europe, specifically culture change and new-found freedom. Indeed, Mudde (2007, 159)
identified the 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty as the ‘turning point’ for radical right
parties in terms of both their position on European integration and the salience of the
issue in their agenda. Although the EU existed before the Maastricht Treaty, it was
formally established under its current name following the signing of the Treaty in 1993
with 12 member countries. Since that time, the EU has more than doubled in size. In
1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden were admitted. In 2004, the largest enlargement of
the EU occurred with the addition of ten countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Romania and Bulgaria
joined in 2007, and Croatia in 2013, bringing the total number of member countries to 28
(European Commission 2015). Such rapid expansion, coupled with the launch of the
euro as the single currency and austerity issues, has led to significant backlash against the
status quo in the form of euroscepticism, in addition to altering life for its citizens.
Malone (2014, 7) noted that “in the years immediately following the Second
World War, right wing populist parties virtually ceased to exist across Europe, as their
brand had become toxic.” In fact, statistics reflect a waxing and waning of fascist groups
that will coincide with the end of war. Halla, et al. (2014, 2) observed that from “the
1970s until the mid-1980s, hardly any ERW [extreme right-wing party] had gained more
than five percent in a general election. Fifteen years later, ERW parties received between
ten and twenty-five percent in these votes.” Figure 4.6 (from Langenbacher 2011) traces
this increase in radical right-wing parties.
Langenbacher (2011, 38) opined that “present-day European right-wing
radicalism is a modern phenomenon that has undergone several phases of renewal. These
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Figure 4.6. Election results of radical right-wing parties. Data is shown in five-year
increments from 1980 to 2009. Source: Langenbacher, Nora. 2011. Is Europe on the
"right" path? Right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in Europe; Friedrich-Ebert--Stiftung, Berlin; 2011.
phases were either visible as the consequence of modernisation spurts in postwar Western
societies, or appeared as newly constituted forms in the wake of the regime changes in
Eastern Europe.” In 2004, Paxton noted that “all the eastern European successor states
have contained radical Right movements since 1989, but most of these have remained
gratifyingly weak” (Paxton 2004, 189). Such perspectives support the argument of the
FOTW as the trigger event for Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, but also provide support
for the theory that a subsequent trigger event within a short timeframe-- 9/11-- could
serve to strengthen resolve and offer additional opportunity for groups in transition or on
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the verge of formation. In fact, groups such as ATAKA (2004), Jobbik (2003), and Syriza
(2004) were all formed within 2-3 years of 9/11.
These examples support the claim that a single event can dramatically change and
impact life. The chain of events each set into motion evidences the influence possible
from one single event. In the case of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, the FOTW as a
trigger event served as the impetus for socio-cultural change: the variable examined in
the next section.
Cultural Change. It was Geertz (1973) who observed that symbols derive their
meaning not from their relationships with one another, but rather from the various roles
they play in people’s lives, and the Berlin Wall was one powerful symbol. With its
demise, literal and figurative borders were opened providing opportunity and freedomoften where none before existed. In an interview with Foreign Policy, Volen Siderov,
leader of the Bulgarian ATAKA party, discussed the hopes and expectations shared by
those against the communist regime that were borne from the FOTW:
People…believed that with the fall of the communist regime, things would settle
down in a democratic fashion along the lines of the freedoms that were missing —
the freedom of expression, the freedom of speech — as well as in terms of
lifestyle, because back then we were frustrated from an economic point of view
… we were too naïve. (Feffer 2013)
Interestingly, Siderov even referenced Huntington when discussing the effects of the
FOTW:
Ideologically, I realized that there was a clash between the model of globalization
and the model of national identity. This is not the clash of civilizations offered by
Samuel Huntington, the clash between Islam and Christianity. The true clash is
between the globalization model and the well-developed national sovereign state
that has a well-preserved identity, economy, middle class, and social system.
(Feffer 2013)
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In 2004, Paxton observed that “the most successful of a number of antiliberal, antiWestern, anti-Semitic parties in Russia was Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s badly misnamed
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), founded at the end of 1989, with a program of national
revival and unification under strong authority combined with wild-eyed proposals for the
reconquest of Russia’s lost territories.”
Indeed, theorists tend to view culture change from one of two schools of thought:
one views traditional values as declining due to modernization while the other views
traditional values as persisting in spite of modernization (Inglehart and Baker 2000).
Accordingly, Griffin’s concept of palingenesis- a rebirth- is acutely appropriate.
Such rebirth captures traditional values bringing them to the forefront. His idea of
palingenetic ultranationalism (1991) mirrors the surge in post-war nationalism seen in
Japan.
Surges in post-war nationalism are more common than not lending more
plausibility to the idea of social and culture change following a trigger event. Examples
include the United States following the War of 1812, Germany after World War I (in
which Hitler embraced symbols), and Africa following World War II. The surge in
nationalism in Europe following the FOTW, however, had unintended consequences and
led to a nationalism collision rather than unification and, ultimately, euroscepticism. As
noted by Langenbacher (2011, 37): “More than sixty years after the end of the Second
World War, with Europe largely reunited, radical-right-wing, ultra-nationalist and
xenophobic movements and parties have become part of the normal political scene.”
Snow, et al. (2004) made the observation that two conceptual shifts have
occurred. First, the political opportunity structure in Europe is conceived as multilevel.
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Scale shift has become part of the social movement repertoire. When problems implicate
several levels of government but political opportunities across these governments vary,
strategic actors can be expected to exploit the opportunities that are available. Tarrow
(2001, 18) opined that “the European Union . . . is at the same time cross-territorial,
intergovernmental, and multilevel, which opens opportunities for coalitions of actors and
states to formulate common positions and overcome their diversity and dispersion to
exploit its political opportunities.”
Harmsen and Spiering (2004) acknowledged the relevance of culture and the
pervasive role it plays. They noted that the term Euroscepticism “assumes a meaning
which must be understood relative to the different national political traditions and
experiences of European integration which frame those debates” (Harmsen and Spiering
2004, 17). This is particularly critical in times of transition when values and norms can be
challenged and even targeted.
Many Europeans point to demographic changes as a primary cause of sociocultural change in the 90s. Allievi (2005, 21) noted that “the presence of ever-increasing
numbers of immigrants in the European social landscape it is not merely a quantitative
fact with different consequences for many social and cultural dynamics. Changes in the
quantitative levels of so many different indicators (economic, social, cultural, political,
religious) not only produce quantitative change, they alter the scenario completely.”
Azmanova (2004, 119) focused on political change, noting that “the nature of political
centrism itself has undergone a change in the nineties, and thus given rise to new political
cultures. At the root of this change are the deep socio-economic transformations in
Europe.” In fact, a 2015 Pew Research Study revealed that 50% or greater of people
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surveyed now view non-traditional parties positively. Langenbacher (2011, 54) offered
additional support for the argument of a cultural shift: “Various studies show that from
the 1980s up to the present day, the framework conditions have shifted towards a higher
rather than a lower degree of tolerance.”
In 1961, Maurice Bardéche wrote that “fascism is, by its essence, nationalist, and
while it originates as the reaction to a crisis, all fascist reaction is resurrection” (Griffin
1991, 172). This dissertation argues that Bardéche’s ‘resurrection’ is Griffin’s
palingenetic ulltranationalism; it is the manifestation of coveted traditional values
embraced by MEPGs and materializing in the form of nationalism and euroscepticism as
a result of the culture change in Europe triggered by the FOTW.
Organizational Aptitude: H2 Success
H2 examines organizational aptitude, defined as the internal elements of an
organization that have contributed to solidifying its presence. The OO model argues that
leadership and ideological consistency, marketing presence, and public outreach are
essential components of a successful group.
Success in this study will be considered as a group having a member in the EP. Scores are
coded using the six-value fuzzy set: ≥ 25%=1; 15-24%=.9; 9-14%=.6; 4-8%=.25; 13%=.1; and 0=0. Table 4.2 details the scoring process. Testing of H2 consisted of data
from sources including the World Values Survey and the Eurobarometer. Data was
analyzed using fsQCA.
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Table 4.2.
MEPG Success as of January 2016
MEP
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)
Finns Party-Perussuomalaiset
Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ)
Front National (FN)
Podemos- Spain
Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)
Swiss People’s Party (SVP)
Swedish Democrats (SD)
Syriza- Greece
UKIP-England
Vlaams Belang- Belgium

2 of 96
2 of 13
4 of 18
23 of 74
5 of 54
4 of 26
2 of 7*
2 of 20
4 of 21
22 of 73
1 of 12

%
2.083
15.384
22.222
31.081
9.259
15.384
28.571
10.00
19.047
30.136
8.333

Score
.1
.9
.9
1
.6
.9
1
.6
.9
1
.25

Note.

Scores: ≥ 25%=1; 15-24%=.9; 9-14%=.6; 4-8%=.25; 1-3%=.1; 0=0. As Switzerland is not part of the EU, party success was
measured as a seat on the Federal Council.

Consistency: Leadership and Ideology. In their article on elements of social
movement organizations, Benford and Snow (2000) discussed the importance of
consistency in framing collective action, noting that it “refers to the congruency between
an SMO’s articulated beliefs, claims, and actions.” Further, the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) specified that “clearly defined political identity serves to strengthen
political parties through its contribution to consistent policies based on common values”
(NDI 2008).
The link between consistency and political parties has become increasingly
significant. A 2014 survey by the Pew Research Center revealed that “as ideological
consistency has become more common, it has become increasingly aligned with
partisanship” (Pew Research Center 2014). In their survey on American ideological
partisanship, Pew found that “70% of the politically engaged now [2014] take positions
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that are mostly or consistently in line with the ideological bent of their party. By
comparison, the equivalent positions were held by 58% of Republicans and 35% of
Democrats in 1994 and 40% of Republicans and 59% of Democrats in 2004” (Pew
Research Center, 2014).
For this research, consistency was examined as it related to a group’s leadership,
mission and ideology. Though leadership can and often does change, it was held that
when a group’s central focus and ideology remained consistent, its status and level of
success would not falter. MIT (April 2014) underscored the importance of leadership
consistency, noting that “consistent, replicable behavior of leaders plays a crucial role to
create organizational trust.” Though leadership is certainly believed to be important,
change in leadership is surmountable as long as the group’s underlying mission and goals
remain consistent. An examination of the DF revealed a positive result when leadership
was replaced by consistent ideology was maintained: “DF’s broader appeal among the
voting public has also increased significantly since the polarizing Pia Kjærsgaard stepped
down in 2012 and was replaced by the younger and more rhetorically restrained Kristian
Thulesen Dahl.” (Jensen 2015).
In this study, consistency was measured in terms of ideology and of leadership.
Some of the information for this dataset utilized data compiled in Chapter Three: Testing
for Millennial Eurosceptic Populism. Leadership and Ideology scores will again be based
on a six-value fuzzy set with a scoring system as detailed in Table 4.3.
Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD). AfD has had two
leaders in as many years. However, it has remained solidly nationalist, populist and
right-wing with a firm anti- Euro/anti-EU stance. Leadership: .9 Ideology: 1
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Table 4.3.
Leadership and Ideology Scores
Score

Leadership

Ideology

same leader since
founding

same ideology since founding

0.9 (mostly but not
fully in)

two leaders total in 10+
years

same ideology though softer or
harsher stance

0.6 (more or less in)

three leaders total in 10+
years

same ideology but shift in primary
focus

0.4 (more or less out)

three leaders in less than
10 years

one change in primary ideology
OR two shifts in focus

0.1 (mostly but not
fully out)

more than four leaders in
10 years

more than one change in primary
ideology in 10 years

ALL OTHERS

more than one change in primary
ideology in 10 years

1 (fully in)

0 (fully out)

Note. Scores were based on a six-value fuzzy set as described by Ragin 2008.

Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF). In more than 10 years of existence
DF has seen one leadership change in 2012. It has remained a right-wing populist group
since its inception with strong anti-immigration policies. Leadership: .9
Ideology: 1
True FINNS Party. The True Finns have had the same leader, Timo Soini, since
1997. The party was founded as and remains socially conservative, populist and
nationalist. Leadership: 1 Ideology: 1
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Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ). FPÖ has had
two leaders as well as coalition government rule since the 90s. However, it has remained
fervently right-wing, nationalist and anti-immigration since its reinvention in the 90s.
Leadership: .6 Ideology: 1
Front National. Led by a Le Pen since 1972; Founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen and
assumed by daughter Marine Le Pen in 2011. The party has been consistently right-wing
and nationalist with increasing focus on immigration. Leadership: .9 Ideology: .9
Podemos. As a new party, Podemos has only seen one national election and one
leader. Its platform continues to evolve though it is left-wing and focused on economic
recovery. Leadership: 1 Ideology: 1
Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV). Party leader Wilders has
remained at the helm since the party was founded in 2006. It is staunchly right-wing,
populist and Eurosceptic. Leadership: 1 Ideology: 1
Swiss People’s Party, SVP. Since it was reinvented in the 90s, the SVP has had
three leaders with their current leader serving since 2008. The party has refined its goals
and policies several times, presenting a new manifesto in 2010. It remains firm is its
rejection of EU membership and is right-wing populist. Leadership: .6 Ideology: .4
Swedish Democrats. The party has had several leadership changes, though
current leader Akesson has been at the helm since 2005. The party has maintained a
right-wing-populist, nationalist and anti-immigration focus since Akesson assumed
leadership. Leadership: .6 Ideology: .4
Syriza. Syriza was founded and remains a left-wing, populist and nationalist
party. Its leader, Tsipras, has served as chairman since 2009, sitting out a little more than
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a month following a party splinter in 2015. This led to Tsipras’ loss of the majority in
Parliament, so he stepped down as Prime Minister and called for a new election, which
Syriza ultimately won. Leadership: 1 Ideology: 1
UKIP. Nigel Farage has served as party leader from 2006-2009 and again from
2010 to present (2016). Since 2006, UKIP has had Roger Knapman, The Lord Pearson of
Rannoch, Jeffrey Titford and Farage at the helm. UKIP is firmly populist, right-wing,
and Eurosceptic. It was founded as a Eurosceptic party. Leadership: .1 Ideology: 1
Vlaams Belang. Vlaams Belang has remained an anti-immigrant, right-wing
nationalist party seeking an independent Flemish republic. The party has had four leaders
since 2004, with Frank Vanhecke, Bruno Valkeniers, Gerolf Annemans, and Tom Van
Grieken serving as chairman since 2008. Leadership: .1 Ideology: 1
Online Marketing Presence
As explored in Phase I, testing of PP, McAdams’s idea of cognitive liberation was a
powerful and important concept. However, one must consider how these shared ideas are
developed and imparted. This study holds that messaging/marketing is the method of
delivering and establishing these shared ideas and beliefs.
One of Adolf Hitler’s legacies was his adept usage of propaganda. The London
Jewish Cultural Centre (2011) noted that Hitler chose to appoint Josef Goebbels as
Minister of Propaganda to propel his efforts: “Goebbels developed extremely successful
campaigns using simple slogans and images repeated over and again in order to win
public support for the party. The Nazis spent huge sums on newspapers, leaflets and
poster campaigns.” Hitler had Goebbels depict Germany as a country “with traditional
values and with Hitler as the beloved Führer. The promotion of Nazi racial policy was at
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the very centre of Goebbels’s message. The re-writing of school books and the
production of antisemitic books, films and exhibitions supported this policy” (London
Jewish Cultural Centre 2011). This early manifestation of a marketing campaign was
telltale of the potential impact possible through a strategic marketing effort.
A marketing campaign can take many forms and involve many different aspects.
Social media and traditional media are now the two primary outlets. In 2012,
Ramalingam determined that “in recent years, the far right’s use of social media has
expanded. The extreme right capitalises on relationship-building mechanisms online, and
the emergence of new social media and other such tools has become far more important
than static websites, particularly to build a sense of comradeship as well as ownership
over the movement” (Ramalingam 2012, 9). De Vreese (2007, 280) highlighted the role
of the media in shaping citizen’s attitudes towards European integration, concluding that
“Euroscepticism is, at least partially, a function of the diet of information that citizens
consume about European affairs. News media coverage of EU-issues and events, such as
Council meetings, can cause changes in the level of cynicism about European
integration” (DeVreese 2007, 280).
Another important aspect of marketing is branding and messaging, i.e. how a
group presents itself and the words and methods it uses to represents its ideology and
goals. Word use is particular important- in this case semantics are everything. Word
choice paints a clear picture of a group’s meaning and/or intention; for example, opting to
use the word “demand” rather than “ask for” conveys a particular tone and meaning. In
an article for the BBC, Williamson (2014) reported that: “In the past three years, Marine
Le Pen has put a lot of effort into ‘detoxifying’ her party - ridding it of the racist stigma
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and neo-Nazi links it attracted under her father's leadership.” Le Pen stated that "The
devil's cloak that we were forced to wear has been removed…the French are beginning to
see us as we really are. Our party was never racist. None of our proposals are based on
race or religion. We are patriots: we welcome and work with all who are French"
(Williamson 2014). It is important to note Le Pen’s emphasis on and, perhaps,
misdirection evidenced by the choice of the word “patriot.”
As a whole, the method and manner of spreading the word about one’s
organization takes a new form in the 21st century. The number of people using the
internet as their primary source of news has continued to climb, while the number of
traditional print news readers declines. Observed Sheppard (2015): “Industry focused
research reiterates the popularity of online news consumption in comparison to the fading
traditional print formats. Accessing news online is favoured over print in France,
Germany, Italy, Denmark, United Kingdom, Spain and Finland.”
It is therefore not surprising to recognize the utility, reach and growing need to
focus marketing and publicity campaigns online. In this study, marketing will be
measured in terms of online presence. Each party in our study will be analyzed to
determine whether it has a website and, if so, what social media links they have included.
Any icon links/feeds displayed on the party’s homepage will be noted.
Scoring was based on the number of social media links found on a party’s
main/home page on its website, if applicable (Table 4.4). The party’s own website
counted as one point. One additional point was given if a website offered any additional
languages. An additional point was also given for a group exceeding more than 100,000
page likes on Facebook, 50,000 followers or 5,000 tweets on Twitter, and 10,000
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Table 4.4.
Social Media Scoring
# of social media links plus bonus points

10+
1

Corresponding Score

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

.9 .8 .7 .6 .5 .4 .3 .2 .1

Note. Scoring for each group was based on the number of social media links found on the party’s main/home page on its official
website.

YouTube subscribers. Thus, a maximum of 15 points was possible. The tallied points
corresponded to a score which was then utilized for fsQCA. For consistency, the English
versions of online media were utilized for data compilation. For example, Facebook was
utilized instead of the Dutch version “Hyves.” An online presence chart (Figures 4.7 and
4.8) shows the information compiled.
Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD).


http://www.alternativefuer.de/ (1)



Four social media links: Google +, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube (4)



Offers English as a language (1)



Facebook likes >100,000K (1)
TOTAL: 7 (.7)

Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF).


http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/ (1)



One social media link to Facebook (1)



Also has links to the FB pages of several members/leaders
TOTAL: 2 (.2)
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Finns Party-Perussuomalaiset.


https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/ (1)



Has four social media links: Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, Blog (4)



Offers English (1)
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Figure 4.7. MEPG Online Media Presence Part 1.
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Figure 4.8. MEPG Online Media Presence Part 2.

TOTAL: 6 (.6)
Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ).


http://www.fpoe.at/ (1)



Has three social media links to YouTube, Facebook and Twitter (3)



Also has link to party leader Stroche’s website and the FPO-TV site



Facebook >100,000 likes (1)



YouTube subscribers >10,000 (1)



Twitter >5,000 tweets (1)
TOTAL: 7 (.7)

Front National- France.


http://www.frontnational.com/ (1)



Lists seven social media links on their website (7)



Lists two audio/video links (iTunes and Google play)



Live Twitter feed with >5,000 tweets and >50,000 followers (1)



Facebook >100,000 likes (1)



YouTube >10,000 subscribers (1)
TOTAL: 11 (1)

Podemos- Spain.


http://unpaiscontigo.es and podemos.info (1)



Has social media links to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr (4)



Lists hashtags for use in English and Spanish #TOGETHERPODEMOS
#UnPaísContigo
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Offers five language choices (1)



Twitter >5,000 tweets and >50,000 followers (1)



Facebook >100,000 likes (1)



YouTube >10,000 subscribers (1)
TOTAL: 9 (.9)

Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV).


http://www.pvv.nl/ (1)



Has links to RSS feed and party leader Geert Wilders’ Twitter (2)



Twitter >50,000 followers (1)
TOTAL: 4 (.4)

Swiss People’s Party, SVP.


http://www.svp.ch/ (1)



Has social media links to YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram (4)



Offers French or German (1)
TOTAL: 6 (.6)

Swedish Democrats.


http://sd.se (1)



Has social media links to Twitter and Facebook (2)



Facebook >100,000 likes (1)
TOTAL: 4 (.4)

Syriza- Greece.


http://www.syriza.gr/ (1)
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Has social media links to Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, RSS feed (5)



Offers international option for other languages (1)



Twitter >50,000 followers (1)



Facebook >100,000 likes (1)
TOTAL: 9 (.9)

UKIP-England.


http://www.ukip.org/ (1)



Has links to Twitter, Facebook and YouTube (3)



Has live Twitter and Facebook feed



Twitter >50,000 followers (1)



Facebook >100,000 likes (1)



YouTube >10,000 YouTube subscribers (1)
TOTAL: 7 (.7)

Vlaams Belang- Belgium.


http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/ (1)



Has social media links to Facebook, Twitter, Google+, Pinterest, YouTube,
and RSS feed (6)



Live feed/video links Twitter, Facebook, Google+



Twitter >5,000 tweets (1)
TOTAL: 8 (.8)

Public Outreach
In 2005, the European Commission found that “access to decision-makers is more
difficult for the eurosceptics than for supporters of the integration process. In other
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words, we expected the strong EU opponents to rely more heavily on public-related
strategies than the EU supporters.” They further observed that “eurosceptics are obliged
to rely more heavily on public-related strategies, because they find it difficult to get
access to decision-makers at the national or the EU-level” (European Commission, 2005).
Such insight is central to the proposed variable of grassroots activism. Public
appeal and involvement is a critical component of most campaigns, but especially so with
MEPGs. Evans and Butt demonstrated that “public opinion increasingly cues political
parties rather than the reverse,” and that “Euroscepticism in Britain has become less
driven by economic insecurity and moreso by concerns about British (or English)
identity” (Hooghe and Marks, 2007).
MEPGs have sought to change the status quo; to do so they must involve and call
upon the masses to gain voters and, subsequently, seats. Groups seek to inspire and
mobilize the public, encouraging them to engage and demand change on behalf of their
cause. From these efforts emerge voters- like-minded and patriotic citizens responding to
a call-to-action.
Websites and social media are now considered agents of mobilization. They
allow politicians and parties to interact and engage with constituents and members as
well as serve to broadcast a call to action. Indeed, Bartlett, et al. (2013) observed that
“The M5S Movement in Italy has evolved rapidly to become a significant political player
by using social media to engage like-minded people in virtual and real life political
action.” Indeed, traditional outreach efforts may not have disappeared from the choice of
tools in the toolbox, but they have been forced to make ample space for millennial
grassroots activism such as online marketing and targeting.
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As a practical example, Podemos is widely considered to have created one of the
best social media and marketing campaigns in Europe. Miguel Arana Catania, co-founder
of Laboratorio Democratico, noted that “the use of social media has been a major success
for Podemos” (Sangsari 2015). Sangsari (2015) reported that “Podemos’s social currency
reaches close to one million Facebook fans and 557,000 Twitter followers. To put that in
perspective, the four largest federal parties in Canada have a combined total of 270,000
Facebook likes and 370,000 Twitter followers.” Troncoso (2014) described how
“Podemos’ unprecedented tactics and organizational methods can reinvigorate the New
Left in Europe.” Accordingly, Ken Loach, co-founder of the UK party Left Unity, told
Troncoso: “I think we can emulate [Podemos] in the organising in the grassroots, drawing
people in, speaking to the 90%, using social media when necessary” (Troncoso 2014).
The Podemos website not only proudly recruits members and volunteers, it
encourages public involvement and engagement. Their efforts include online do-ityourself door hangers, bicycle tags, and campaign cards. They also involve visitors by
encouraging them to take ‘selfies’ and videos and post them with a Podemos hashtag.
Podemos even goes the extra mile when it comes to online fundraising, offering
microcredit and crowdfunding options in addition to more traditional methods. Further,
Podemos uses Reddit to enable their political candidates to debate with citizens.
In this study, a MEPG’s level of public outreach was tabulated utilizing a scale of
0-2 points for each of five categories:
1.

info availability (news, manifesto, events)

2.

face-to-face efforts (canvassing, leafleting, contacting voters)

3.

public events (demonstrations, protests, rallies)
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4.

encouragement of youth involvement

5.

media mentions
Figure 4.9 provides the compiled results. Info availability focused on ease of

access (via the group’s website) to news, manifesto, vision, goals, and events. Face-toface efforts reflected the extent of personal contact with voters via methods such as
canvassing, leafleting, and door-knocking. Results were obtained by searching the
group’s website and via open-source google searches using the MEPG name and the
terms (and variations thereof) “canvassing,” “leafleting,” and “door-knocking.” Public
events were opportunities for the party to address the public and for the public to gather

MEPG

Figure 4.9. MPEG Public Outreach Scores. The 12 MPEGs in this study are shown with
their respective scores in each of five public oputreach categories.
in support of and to promote the group. These include rallies, demonstrations and
protests. The same method was used as was for face-to-face, utilizing search
terms/variations of “demonstrations,” “protests,” and rallies.” Encouragement of youth
involvement reflected whether a group had a youth wing and how interactive, embedded
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and involved the MEPG was with them. The MEPG’s website was examined for links to
a youth group and google was used to search for the MEPG and “youth wing.” Opensource news reports were searched using google and the same terms to determine any
news items involving the group and youth. A “0” will reflect a below average result in
that category, “1” will indicate an average result, and a “2” will reflect an above average
result.
Media mentions revealed the number of times a group made the news. Media
mentions data was compiled utilizing the New York Times visualization tool “Chronicle”
(Figure 4.10). The Chronicle tool is described as “visualizing language usage in New
York Times news coverage throughout its history” (NYTlabs 2015). Though the New
York Times is a US based newspaper, it amasses and prints news from around the world.
The tool is considered a method of visualizing “a historic corpus of news coverage”
(NYTlabs 2015). Similarly, because none of the MEPGs are US-based, the groups are

MEPG

Figure 4.10. Media Mentions. Media mentions of each MPEG are indocated by colorcoded waves. Data was compiled using the New York Times Chronicle Visualization
Tool.
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equally disparate and any mentions would be equally impartial and based on widespread
European media coverage. Note that searches were performed using MEPG native
language spelling and English language spelling (ex: Alternative für Deutschland vs
Alternative for Germany). In all cases, the native language search returned fewer or no
results, most likely because the New York Times is US-based and, therefore, would
present the group’s name in English. Figure 4.11 provides the calibrated score for each
MPEG.
Media Mentions in 2015 (highest % if year other than 2015)
MEPG
AfD:
DF:
Finns Party
FPO:
Front National:
PVV:
Podemos:
Swedish Democrats:
SVP:
Syriza
UKIP
Vlaams

PERCENTAGE
.01 (.02 in 2016)
.01 (.03 in 2016)
.0 (.02 in 2016)
.0 (.01 in 2000)
.01 (.03 in 2016)
.0
.14
.0
.0 (.01 in 2014)
.32
.04
.0

SCORE
1
1
1
0
1
0
2
0
0
2
1
0

Figure 4.11. Media Mentions Scores. Scores for each MPEG were calibrated based on a
conversion of the percentage of mentions received.
Highest percentages were used as media mentions fluctuate with peaks typically
occurring during election years (which vary per country). Based on the results using
Chronicle, percentages above .10 earned a “2” representing an above average result;
percentages of .02-.09 were assigned an average score of “1;” and percentages less than
or equal to .01 were assigned a below average score of “0.” With five categories and a
maximum score of “2” for each, the greatest total score possible was a “10” which
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corresponded, for fsQCA purposes, to a “1.” A total score of “5” equaled a “.5,” and so
on.
All MEPGs had fairly comprehensive websites that included their
program/manifesto. Some had extensive news reports and even included news and social
media feeds (Front National, SVP). A few were difficult to navigate and/or information
was buried/difficult to locate (PVV, FPÖ). In some cases, a party had few events listed
on their primary website but a google search led to a local branch of the group which had
posted additional events in that location (ex. AfD vs http://afd-bw.de/termineveranstaltungen/). Others had extensive schedules listed on their primary site (Finns
Party, SVP). Some parties had less events noted, but extensive details such as the food to
be served and how to carpool or take the bus to attend (DF). Others had full schedules
during the election year but few to none other years (SD). Podemos relied heavily on
social media for advertising events. This strategy is excellent for cutting costs and
targeting younger, tech-savvy voters but overlooks those accustomed to and expecting
traditional notification methods.
Media mentions results indicated that Syriza and Podemos had significantly
greater results than any other group. UKIP, Front National, and DF had the next three
highest scores, while PVV, Swedish Democrats and Vlaams Belang had negligible
results.
Overall public outreach scores revealed that PVV had the lowest total score for
public outreach-- ostensibly because as a one-man party Wilders simply cannot do
everything a traditional party with members can do. Syriza had the highest and only
perfect score of 10.
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Remarks
Chapter IV served to introduce the methodology and design for this study. Data
collection was completed and detailed. The next chapter, Chapter V, will detail the
testing procedure and present results, with Chapter VI serving as the forum for a
discussion and analysis of results and conclusions.
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CHAPTER V
THE EFFICACY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND ORGANIZATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY MODELS: TESTING AND RESULTS
This chapter utilizes the data collected in Chapter IV to test the efficacy of PP and
OO using fsQCA. For fsQCA testing, data sets require a determination of degree of
membership based on a scale of 0-1: zero (“0”) corresponded with .00% and “1” equated
with 100% or 10, depending on data format. Each variable’s value was considered to be
its degree of membership. A “1” indicated “full membership” in the data set and a “0”
was indicative of “full non-membership.” FsQCA analysis will indicate the strength of
the relationship between causal conditions and the outcome, allowing for a determination
of the conditions which might be sufficient, necessary, or both.
Data consisted of four variables from each of the three elements of PP: political
opportunity, cognitive liberation (two conditions) and indigenous organizational strength.
The variables utilized for testing PP were: Political Opportunity (polopp), Indigenous
Organizational Strength (indorgst), Cognitive Liberation-Euroscepticism (coglibeur),
and Cognitive Liberation-Nationalism (coglibnat).
OO model testing also had four variables from three elements: consistency (two
causal conditions), marketing presence, and public outreach. The variables utilized for
testing OO were: Consistent Leadership (consldr), Consistent Ideology (considea),
Marketing Presence (markpres), and Public Outreach (pubout). The outcome variable
was success for both models. FsQCA utilizes the term “causal condition” rather than
independent variable, and “outcome” for dependent variable. As a result, these terms will
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be used in addition to standard statistical terminology. As a starting point, Figure 5.1
provides the data that was entered into fsQCA.

Figure 5.1. Variables by MPEG. The eight independent variables and the dependent
variable are identified by group, calibrated according to fsQCA requirements.
FsQCA provides the following descriptive statistics (Figure 5.2) for the study’s causal
conditions:

Figure 5.2. Descriptive Statistics. fsQCA printout displaying the descriptive statistics for
each variable.
In fsQCA (as with its parent technique, QCA), analysis is based on relationships between
and amongst sets rather than correlations. Ragin (2008) distinguished “between the
analysis of ‘independent variables’, where factors are necessarily distinct, and the
configurational analysis of causes and conditions.” “In the former, investigations of
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combinations of conditions are hampered by collinearity (when variables have a linear
relationship), whereas the fact that some conditions may be related to one another is
expected in a QCA, and is part of the Boolean set logic (intersection) that underpins the
analysis” (Thomas et al. 2014). Ragin and Rihoux (2004) discussed five primary goals of
QCA: data representation as a truth table; consistency review of the data; testing of the
hypothesis; the basic assumptions of the analysis; and the development of causal
hypotheses based on observable patterns in the data.
The truth table is the starting point and is essentially a data spreadsheet which
displays the causal conditions (independent variables), the outcome (dependent variable),
and the degrees of membership of each. It provides consistency scores based on various
relationships and allows for the researcher to input an outcome value based on data and
theoretical information. Ragin (2008, 46) noted that: “The truth table will have 2k rows
(where k represents the number of causal conditions), reflecting all possible combinations
of causal conditions. The 1s and 0s represent full membership and zero membership for
each condition, respectively.”
The researcher then determines a frequency threshold and a consistency threshold:
The researcher must begin by developing a rule for classifying some
combinations (rows) as relevant and others as irrelevant, based on their frequency.
This is accomplished by selecting a frequency threshold based on the number of
cases in each row, shown in number column. When the total number of cases in
an analysis is relatively small, the frequency threshold should be 1 or 2. (Ragin
2008, 46)
Once the frequency threshold is determined, all rows below the threshold are deleted. The
researcher must then “distinguish configurations that are subsets of the outcome from
those that are not” (Ragin 2008, 46). He notes that “values below 0.75 indicate
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substantial inconsistency” while a threshold of .8 is the standard threshold (Ragin, 2009).
Based on the chosen threshold, the researcher then enters a “1” in the outcome column
for each configuration whose consistency level meets and/or exceeds the threshold and a
“0” in the outcome column for each configuration whose consistency level does not meet
the consistency threshold (Ragin 2008).
Once the above procedures are completed, analysis may begin. FsQCA analyzes
causal combinations or “recipes” to determine those that are sufficient and/or necessary
for the outcome. This research will utilize the fsQCA “standard analysis” which, as
Ragin (2008) explained “is the recommended procedure, as this is the only way to derive
the intermediate solution.” Not only is the intermediate result considered the most
reliable, it also “conducts counterfactual analyses based on information about causal
conditions” (Ragin, 2008).
The standard analysis method returns three different results in truth table analysis:
complex, intermediate and parsimonious. The complex result omits contradictory cases
(rows with no cases); the intermediate result uses only the remainders that survive
contradictory analysis as determined by the researcher; and the parsimonious result
utilizes any remainder that will offer simpler combinations. Summarizing, Elliott (2013,
9) noted that “the complex solution makes no assumptions, the parsimonious solution
uses both easy and difficult assumptions to simplify, and the intermediate only uses easy
assumptions.”
Evaluation will also include analysis of necessary conditions, coincidence, and
subset/superset analysis. Necessary conditions and coincidence will be tested for each
model: Phase I (PP) and Phase II (OO).
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Phase I: Testing of PP Model
To determine the degree to which PP explains rise and success, the combination
of causal conditions specific to this model were evaluated: polopp, indorgst, coglbeur,
and coglibnat. Analysis began with subset/superset analysis (Figure 5.3). Truth table
analysis followed, beginning with the creation of the truth table, appropriate evaluation
and deletion/coding, causal condition selection, and finally, analysis. Testing for
Necessary Conditions and Coincidence followed, as did any graphic representations of
interest. As described in Chapter IV, success was considered as a group having a member
in the EP.

Figure 5.3. PP Model Subset/Superset Analysis. fsQCA data report showing consistency
and coverage scores for the four variables of the PP model. Yellow indicates potential
important relationships.
Subset and superset analysis offers insight into potential relationships and causal
conditions of interest. It examines all variables and provides coverage and consistency
scores which are considered parameters of fit. Consistency scores below .75 indicate
substantial inconsistency, while scores greater than 90% tend to indicate those variables
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which are potentially necessary conditions. Ragin (2008) notes that “consistency
measures the degree to which membership in each solution term is a subset of the
outcome” and that “raw coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the
outcome explained by each term of the solution.” Following this formula, as well as the
recommended coverage of 50%, subset/superset analysis (Figure 5.3) identified indorgst
as the causal condition having the highest combined score as well as the highest
consistency score of .81.
Truth Table Analysis
In order to interpret the results, it is essential to understand the components used
in analysis. Ragin (2008) defined coverage as the measurement of how much of the
outcome is explained (or covered) by each solution term and by the solution as a whole.
Consistency reflects the degree to which solution terms and the solution as a whole are
subsets of the outcome. Another way of explaining consistency is that it determines
whether the causal path regularly produces the outcome. As Epstein, et al. (2008)
observed: “Consistency is thus a measure of the extent to which membership strength in the
causal configuration is consistently equal to or less than membership in the outcome.” Stated

differently, coverage “determines the empirical relevance of a solution and quantifies the
variation in causal pathways to an outcome” (Schneider and Wageman 2010).
It is important to recognize that fsQCA stresses equifinality- the idea that there is
more than one combination of conditions associated with the same outcome. Truth table
results will report several paths to the outcome. Explained Schneider and Wagemann
(2010): “The empirical significance of a path, measured by the degree of coverage of the
outcome to be explained, is not equivalent to its theoretical significance. Some paths with
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a high coverage can be theoretically uninteresting or even trivial. Likewise, researchers
should not focus on any minimum value of consistency and hide those cases that deviate
from broad patterns.” Kane, et al. (2014) succinctly noted “When coverage of a causal
pathway is high, the more common the solution is, and more of the outcome is accounted
for by the pathway.” Wrote Elliott (2013):
…the lower your consistency, the higher your coverage. The goal is to find a good
balance, in which the solution is empirically and theoretically compelling, and
your consistency and coverage are in ranges that validate your solution. If you
have a super high consistency, but your coverage is super low, then your solution
isn't that compelling because it doesn't describe many cases at all.
On the other hand, if you have high coverage, but low consistency, it isn't
compelling because your solution doesn't lead to the outcome often enough to
make a strong causal argument. (Elliott 2013)
Kenworthy and Hicks (2008, 78) explain that “by definition, an intermediate
solution must be a superset of the complex solution (no simplifying assumptions used)

Figure 5.4. PP Model Truth Table Before Evaluation. fsQCA data report showing
consistency scores for the four variables of the PP model.
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Figure 5.5. PP Truth Table After Evaluation. fsQCA data report showing consistency
scores for the four variables of the PP model after coding.
and a subset of the parsimonious solution (all possible simplifying assumptions used,
regardless of their plausibility).” Additionally, Ragin (2008, 86) noted that “unique
coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained solely by
each individual solution term,” while raw coverage identifies which share of the outcome
is exclusively explained by a certain alternative path (Schneider and Wagemann 2010).
Necessary conditions represent a superset of the outcome while sufficient conditions are a
subset (Ragin 2008).

Figure 5.6. Selections for Causal Conditions. fsQCA prompt for casual condition
inclusion selections.

Truth Table Results. Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 provide the truth table procedural
steps which must be undertaken before analysis. In this model, data was run with causal
conditions present as well as with causal conditions present or absent. Results were more
reliable when run with conditions “present.” As detailed below in Figure 5.7, truth table
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analysis yielded two configurations (paths) leading to success in the complex and
intermediate solutions: coglibnat*polopp and coglibeur*indorgst*polopp. There was no
parsimonious solution because causal conditions were evaluated based on their presence
rather than absence. When a contributing cause contains no elements, there are no
minimal prime implicants and no parsimonious solutions. The “ERROR(QuineMcCluskey): The 1 Matrix Contains All Configurations” message indicates that all cases
met the consistency threshold and there were therefore no cases coded “0.”
________________________________________________________________________
**********************
TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS
**********************
Model: success = f(polopp, indorgst, coglibeur, coglibnat)
Rows:
5
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.820896

polopp*coglibnat
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur

raw
unique
coverage coverage consistency
--------- ---------- ---------0.731148 0.253443 0.839503
0.508852 0.031148 0.968789

solution coverage: 0.762295
solution consistency: 0.845045
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polopp*coglibnat: DF (0.763,1),
UKIP (0.758,1), AfD (0.738,0.1), Finns (0.734,0.9),
SD (0.727,0.6), FPO (0.712,0.9), PVV (0.696,0.9),
VB (0.688,0.25), Podemos (0.676,0.6), FN (0.626,1),
Syriza (0.54,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polopp*indorgst*coglibeur: SVP (0.596,1),
FPO (0.59,0.9), Podemos (0.54,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9),
FN (0.51,1)
*** ERROR(Quine-McCluskey): The 1 Matrix Contains All Configurations. ***
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1-L
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
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frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.820896
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.820896
Assumptions:
coglibnat (present)
coglibeur (present)
indorgst (present)
polopp (present)

coglibnat*polopp
coglibeur*indorgst*polopp

raw
unique
coverage coverage consistency
---------------------------0.731148 0.253443 0.839503
0.508852 0.031148 0.968789

solution coverage: 0.762295
solution consistency: 0.845045
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term coglibnat*polopp: DF (0.763,1),
UKIP (0.758,1), AfD (0.738,0.1), Finns (0.734,0.9),
SD (0.727,0.6), FPO (0.712,0.9), PVV (0.696,0.9),
VB (0.688,0.25), Podemos (0.676,0.6), FN (0.626,1),
Syriza (0.54,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term coglibeur*indorgst*polopp: SVP (0.596,1),
FPO (0.59,0.9), Podemos (0.54,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9),
FN (0.51,1)

Figure 5.7. PP Model Truth Table Analysis. The complete fsQCA analysis providing
consistency and coverage scoresfor the PP model variables for the complex, intermediate
and parsimonious solutions.
The first path in both the complex and intermediate solutions indicates that
political opportunity and cognitive liberation-nationalism cover 73% of the instances of
success. Twenty-five percent of the instances of success in MEPGs are uniquely
explained by political opportunity and cognitive liberation-nationalism. The consistency
score of .84 indicated that 84% of this configuration is supported by the empirical
evidence or, that this causal combination will lead to the outcome in approximately 84%
of cases.
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The second path in both the complex and intermediate solutions indicates that
cognitive liberation-euroscepticism, political opportunity, and indigenous organizational
strength cover 51% of the instances of MEPG success. Three percent of the instances of
success in MEPGs are uniquely explained by the cognitive liberation-euroscepticism,
political opportunity, and indigenous organizational. The consistency score of .97
indicated that 97% of this configuration is supported by the empirical evidence and that
this combinations will almost always lead to the outcome of success.
The overall solution coverage score of 0.76 indicates the proportion of
memberships in the outcome success that is explained by the complete solution, while the
solution consistency score of 0.84 indicates the degree to which membership in the
solution (the set of solution terms) is a subset of membership in the outcome.
According to Tomasino (2015), a necessary condition occurs when “the relevant
causal condition is present in all instances of an outcome. In contrast, sufficient
conditions represent causal complexity because they exist only in combinations with
other conditions” (Tomasino 2015, 4). He noted that in “fsQCA sufficiency is indicated
when the membership of the input is less than or equal to the membership of the
outcome….High consistency values indicate the condition is sufficient for the output”
(Tomasino 2015, 5). Ragin (2008) asserted that “when utilizing fsQCA, analysis
conditions considered potentially sufficient for an outcome typically have consistencies
greater than .8” (Tomasino 2015, 5).
This truth table analysis returns the causal condition polopp in both paths to the
outcome success. In this model, polopp is considered a necessary condition for a MEPG

234

to achieve success, though it is not sufficient because it does not produce the outcome on
its own. The two paths indicate they are sufficient combinations of conditions.
Analysis of Necessary Conditions
Schneider and Wagemann (2010) explained that “the necessary condition
represents – in set-theoretic terms – a super-set of the outcome Y, or, inversely, the
outcome Y is a sub-set of the necessary condition X.” They also observed that the logical
minimization of a truth table is essentially an analysis of sufficient conditions and that
QCA's sensitivity to causal complexity gives it an analytic edge over many statistical
techniques of data analysis (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Legewie (2013) detailed it
in this manner:
Condition A is necessary for outcome Y if the occurrence of Y is not possible
without the presence of A, but A alone is not enough to produce Y. In such cases,
all cases in which outcome Y occurs share the presence of condition A. In fuzzy
set terms, a necessary relation exists if outcome Y is a subset of causal condition
A; that is, in each case the degree of membership in Y is less than or equal to the
degree of membership in A (Y ≤ A). (Legewie 2013, 3.1.2)
Beginning with the assumption that the union of all causal conditions is a
necessary condition, the variables are broken down to stand alone and into pairs in an
effort to reduce and determine the fewest number of necessary terms. FSQCA returns a
consistency and a coverage score for each condition/condition union tested with the
outcome variable. In this analysis, consistency scores greater than 90% with coverage
scores greater than 50% indicate potentially necessary and/or sufficient conditions.
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Figure 5.8. PP Model Analysis of Necessary Conditions Testing. The variables of the PP
model were tested for necessary conditions. Yellow indicated likelihood of necessity.
In this analysis (Figure 5.8), no single conditions appear to meet the threshold for
necessary, though indorgst has the highest coverage score of .94 and coglibnat has the
highest consistency score of .86. This is interesting since polopp was determined to be a
necessary condition in truth table analysis. Two of the six pairs and the entire union of
causal conditions meets the threshold. The combined condition of polopp+coglibnat and
indorgst+coglibnat meet the threshold, as does the union of all four variables. The union
of polopp and coglibnat is consistent with truth table findings and indicates potentially
necessary combination to achieve success.
Coincidence
Set coincidence measured the number of cases found in the intersection of
variables. In essence, it measured the degree to which the sets overlapped. Ragin (2009,
59) clarified: “Set coincidence is not the same as the correlation but rather is a special
case of correlation. In a plot of two fuzzy sets, any straight line that is neither vertical nor
horizontal yields a perfect correlation coefficient. However, perfect set coincidence
occurs only when all the cases plot exactly on the main diagonal of the plot.” Scores
should be closer to 0 than 1, as this provides for greater diversity in explaining the
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outcome. Scores close to 1 indicate conditions that could be capturing the same
phenomenon. Analysis of the causal conditions for PP yielded the following results:

Table 5.9. PP Model Coincidence. fsQCA analysis of the PP model variables for
coincidence.
The results (Figure 5.9) indicated that the greatest overlap in cases existed
between the variables polopp and coglibnat with a score of .78. The combination with
the least overlap was coglibeur and coglibnat with .57. The overlap for all four causal
conditions was .44. Political opportunity data was derived from freedom of corruption.
Cognitive liberation in the form of nationalism was derived from scores of national pride.
An overlap could be construed based on pride for one’s country stemming from
opportunity. This seems to be quite a reach, however, as one does not require
opportunity in order feel pride. An alternate analysis provides the observation that
nations experiencing greater freedom from corruption would be exhibit more pride in
their country, though the opposite could be true as well. Pride could increase as a
demonstration of solidarity to spite existing corruption. For greater perspective, consider
whether it seems logical that a country with high levels of corruption would also exhibit
high levels of pride. The response is most likely a “probably not.” As a result, it is
prudent to consider that an overlap between polopp and coglibnat is possible.

Extending the Analysis: Visual Representations
The XY Plot provides a visualization of the relationships between variables. Plots
returning cases above the diagonal indicated the X-axis variable was a subset of Y, thus
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supporting the contention that X was sufficient for Y. If cases were on or below the
diagonal, a superset is indicated supporting the contention that X was necessary for Y.
Ragin (2008, 31) noted that: “the lower right box shows the degree to which the data
plotted are consistent with Y ≤ X (Y is a subset of X). The upper left box shows the
degree to which the data plotted are consistent with X ≤ Y (X is a subset of Y). If one of
these two numbers indicates high consistency, the other can be interpreted as a coverage
score” (Ragin 2008, 31).
The fuzzy set XY plot examines bivariate relationships between conditions.
Figure 5.10 examined the union of the four PP model causal conditions against the
outcome variable success. It indicated all but one case above the diagonal, with Vlaams
Belang serving as the outlier. The plot indicates that the combined four causal conditions
of the PP model are a potentially sufficient condition for success from a complex
causality perspective.
The union of polopp,coglibnat (Figure 5.11) yielded contradictory results. It was
expected to show necessity or sufficiency but returned neither. Interestingly, indorgst
(Figure 5.12) showed a strong relationship with only two outliers: VB and Podemos.
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Figure 5.10. PP Model Conditions Leading to Success. Plot indicating the PP model
conditions are a potentially sufficient condition for success.

Figure 5.11. Polopp/Nat Leading to Success. Plot indicating lack of necessity and
sufficiency in polopp and coglibnat in leading to success.
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Figure 5.12. Indorgst and Success. Plot indicating indorgst is a potentially sufficient
condition for success.
Phase II: Testing of OO Model
To determine the degree to which OO explains rise and success, the combination
of causal conditions specific to this model will be evaluated: consldr, considea,
markpres, and pubout. As in Phase I, analysis will begin with the creation of the truth
table, followed by appropriate evaluation and deletion/coding, causal condition selection,
and finally, evaluation. As in testing of the PP model, success in this study will be
considered as a group having a member in the EP.
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Figure 5.13. OO Model Subset/Superset Analysis. fsQCA data report showing
consistency and coverage scores for the four variables of the PP model. Yellow indicates
potential important relationship.
In this analysis (Figure 5.13), no OO causal conditions return scores greater than
the threshold of .85. The highest consistency score was for consldr*markpres*pubout
which returned a score of .75.
Truth Table Analysis
Figures 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, and 5.18 detailed the truth table procedural steps
for this model. In this model, data was run with causal conditions present as well as with
causal conditions present or absent. Results were more reliable when run with conditions
“present or absent.”
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Figure 5.14. OO Model Truth Table Before Evaluation. fsQCA data report showing
consistency scores for the four variables of the OO model.

Figure 5.15. OO Model Truth Table After Evaluation. fsQCA data report showing
consistency scores for the four variables of the OO model after coding.

Figure 5.16. Selections for Prime Implicants. OO model analysis necessitated selections
for prime implicants.
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Figure 5.17. Additional Selections for Prime Implicants.

Table 5.18. OO Model Causal Conditions Selections.
______________________________________________________________________
**********************
TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS
**********************
Model: success = f(consldr, considea, markpres, pubout)
Rows:
6
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.873134
raw
coverage
consldr*~markpres*~pubout
consldr*markpres*pubout
consldr*considea*~markpres
consldr*considea*pubout

0.273224
0.661202
0.338798
0.726776

unique
coverage consistency
---------------------------0.021858 0.925926
0.021858 0.876812
0.010929 0.939394
0.032787 0.886667

solution coverage: 0.814208
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solution consistency: 0.897590
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term consldr*~markpres*~pubout: PVV (0.6,0.9),
SD (0.6,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term consldr*markpres*pubout: FN (0.9,1),
Podemos (0.9,0.6), Syriza (0.8,0.9), UKIP (0.7,1),
Finns (0.6,0.9), FPO (0.6,0.9), SVP (0.6,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term consldr*considea*~markpres: DF (0.8,1),
PVV (0.6,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term consldr*considea*pubout: Finns (0.9,0.9),
FN (0.9,1), Podemos (0.9,0.6), Syriza (0.8,0.9),
DF (0.7,1), UKIP (0.7,1), FPO (0.6,0.9)
**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Rows:
6
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1-L
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.873134

consldr

raw
unique
coverage coverage consistency
---------------------------0.879781 0.879781 0.838542

solution coverage: 0.879781
solution consistency: 0.838542
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term consldr: Finns (1,0.9),
Podemos (1,0.6), PVV (1,0.9), AfD (0.9,0.1),
DF (0.9,1), FN (0.9,1), UKIP (0.9,1),
Syriza (0.8,0.9), FPO (0.6,0.9), SVP (0.6,1),
SD (0.6,0.6)
**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Model: success = f(pubout, markpres, considea, consldr)
Rows:
16
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
0 Matrix: 0L
Don't Care: --- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.873134
Assumptions:
raw
coverage

unique
coverage consistency
----------------------------
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~pubout*~markpres*consldr
pubout*markpres*consldr
~markpres*considea*consldr
pubout*considea*consldr

0.273224
0.661202
0.338798
0.726776

0.021858
0.021858
0.010929
0.032787

0.925926
0.876812
0.939394
0.886667

0.731148
0.508852

0.253443 0.839503
0.031148 0.968789

solution coverage: 0.814208
solution consistency: 0.897590
coglibnat*polopp
coglibeur*indorgst*polopp

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~pubout*~markpres*consldr: PVV (0.6,0.9),
SD (0.6,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term pubout*markpres*consldr: FN (0.9,1),
Podemos (0.9,0.6), Syriza (0.8,0.9), UKIP (0.7,1),
Finns (0.6,0.9), FPO (0.6,0.9), SVP (0.6,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~markpres*considea*consldr: DF (0.8,1),
PVV (0.6,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term pubout*considea*consldr: Finns (0.9,0.9),
FN (0.9,1), Podemos (0.9,0.6), Syriza (0.8,0.9),
DF (0.7,1), UKIP (0.7,1), FPO (0.6,0.9)
______________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 5.19. OO Model Truth Table Analysis. The complete fsQCA analysis providing
consistency and coverage scoresfor the OO model variables for the complex, intermediate
and parsimonious solutions.
Results. Truth Table analysis (Figure 5.19) indicated four paths in the complex
and intermediate solutions leading to success: ~pubout*~markpres*consldr,
pubout*markpres*consldr, ~markpres*considea*consldr, and pubout*considea*consldr.
The parsimonious solution indicated that the condition consldr alone causes
success. This finding indicates consldr is a sufficient condition to produce the outcome
success.
The first path ~pubout*~markpres*consldr indicated that the absence of both
public outreach and marketing combined with consistent leadership covered 27% of the
instances of success. Two percent of the instances of success in MEPGs were uniquely
explained by these conditions. The consistency score of .93 indicated that 93% of this
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configuration was supported by the empirical evidence and that this combination will
almost always lead to the outcome of success.
The second path pubout*markpres*consldr indicated that the presence of public
outreach, marketing presence, and consistent leadership covered 66% of the instances of
success. Two percent of the instances of success in MEPGs were uniquely explained by
these causal conditions.

The consistency score of .88 indicated that 88% of this

configuration was supported by the empirical evidence. In other words, this combination
will lead to success 88% of the time.
The third path ~markpres*considea*consldr indicated that the absence of
marketing, consistent leadership and consistent ideology covered 34% of the instances of
success. One percent of the instances of success in MEPGs were uniquely explained by
these conditions. The consistency score of .94 indicated that 94% of this configuration
was supported by the empirical evidence and almost always will lead to success.
The fourth path pubout*considea*consldr indicated that the presence of public outreach,
consistent ideology, and consistent leadership covered 73% of the instances of success.
Three percent of the instances of success in MEPGs were uniquely explained by political
opportunity and cognitive liberation-nationalism. The consistency score of .89 indicated
that 89% of this configuration was supported by the empirical evidence. This
combination provided the strongest path to success because it resulted in the highest
consistency and highest coverage scores.
The overall solution coverage score of 0.81 indicated the proportion of
memberships in the outcome success that was explained by the complete solution, while
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the solution consistency score of 0.90 indicated the degree to which membership in the
solution was a subset of membership in the outcome.
Because consldr appeared in all four paths to the solution and as a single
condition leading to success, it is considered necessary and sufficient. The four
combined causal conditions were sufficient to cause success.

Figure 5.20. OO Model Analysis of Necessary Conditions Testing. The variables of the
OO model were tested for necessary conditions.
In this analysis (Figure 5.20), consistency scores of .90 and coverage greater than
.50 warrant closer scrutiny. One of the four variables (considea) and five of the six pair
combinations, as well as the combination containing all four causal conditions returned
scores meeting this threshold, indicating potential necessary conditions. It should be
noted that some studies include consistency scores of .85 or greater. In this research,
using that threshold leads to the inclusion of another singleton, consldr. When comparing
these results to the truth table analysis, it becomes important to recognize that a high
coverage score is most important but that it must also be accompanied by a high
consistency score.
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Coincidence
The four variables (consldr, considea, markpres, pubout) tested in the OO model
yielded the following results:

Figure 5.21. OO Model Coincidence. fsQCA analysis of the OO model variables for
coincidence.
Results indicate that the greatest potential for overlap in cases was between
considea and consldr with a score of .83. Markpres and pubout also had a high
probability scoring a .82. The least overlap occurred between consldr and markpres with
a score of .69. The overlap between all four causal conditions was .60. The higher the
score, the more potential for overlap. High scores indicate a need for examination so as to
ensure they are not capturing the same phenomena.
The two highest combinations for coincidence were consldr,considea (.83) and
markpres and pubout (.82). Considea measured the vision, mission and ideology of a
group, while consldr measured consistency in a group’s leadership. Pubout measured a
group’s public contact and interaction, while markpres focused on a group’s online
presence.
On reflection, consistency in ideology and consistency in leadership could
certainly capture the same elements. Consider that a leader often remains in power
embracing the same ideology for decades. However, other variances are equally true. A
leader can change his/her ideology, different leaders can retain the same ideology.
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Indeed, different leaders often bring different ideologies, and the same leader can try
different strategies. Ultimately, this combination is one in which analysis of coincidence
rightfully indicates a warning to beware of overlap.
The other pair, markpres and pubout, measured a group’s presence online via
social media marketing and public outreach, respectively. At first glance, this
combination also seemed likely to potentially capture the same phenomenon. In fact, it
now becomes obvious that markpres could be a subset of pubout since social media
activity was certainly a component of public outreach. In this case, the primary objective
of the variable public outreach was capturing a groups personal contact with voters, the
“reach out and touch someone” phenomenon. However, a review of the indicators within
the data collection of pubout revealed that the categories “info availability” and “media
mentions” did not contain the personal contact the variable sought to capture. They were
included as ways of reaching and arming the public with information in order to engage
and involve them and gauging how well the information was spread to the public.
Removing these two indicators could result in better measurement of public
contact/personal interaction. Further, because markpres focused on social media activity
there is no direct overlap. However, social media in many cases is exclusively and/or
primarily used as a means of public outreach. Technology has greatly reduced the
amount of face-to-face interaction people have with one another. Though in-person
connections remain valuable they are perhaps not as necessary as they were in in years
past. Ultimately, though the two variables were designed to capture different
phenomena, in the new millennium these phenomena are no longer distinct.
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Extending the Analysis: Visual Representations

Graph 5.4 shows an XY Plot of the OO model’s four causal conditions on the xaxis and the outcome success on the y-axis. The graph indicated all but three cases in the
upper triangle leading to a consistency score of (.87) on sufficiency. This indicated OO
causal conditions were a potentially sufficient condition for success from a complex
causality perspective. AfD returned a score higher in causal condition membership (.5)
than the outcome (.1), as did Podemos (.9, .6), and VB (.4, 25). These three cases can be
construed as outliers because they undermine the strength of the argument for an explicit
relationship between X and Y.

Figure 5.22. OO Model Conditions and Success. Plot indicating the combined causal
conditions of the OO model do not appear to be a sufficient condition for success.
A detailed discussion of all results and conclusions will follow in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER VI
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
The testing of the efficacy of the two models and their relationship to success led
to surprising insight and results. At the onset of this study, it was anticipated that data
would reflect a stronger relationship between the Organizational/Opportunity model
(OO) and successful MEPGs rather than McAdam’s Political Process model (PP). To
reiterate, for the testing of PP, it was hypothesized that:
H1: The elements of PP (political opportunities, indigenous organizational
strength, cognitive liberation) led to the emergence and success of MEPGs in Europe.
For the testing of the OO model, it was hypothesized that:
H1: MEPG emergence was a result of opportunity borne from a trigger event- the
Fall of the Wall- that led to culture change in which the political and social environment
became conducive to the formation of MEPGs.
H2: MEPG success is a result of internal organizational efficacy and capacity
(consistent leadership and ideology, public outreach, and marketing presence).
Results corroborated the hypotheses, but did not necessarily reveal one model
better than another.
PP Model
Testing of the causal conditions of the PP model revealed that the union of
political opportunity and nationalism (polopp*coglibnat), and the union of political
opportunity, indigenous organizational strength, and euroscepticism
(polopp*indorgst*coglibeur) provided the greatest causality. These unions were
sufficient to lead to a MEPG’s success. The latter union accounted for a greater than .5
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membership by 11 of the 12 cases (SVP was the exception). Seven cases had
membership in this union of >.7. The former combination contained five of the 12 cases,
though all had membership scores around .5. Because political opportunity was present
in both paths to the success, it is considered a necessary condition and, therefore, the
variable which bears perhaps the greatest need for further examination in its studies of
MEPGs.
Data was run again using a higher consistency threshold of .966. This embraced
the natural gap in the data. This analysis was nearly identical to the lower threshold
analysis in Figure 5.7. The difference was the disappearance of the combination political
opportunity and nationalism (polopp*coglibnat) found in Table 5.7, and the addition of
nationalism, indigenous organizational strength, and political opportunity
(coglibnat*indorgst*polopp). With a coverage of nearly 60% and a consistency of 96%,
this combination was stronger than the other triad combination of political opportunity,
indigenous organizational strength and euroscepticism (polopp*indorgst*coglibeur), also
reported in Figure 5.7:
coglibnat*indorgst*polopp

0.588962

0.111257

0.959751

coglibeur*indorgst*polopp

0.508852

0.031148

0.968789

Since testing revealed a potential overlap in political opportunity and nationalism, the
data was run again, this time omitting the causal condition of nationalism (coglibnat).
Results are presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. These results revealed one path to success:
the union of indigenous organizational strength and political opportunity
(indorgst*polopp). The parsimonious result (the most minimized result) revealed
indigenous organizational strength as a necessary condition.
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**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
File: C:/Users/Prebble/Documents/Grad School/PhD/Dissertation/Drafts/Full Dissertation/4Methodology/MFGdataforFSQCA3.csv
Model: success = f(polopp, indorgst, coglibeur)
Rows:
4
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.968112

polopp*indorgst
solution coverage:
solution consistency:

raw
coverage
---------0.642951
0.642951
0.963005

unique
coverage consistency
---------- ---------0.642951 0.963005

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polopp*indorgst: SVP (0.805,1),
DF (0.75,1), FPO (0.712,0.9), Podemos (0.676,0.6),
FN (0.626,1), SD (0.6,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9)
**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1-L
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.968112

indorgst
solution coverage:
solution consistency:

raw
unique
coverage coverage consistency
---------------------------0.710383 0.710383 0.935252
0.710383
0.935252

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term indorgst: FPO (0.9,0.9),
FN (0.9,1), Podemos (0.9,0.6), SVP (0.9,1),
DF (0.75,1), SD (0.6,0.6), Syriza (0.6,0.9)
**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Rows:
2
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Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
0 Matrix: 0L
Don't Care: --- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.968112
Assumptions:
coglibeur (present)
indorgst (present)
polopp (present)
raw
unique
coverage coverage consistency
---------- ------------------indorgst*polopp
0.642951 0.642951 0.963005
solution coverage:
0.642951
solution consistency: 0.963005
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term indorgst*polopp: SVP (0.805,1),
DF (0.75,1), FPO (0.712,0.9), Podemos (0.676,0.6),
FN (0.626,1), SD (0.6,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9)
__________________________________________________________________________

Figure 6.1. Revised PP Model Truth Table Analysis. The analysis providing revised
scores for the PP model variables based on revised consistency threshold.
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Figure 6.2. PP Model Plot w/o Coglibnat. Plot indicating the causal conditions of PP
(minus the variable “nationalism”) were sufficient to produce success. VB is the outlier.
However, when presented in combination with political opportunity, consistency
increased. (Consistency, explained in Chapter V, is a measure of whether a causal path
regularly produces the outcome.) This signifies that the addition of political opportunity
to an existing condition of indigenous organizational strength has the rather substantial
effect of increasing the consistency of the solution (Figure 6.3). Put another way, the pair
are stronger together and lead to success more frequently than each variable on its own.
This corroborates the underlying premise of this study that it is the union of several
conditions that leads to the emergence and success of MEPGs.

Figure 6.3. PP Model Plot of Polopp and Indorgst. This plot reveals that Political
Opportunity and Indigenous Organizational Strength are sufficient to produce success.
The two outliers are Podemos and VB.
Data was also reevaluated without the variable political opportunity in order to
gauge any changes. These results nearly mirrored those found above in which
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nationalism was omitted. Two paths to success were indicated, both of which included
indigenous organizational strength rendering it a necessary causal condition:
coglibeur*indorgst

0.515410

0.031148

0.969174

coglibnat*indorgst

0.641639

0.157377

0.940715

The parsimonious result was identical, also revealing indigenous organizational
strength as necessary. These results indicate that in the absence of nationalism,
indigenous organizational strength becomes stronger. Results also reveal that political
opportunity and nationalism are each stronger when both are present, and weaker when
one is absent. If these two variables were capturing the same phenomena, one would
expect results to show each supplanting the other.
Due to the unanticipated rise of indigenous organizational strength, the original
data was run once again utilizing the natural gap in raw consistency occurring between
.96 and .84 (see Figure 6.4) as a threshold. As a reminder, the original data coded all five
rows as “1” as they all were greater than the .80 threshold utilized.

Figure 6.4. Revised PP Truth Table. The revision shows coding with higher consistency
threshold.
During this reevaluation, the second and fifth rows (.82 and .84 raw consistency)
were recoded to “0” instead of “1” indicating they would serve as logical remainders.
When compared to the original results, testing revealed indigenous organizational
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strength emerging as a causal condition in both the intermediate and complex paths, and
its appearance as the sole condition in the parsimonious solution:
coglibnat*indorgst*polopp

0.588962

0.111257

0.959751

coglibeur*indorgst*polopp

0.508852

0.031148

0.968789

indorgst

0.710383

0.710383

0.935252

Thus, when consistency was increased, political opportunity became less important and
indigenous organizational strength became more important. This indicates that though the
political opportunity is capable of producing success when part of a combination, it does
not serve as reliable causal condition on its own. Conversely, indigenous organizational
strength proved reliable on its own as its presence became more important the greater the
consistency threshold. These results explain the Chapter Five Phase I findings in which
Figure 5.2, the combination of political opportunity and nationalism (polopp*coglibnat)
failed to show sufficiency, and the somewhat surprising strength of indigenous
organizational strength (Figure 5.3).
PP Testing Summarization. Ragin (2009) acknowledged that the “evidentiary
bases for consistency assessments are much broader.” When discussing good practices,
Ragin (2009) observed that it is important to take into account the nature and quality of
the evidence, and that one should “choose a threshold as close to 1.0 as feasible, given
the nature of the data.” He advised to “look for gaps in the distribution of consistency
scores” and to “avoid a threshold below .75” (Ragin 2009). With this advice in mind, a
review of the analysis utilizing the highest consistency threshold served to corroborate
H1: The elements of PP (political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength,
cognitive liberation) led to the emergence and success of MEPGs in Europe. The
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combination of nationalism, indigenous organizational strength, and political opportunity
with a coverage of 59% and consistency of 96%, and the combination of euroscepticism,
indigenous organizational strength, and political opportunity with a coverage of 51% and
consistency of 97%, collectively utilized all four of the model’s variables to reach
success. As depicted in Figure 6.4, there was a nearly perfect subset relationship between
the variables of the PP model and the outcome of success. With the exception of one
outlier, Vlaams Belang, when present, these causal conditions were sufficient to produce
success.

Figure 6.5. PP Model and Success Plot. This plot indicates that, with consistency set to
the highest threshold, the PP model variables are sufficient to produce success.
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OO Model
As noted above, the underlying premise of this study was that the idea no one
condition could produce MEPG success, rather it was a combination of causal conditions.
Testing of the OO model yielded corroborating results.
Testing of the causal conditions associated with OO revealed that it was indeed
the interplay among variables that led to success. The combination of consistent
leadership, marketing presence, and public outreach (consldr*markpres*pubout), and the
combination of consistent leadership, consistent ideology, and public outreach
(consldr*considea*pubout), were most significant, revealing high degrees of both
coverage and consistency. Consistent leadership was determined to be a necessary and
sufficient condition, returning scores of 0.879781, 0.879781, 0.838542. However, in both
combinations to the solution, consistency increased four and five percent when other
conditions joined consistent leadership. This substantiated the argument that it was the
combination of causal conditions that provided the strongest path(s) to the solution.
Running the data again and excluding consistent leadership led to exceptionally
low coverage scores of .39 and less, underscoring the necessity of this condition. The
removal of consistent ideology led to consistent leadership as a single causal condition
for success in the parsimonious and intermediate analyses, and in two combinations:
consldr*~markpres

0.360656

0.065574

0.942857

consldr*pubout

0.748634

0.453552

0.889610

consldr

0.879781

0.879781

0.838542

The addition of public outreach resulted in consistency increasing 5%.
Interestingly, the absence of marketing presence with the presence of consistent
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leadership, caused consistency to rise to 94%, though it also made coverage reduce to
36%. The low coverage was sufficient cause to rule out this combination.
Exclusion of public outreach also yielded detrimental results as all coverage
scores dropped below 36%. Removal of marketing presence as a causal condition
resulted in only one path in all three analyses: consistent leadership. This finding
reinforced the strength of consistent leadership and determination of it as both necessary
and sufficient to cause success. However, it is important to recognize that the presence of
other conditions increase its explanatory power.
Changing consistency thresholds for truth table analysis did not substantially alter
the results in this model, nor did altering the conditions “Present or Absent.” Consistent
leadership remained a necessary causal condition because it remained a part of all paths
to the solution. What proved interesting was the impact of the absence of two variables
when the consistency threshold was increase to .92:
~markpres

0.360656

0.251366

0.942857

~considea

0.142077

0.032787

1.000000

This finding indicated that the absence of marketing presence led to success 94% of the
time. This seemed counterintuitive, but when viewed in conjunction with the coincidence
analysis it was more plausible. The absence of marketing presence would not be
impactful in the presence of public outreach if both conditions captured the same
phenomena.
OO Testing Summarization. Results of OO testing were surprising in that there
were a number of causal combinations containing the absence rather than the presence of
specific variables. Adjusting the consistency threshold accomplished little more than
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adding more combinations containing the “absence of” particular variables. Ultimately,
the most reliable threshold was .87, utilized in Table 5.15, which caused one logical
remainder.
The strongest combination to the solution was consistent leadership, consistent
ideology, and public outreach (consldr*considea*pubout) which provided for 73%
coverage and 89% consistency. The other strong combination was consistent leadership,
marketing presence, and public outreach (consldr*markpres*pubout) which had a
coverage of 66% and consistency of 88%. A plot of all four variables in the OO model
(Figure 6.6) provided a visual of the subset relationship between the variables of the OO
model and the outcome of success.

Figure 6.6. OO Model and Success Plot. The plot indicates the four variables of the OO
model are sufficient to produce success with the exception of three outliers.
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With the exception of three outliers, Vlaams Belang (also an outlier in the PP
model), AfD and Podemos, when present, these causal conditions were sufficient to
produce success.
Combinations provided the strongest paths to the solution, which supported the
hypothesis H2: MEPG success is a result of internal organizational efficacy and capacity
(consistent leadership and ideology, public outreach, and marketing presence). In other
words, it was the interplay among the four variables that leads to success.
PP and OO Models Tested Jointly
Data was analyzed one final time to include all causal condition from both
models. Results were somewhat surprising (Figure 6.7):
**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
File: C:/Users/Prebble/Documents/Grad School/PhD/Dissertation/Drafts/Full Dissertation/4Methodology/MFGdataforFSQCA3.csv
Model: success = f(polopp, indorgst, coglibeur, coglibnat, consldr, considea, markpres, pubout)
Rows:
8
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.896373

raw
unique
coverage coverage
consistency
----------

----------

---------polopp*indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*~considea*~markpres*~pubout
1.000000
polopp*~indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*~markpres*~pubout
0.896373
polopp*indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*~markpres*pubout
1.000000
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*~coglibnat*consldr*~considea*markpres*pubout
1.000000
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*markpres*pubout
0.965839
solution coverage: 0.631257
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0.098470

0.020765

0.189071

0.052459

0.261312

0.057924

0.091366

0.031148

0.463497

0.255738

solution consistency: 0.942866
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*~considea*~markpres*~pubout: SD (0.59,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*~indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*~markpres*~pubout: PVV (0.58,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*~markpres*pubout: DF (0.68,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*~coglibnat*consldr*~considea*markpres*pubout: SVP (0.596,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*markpres*pubout: FPO (0.59,0.9),
Podemos (0.54,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9), FN (0.51,1)

**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Rows:
8
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1-L
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.896373
raw

indorgst
~pubout
~markpres
solution coverage: 0.781421
solution consistency: 0.893750

unique
coverage coverage consistency
---------- ---------- ---------0.710383 0.344262 0.935252
0.349727 0.010929 0.888889
0.360656 0.005464 0.942857

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term indorgst: FPO (0.9,0.9),
FN (0.9,1), Podemos (0.9,0.6), SVP (0.9,1),
DF (0.75,1), SD (0.6,0.6), Syriza (0.6,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~pubout: PVV (0.7,0.9),
SD (0.6,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~markpres: DF (0.8,1),
PVV (0.6,0.9), SD (0.6,0.6)
**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Rows:
59
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
0 Matrix: 0L
Don't Care: --- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.896373
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Assumptions:
pubout (present)
markpres (present)
considea (present)
consldr (present)
coglibnat (present)
coglibeur (present)
indorgst (present)
polopp (present)

consldr*coglibnat*indorgst*polopp
~markpres*considea*consldr*coglibnat*polopp
~pubout*considea*consldr*coglibnat*polopp
pubout*markpres*consldr*coglibeur*indorgst*polopp
solution coverage: 0.674426
solution consistency: 0.907901

raw
unique
coverage coverage
------------------0.576721 0.042186
0.325027 0.001421
0.317705 0.010492
0.494645 0.031148

consistency
---------0.958932
0.936988
0.879044
0.967921

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term consldr*coglibnat*indorgst*polopp: DF (0.75,1),
Podemos (0.676,0.6), FN (0.626,1), FPO (0.6,0.9),
SD (0.6,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~markpres*considea*consldr*coglibnat*polopp: DF
(0.763,1),
PVV (0.6,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~pubout*considea*consldr*coglibnat*polopp: PVV
(0.696,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term pubout*markpres*consldr*coglibeur*indorgst*polopp:
SVP (0.596,1),
FPO (0.59,0.9), Podemos (0.54,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9),
FN (0.51,1)
_________________________________________________________________________________

Figure 6.7. Joint Model Truth Table Analysis. This analysis provided scores on causal
paths of PP and OO model variables.
Consistent leadership was no longer the standout condition. Rather, indigenous
organizational strength proved to be the one causal condition, in the presence of all
others, strong enough to cause success on its own. Its coverage of 71% and consistency
of 94% considerably surpassed any other condition or combination. The next strongest
combination was consistent leadership, nationalism, indigenous organizational strength,
and political opportunity (consldr*coglibnat*indorgst*polopp), with a coverage of 58%
and consistency of 96%.
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There were several options when running the data with all eight variables (Figure
6.9). The consistency level could occur at first gap (<.965), second gap (<.896), third gap
(<.843), or less than .828, the latter which would code all cases as a “1.” The option for
coding all cases “1” was dismissed, as even though this met recommended consistency
levels of 80%, the results were very complex and contained multiple combinations of
seven and eight variables which were not compelling.

Figure 6.8. Joint Model Truth Table. This analysis indicated clear gaps in consistency
offering natural threshold division points.
Running the data with various consistency thresholds resulted in several
observations. Indigenous organizational strength emerged during the highest consistency
threshold (the first natural gap) of .96, see Figure 6.9. It was the only causal condition
leading to success in the parsimonious solution (see Figure 6.10).
**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Model: success = f(polopp, indorgst, coglibeur, coglibnat, consldr, considea, markpres, pubout)
Rows:
8
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.965839
raw
coverage
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unique
coverage consistency

polopp*indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*
~considea*~markpres*~pubout
polopp*indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*
considea*~markpres*pubout
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*~coglibnat*consldr*
~considea*markpres*pubout
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*
considea*markpres*pubout

---------

----------

----------

0.098470

0.020765

1.000000

0.261312

0.063388

1.000000

0.091366

0.031148

1.000000

0.463497

0.255738

0.965839

solution coverage: 0.578798
solution consistency: 0.972457
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*~considea*~markpres*~pubout: SD (0.59,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*~markpres*pubout: DF (0.68,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*~coglibnat*consldr*~considea*markpres*pubout: SVP (0.596,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*markpres*pubout: FPO (0.59,0.9),
Podemos (0.54,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9), FN (0.51,1)
**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Model: success = f(polopp, indorgst, coglibeur, coglibnat, consldr, considea, markpres, pubout)
Rows:
8
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1-L
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.965839

indorgst

raw
unique
coverage coverage consistency
---------------------------0.710383 0.710383 0.935252

solution coverage: 0.710383
solution consistency: 0.935252
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term indorgst: FPO (0.9,0.9),
FN (0.9,1), Podemos (0.9,0.6), SVP (0.9,1),
DF (0.75,1), SD (0.6,0.6), Syriza (0.6,0.9)
**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Model: success = f(pubout, markpres, considea, consldr, coglibnat, coglibeur, indorgst, polopp)
Rows:
4
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
0 Matrix: 0L
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Don't Care: --- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.965839
Assumptions:

~pubout*~markpres*~considea*consldr*coglibnat*
~coglibeur*indorgst*polopp
pubout*~markpres*considea*consldr*coglibnat*
~coglibeur*indorgst*polopp
pubout*markpres*~considea*consldr*~coglibnat*
coglibeur*indorgst*polopp
pubout*markpres*considea*consldr*coglibnat*
coglibeur*indorgst*polopp

raw
coverage
----------

unique
coverage consistency
-------------------

0.098470

0.020765

1.000000

0.261312

0.063388

1.000000

0.091366

0.031148

1.000000

0.463497

0.255738

0.965839

solution coverage: 0.578798
solution consistency: 0.972457
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
~pubout*~markpres*~considea*consldr*coglibnat*~coglibeur*indorgst*polopp: SD (0.59,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
pubout*~markpres*considea*consldr*coglibnat*~coglibeur*indorgst*polopp: DF (0.68,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
pubout*markpres*~considea*consldr*~coglibnat*coglibeur*indorgst*polopp: SVP (0.596,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
pubout*markpres*considea*consldr*coglibnat*coglibeur*indorgst*polopp: FPO (0.59,0.9),
Podemos (0.54,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9), FN (0.51,1)

Figure 6.9. Joint Truth Table Analysis-Highest Consistency. Analysis of joint testing of
all eight variables at the highest natural threshold gap in consistency.
At this high level of consistency, the intermediate solution returned the highest
scores for the combination containing all eight variables. It scored .46 for coverage and
.97 for consistency.
Figure 6.7, discussed earlier in this section, utilized the second gap with the
consistency threshold of .896. It also resulted in the emergence of indigenous
organizational strength as a minimum formula of the parsimonious solution.
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When utilizing the consistency threshold of the third gap (.843), indigenous
organizational strength was replaced by consistent leadership to become the single causal
condition of the minimum formula (Figure 6.10):

Figure 6.10. Joint Testing Third Natural Gap. This image is the relevant portion of the
truth table analysis indicating consldr as the single causal condition for success.
As in the other consistency thresholds that included all cases, the combinations leading to
success were expansive and included no less than seven variables. Overall, there were no
combinations of 2-3 variables which would have indicated an opportunity to combine
variables from each model to achieve success.
PP and OO Model Testing Summarization. During the PP model retest,
indigenous organizational strength returned scores of 71% coverage and 94%
consistency. The model’s two strongest combinations nationalism, indigenous
organizational strength, and political opportunity; and euroscepticism, indigenous
organizational strength, and political opportunity; had coverages and consistencies of
59% and 96%, and 51% and 97%, respectively.
The OO model parsimonious result yielded the causal condition of consistent
leadership with scores of 88% coverage and 84% consistency. The model’s two strongest
combinations, consistent leadership, marketing presence, and public outreach; and
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consistent leadership, consistent ideology, and public outreach; indicated scores of 66%
and 88%, and 73% and 89% respectively.
Though the consistency scores in the OO model are not as high as those in the PP
model (Table 6.1), its coverages are higher. In the second OO model combination
(consistent leadership, marketing presence, and public outreach; and consistent
leadership, consistent ideology, and public outreach), the difference in coverage is 13%
when compared to the PP model’s combination with highest coverage score (nationalism,
indigenous organizational strength, and political opportunity). Similarly, a comparison of
the consistencies of each model revealed that the PP model had scores seven to eight
percent greater than the OO model configurations.
Table 6.1.
Comparison of PP and OO Model Causal Paths

Causal Path
OO Model Combination 1
consistent leadership, marketing presence, public
outreach
OO Model Combination 2
consistent leadership, consistent ideology, public
outreach
PP Model Combination 1
nationalism, indigenous organizational strength,
political opportunity
PP Model Combination 2
euroscepticism, indigenous organizational strength,
political opportunity

Coverage

Consistency

66

88

73

89

59

96

51

97

Note. Consistency scores in the OO model are not as high as those in the PP model but its coverages are high.
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Conclusion
To summarize, when consistency was set to greater than or equal to .896,
indigenous organizational strength emerged as a necessary condition. For consistency
thresholds less than .896, consistent leadership emerged as the necessary condition. With
the consistency threshold set at .92, consistent leadership only appeared in combinations
(with additional variables serving to increase its consistency), and indigenous
organizational strength remained absent because of the presence of other contributing
variables.
Setting consistency too high can compromise coverage and lead to the exclusion
of important causal conditions. As acknowledged by Ragin (2009) and others,
determining that fine line can be tricky. In following the guidance from Ragin (whom
was consulted via email on this study), the results from the highest thresholds would
serve as the ultimate guide in determining the efficacy of the two models. Because
sufficiency in fsQCA focuses on the degree of membership rather than a full-in or fullout (as in csQCA), “assessment of each combination of conditions is ultimately based on
the ‘pattern observed across all cases’ ” (Ragin 2009). This is the reason why various
consistency thresholds were tested. As discussed, these additional analyses served to
eliminate possibilities and obtain a better understanding of the interplay amongst the
causal conditions and the significance of consistency.
Although the results of both models ultimately supported their respective
hypotheses, the OO model combinations were determined to be the stronger paths to
success, if only slightly. This determination was based on the much higher coverage
scores in both its strongest configurations, and consistency scores which were only 7-8%
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lower than the PP model. Though lower than the PP model scores, these consistency
scores were far above 75%, which is considered inconsistent. At the risk of repetition, it
should again be noted that researchers must strike a balance in determining the most
effective levels of coverage and consistency, armed with the awareness that as
consistency increases, coverage decreases. Chapter VII will discuss the implications of
these results as well as provide some final thoughts.
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CHAPTER VII
IMPLICATIONS AND CLOSING REMARKS
Implications
In 2014, Gifford observed that “the mobilisation of a hard right wing
Euroscepticism between 2010-13 represents one of the most profound challenges to a
government’s European policy that has been witnessed in the UK” (Gifford 2014, 16).
Indeed, the emergence and success of MEPGs are impossible to ignore. “Far-right
movements and groups are becoming more diverse, flexible, and are increasingly
working beyond country borders to achieve their goals” (Ramalingam 2012, 28). Such
international alliances and working relationships are in evidence across Europe in
multiple forms. The rise of millennial eurosceptic populism necessitates deeper study into
and understanding of how and why. Its impact has led to a dramatically altered political
landscape, an altered socio-cultural perspective and norm, destabilization of EU
governments, and national, regional and international political uncertainty and instability.
But perhaps most concerning is the influence and enmeshment of Russia.
Kreko, et al. (2015) reported that “up to 20 percent of all MEPs currently vote
at times in the interests of Putin’s Russia.” A 2015 study of far-right MEPs who now
comprise part of the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (ENF) in European
Parliament (EP), found evidence of support for Putin’s Russia before the new caucus had
formed (Kreko, et al. 2015). Kreko, et al. (2015) also found that “in 93 percent of cases
the pre-ENF members voted “no” in Russia-related decisions, which essentially suited
Russian interests.”
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In 2014, Front National’s Marine Le Pen acknowledged that: “I have a certain
admiration for Vladimir Putin because he doesn't allow decisions to be forced upon him
by other countries. I think he focuses first and foremost on what is good for Russia and
the Russians” (Spiegel 2014). In fact, Kreko (2014) reported that “through what Putin
calls the ‘active means’ of his ‘Eurasian Doctrine,’ Russia provides political and
organizational support to ‘friendly’ organizations.” Indeed, Le Pen has confirmed that, in
November 2014, a Kremlin-linked bank lent her party €9M to help her finance Front
National’s campaign for the 2014 EP (Kreko, et al. 2015). Lichfield (2015) added that
the loan “is expected to be the first tranche of a series of Russian payments which will
fund the cash-strapped far right party up to the French presidential election in 2017.”
As Lichfield (2014) observed, “this is part of a growing pattern of connections
between Vladimir Putin’s Russia and far-right and Europhobic parties in the European
Union.” Here are only a few examples of eyebrow-raising associations:







A new policy, supported by the Finns Party, is being tested in municipalities
close to the Russian border, where instead of mandatory Swedish, Finnish
pupils will have mandatory lessons in Russian instead (Sundberg 2015);
Fifteen out of 25 major European far-right parties are vocal and open
supporters of Russia and Russian interests (Kreko 2014);
In its 2014 Defense Policies, the British National Party lists as an objective:
“Engage constructively with Russia as a natural ally and trading partner”
(BNP 2014);
In 2014, several European far-right groups were invited to attend the Russian
National Forum (hosted by the Intelligent Design Bureau) with an objective of
developing a new national doctrine for Russia and Europe with the far-right
parties. Among those invited: Jobbik, Austrian Freedom Party, Swiss People's
Party, Golden Dawn, National Front (Laruelle 2015);
The crisis in Ukraine has revealed the close bonding of European far-right
parties with Russia. Far-right parties sent “independent observers” to the
Crimean referendum and their representatives in the EP have joined forces
with far-left parties to reject a resolution condemning the Crimean annexation
and the “destabilization of eastern Ukraine” (Kreko 2014);
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Jobbik’s MP, Márton Gyöngyösi, has stated that “Hungary should welcome
Russia gaining ground against the West, as a new balance of power will
probably be advantageous for Hungarian national interests” (Klapsis 2015);
and
Vlaams Belang leadership has stated for the record “I think we can be a good
partner for Russia in the European Parliament. And Russia sees us as a
potential partner.” (Kreko 2014)

Though perhaps not surprising, collectively these items are certainly alarming,
particularly in terms of international relations and political affairs. The landscape has
changed, and continues to change, throughout Europe with effects felt worldwide. An
article in the May 31, 2014, Economist echoes this concern:
The global repercussions may be more worrying. The new European Parliament
will probably be more sceptical of free markets and less favourable to free trade,
particularly the ambitious Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with
America. One of Ms Le Pen’s demands is the immediate suspension of these
negotiations. Moreover, anti-EU parties are often markedly pro-Russian.
Internationally, the loser of these elections could be America—and the winner,
Russia. (Economist May 31, 2014)
In a 2015 story on the increasing ties between European parties and Russia,
CNBC reported that Russia appeared to be capitalizing on widespread disenchantment:
“As for Russia's motivation, destabilizing the European Union at one of the most
vulnerable points – and when east-west relationships have soured -- is key” (CNBC
2015). Neil Barnett, the founder of risk consultancy and CEE specialist Istok Associates,
told CNBC: “This is part of a broad spread of measures designed to confuse and
demoralize the opposition. This part is opportunistic, taking advantage of disillusionment
with the existing political order in Europe” (CNBC 2015).
Adding to the level of concern is recognition that many countries and parties
believe they need Russia to succeed. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban
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commented that: "Without co-operation with the Russians we cannot achieve our goals."
(CNBC 2015). Figure 7.1 details established party connections with Russia.

Figure 7.1. Russia’s European Party Relationhips. Source: Some Russian-European ties
are growing closer; CNBC; 23 Feb 2015.
As discussed in Chapter III, the similarities between fascism and euroscepticism
cannot be ignored: nations in social and political turmoil, a rebirth of nationalism, group
formation and rise, and a new generation in a state of revolt. Millennial eurosceptic
populism is the manifestation of groups borne from the unique synthesis of traditional
traits and end-of-the-20th century social and political change. As Klapsis (2015) keenly
observed: “Russia is not a threat but rather an asset to peace and stability in Europe. For
the Kremlin, the growing success of far-right parties (with the backing of Russia, where
necessary) is clearly an advantage since it is thought that this will destabilise EU
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governments and the EU itself.” Indeed, though countries see Russia as aiding in their
struggle, the opposite is also true: by offering support to other countries (often
strategically located) Russia gains influence and the potential for regional hegemony.
The relationships Russia has cultivated with successful and ascending Eurosceptic
groups offer indisputable, viable, and alarming evidence of an underlying master plan in
which foes become allies, acquaintances are dissociated, and compatriots serve both
wittingly and unwittingly as strategic pawns. A deeper understanding of the causal
conditions that have allowed MEPGs to emerge and rise could allow for preemptive
networking and building of relationships. Engaging in dialogue to gain a mutual
understanding of needs and motivations can have far-reaching benefit. As the saying
goes, it is far better to build bridges than tear them down.
Closing Remarks
In 2011, Langenbacher observed that “the important thing is to understand how
the radical right arose as a phenomenon, and particularly the current success of rightwing
populist parties in Europe in terms of its social origins, before we can develop
meaningful counter-strategies” (Langenbacher 2011, 310). This research contends that
the elements at play leading to the emergence and success of MEPGs can now be
identified, studied, and understood.
Statistics clearly indicate an increase in the number MEPGs corresponding with
the FOTW. The resultant cultural shift provided an environment hospitable to their
development. But not every group that formed after the FOTW was successful. This
study offered insight into potential causal conditions and was able to pinpoint variables
that lead to a MEPG’s success.
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One of the main premises of this study was the idea that the PP model was too
general and easily applicable due to a researcher’s ability to select conditions which fit
each of its three elements. A goal of the OO model was to pinpoint specific variables
rather than provide an open-ended framework. This goal was accomplished. The
variables of consistent leadership, consistent ideology, public outreach, and marketing
presence were found to lead MEPGs to success in two separate combinations. Likewise,
nationalism, euroscepticism, number of members (indigenous organizational strength),
and freedom from corruption (political opportunity) also lead to success in various
combinations, though to a lesser degree. This research proves that it is the power of
several variables in the presence of each other that leads to success.
Results corroborated the hypotheses of this research, but did not indicate one
model as significantly stronger than the other. Though results of this study were
expected to show the OO model as having a much stronger causal relationship to success
than McAdam’s PP model, the findings are no less important. A strong contention of this
research is the need to identify specific variables that lead to a MEPG’s success to better
isolate and understand causal conditions. Thus, the goal of the OO model was to pinpoint
variables any researcher could utilize to explain and predict the emergence and success of
MEPGs and -- possibly -- other parties and social movement organizations. The
identification of opportunity created externally by a trigger event and the subsequent
culture shift, and internal organizational capacity resulting from consistency in leadership
and ideology, marketing efforts, and public involvement, provides researchers with the
ability to examine one dynamic that has allowed for MEPGs to achieve success.
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The use of the phrase “one dynamic” was intentional. This study is not
contending that the variables identified here as causal conditions leading to MEPG
success are the only such conditions than can result in that outcome. There may be
others. However, this research does claim that the variables identified in this study as
causal conditions that do lead to success, bear a need for deeper study and analysis. It is
believed that the components of these causal conditions can be narrowed down even
further to identify variables with the strongest relationship to success. Such minimization
will lead to stronger, clearer paths to success.
A goal of social science study is identifying the predictors that lead to a certain
outcome. Understanding the trajectory of MEPGs is of critical importance, particularly
in light of the implications noted above. The ability to identify groups that possess the
identified elements leading to success provides political bodies, intelligence agencies, and
scholars the opportunity to be a step ahead and proactively strategize methods and means
for interception, cooperation or any level in between. This research offers political
scientists, analysts and sociologists enhanced insight into the tools that can be used to
analyze, predict, and perhaps even preempt, potential sources of development, strife or
concern.
The insight it provides offers the potential for a better understanding of the
underlying dynamics within changing cultures, as well as improvement in international,
interregional, and interlocal relationships. The implications and benefits of this
additional insight are many, but perhaps most importantly seek to contribute to the
fortitude of the “3Ds” of U.S. national security: diplomacy, development and defense.
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Maurice Bardéche wrote that “fascism is, by its essence, nationalist, and while it
originates as the reaction to a crisis, all fascist reaction is resurrection” (Griffin 1991,
172). His comments, though made in 1961, remain relevant nearly a half century later in
the new millennium. Not only is this statement prescient, it underscores three main
points of this dissertation: the emergence and success of the non-traditional parties
christened MEPGs was a reaction to a trigger event; nationalism is a fundamental
element of MEPGs; and, that the emergence and ascension of MEPGs has served as a
rebirth of traditional values. In a realm of could be, maybe, and possibly, one thing is
certain: MEPGs have been able to achieve levels of success never before imagined and
have forever changed the face of politics in Europe.
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Olszański, Tadeusz A. Svoboda Party – The New Phenomenon on the Ukrainian
Right-Wing Scene; Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW); 4 July 2011.
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/137051/ipublicationdocument_s
ingledocument/fd513b79-1b42-403d-bde83d3d3a6a6f32/en/commentary_56.pdf.
Open Europe. Meet the man who wants to blow up the European parliament; Open
Europe; May 09, 2014. http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/meetman-who-wants-to-blow-up-european.html.
Orange, Richard. Anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats now the biggest party, according
to poll, The Telegraph; 20 August 2015.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/11814498/Antiimmigrant-Sweden-Democrats-now-the-biggest-party-according-to-poll.html.
Orwell, George. ''As I Please;'' column in Tribune magazine and reprinted in The
Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George Orwell, Vol. 3, As I
Please, 1943–1945, ed. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1968); 24 March 1944. Accessed December 12, 2015.
http://www.orwell.ru/library/articles/As_I_Please/english/efasc.

306

Osborn, Andrew and Faulconbridge, Guy. UK's Eurosceptic UKIP party storms to
victory in Europe vote; Reuters; May 26, 2014. Accessed November 18, 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/26/us-eu-elections-britainidUSBREA4O0EM20140526.
Oudenampsen, Merlin. "Explaining the Swing to the Right: The Dutch Debate on the
Rise of Right-Wing Populism". In Ruth Wodak, Majid Khosravinik, Brigitte
Mral. Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse. A&C Black. p.
191; 2013.
Paelinck, Gianni. Open VLD heeft de meeste leden en steekt CD&V voorbij;
deredactie.be; 30/10/2014.
Papadogiannis, Nikolaos. Power to Our People: Syriza and the History of Greek LeftWing Nationalism; Foreign Affairs; September 21, 2015.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/greece/2015-09-21/power-our-people.
Passmore, Kevin. Fascism: A Very Short Introduction; Oxford University Press; 2002.
Paxton, Robert O. What is Fascism?; Random House; 2004.
Paxton, Robert O. The Anatomy of Fascism; Knopf Publishing Group, 2005.
Paxton, Robert O. The Five Stages of Fascism; The Journal of Modern History, Vol.
70, No. 1. pp. 1-23; Mar. 1998.
Payne, Stanley. A History of Fascism 1914–45; London: University College London
Press, 1995.
Payne, Stanley. Fascism: Comparison and Definition, University of Wisconsin Press;
p. 7; 1980.
Peters, Andrea. Right Sector threatens violence throughout Ukraine; The World
Socialist. 18 July 2015.
Pew Research Center. Political Polarization in the American Public: Section 1:
Growing Ideological Consistency, June 12, 2014. Accessed 12/4/15.
http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-1-growing-ideologicalconsistency/?beta=true&utm_expid=53098246-2.Lly4CFSVQG2lphsgKopIg.1&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com.
Pezard, Stephanie. The Front National and the Future of French Foreign Policy; The
Rand Blog; Rand Corporation; Last modified March 2015.
http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/03/the-front-national-and-the-future-of-frenchforeign.html.

307

Pfisterer, Sophia. Denmark – (not) an oasis in Europe; EMAJ Magazine; May 25, 2011.
http://emajmagazine.com/2011/05/25/denmark-%E2%80%93-not-an-oasis-ineurope/.
Piano, Aili. Freedom in the World 2005: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and
Civil Liberties; Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Freedom House, UK; 2005.
Pinto, António Costa. Rethinking the Nature of Fascism: Comparative Perspectives;
Palgrave; 2011.
Pipes, Daniel. Sweden’s Populist Surge; Washington Times; August 25, 2015.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/aug/25/daniel-pipes-swedenspopulist-surge/.
Pirie, Ian. Social Movements Theory, Lecture Notes. 2007. Accessed January 12, 2015.
http://imagining-other.net/socialmovementstheory.htm
Piven, Frances Fox and Cloward, Richard A. Poor People’s Movements: Why They
Succeed, How They Fail; Vintage Books, 1977.
Piven, Frances Fox and Cloward, Richard A. “Normalizing Collective Protest,”
Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg
Mueller; Yale University, 1992.
Podemos.info. Official Podemos Website. Accessed October 9, 2015.
http://podemos.info.
Poli, Eleonara and Rosselli, Chiara. The Eurosceptic revolution: much ado about
nothing?; Open Democracy; Last modified 26 September 2014.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/eleonora-poli-chiararosselli/eurosceptic-revolution-much-ado-about-nothing.
Politikka. Vihreiden ja perussuomalaisten jäsenmäärät vahvassa nousussa; 31/3/2013.
Accessed 1/26/2016. http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/a1364692661448.
PoliticsForum.org. The Swedish Far-right isn’t dumb; Politics Forum; 23 July 2015.
Accessed October 4, 2015.
http://www.politicsforum.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=28&t=162383.
Pop, Valentina. German anti-euro party broadens its platform to left and right; EU
Observer; 26 Mar 2014. https://euobserver.com/eu-elections/123618.
Πρίφτη, Κατερίνα. The History Of SYRIZA: How A Small Party Came To Power;
Huffington Post, Greece; 01/27/2015.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/26/greece-SYRIZAhistory_n_6547798.html.
308

Prodhan, Georgina. Right wing strong on Europe fears ahead of Austria poll; Reuters;
Sep 25, 2013.
Project Gutenberg. Popular Orthodox Rally; World Public Library; 2015.
http://www.self.gutenberg.org/articles/popular_orthodox_rally.
Pugliese, Stanislao G. Fascism, anti-fascism, and the resistance in Italy: 1919 to the
present; Oxford, England, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004.
Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy;
Princeton University Press, 1993.
Quine, Maria Sop. Population Politics in Twentieth Century Europe: Fascist
Dictatorships and Liberal Democracies'. Routledge, Pp. 46-47; 1995.
Radio Sweden. The Sweden Democrats – Sverigedemokraterna, 8 Augusti 2014.
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?artikel=5933075.
Ragin, Charles C. Fuzzy-Set Social Science; University of Chicago Press; 2000.
Ragin, Charles C. Redesigning social inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008.
Ragin, Charles C. The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and
quantitative strategies. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1987.
Ragin, Charles C. and Rubinson, Claude. Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis;
University of Arizona. Accessed 12/4/2015.
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/index.shtml.
Ramalingam, Vidhya. Far-Right Extremism: Trends and Methods For Response And
Prevention; Policy Briefing-Institute for Strategic Dialogue, December 2012.
Ramswell, Prebble Q. Interest in the Far Right, Google Trends Data Visualization;
11/7/2015.
Rawlinson, Kevin. English Defence League prepares to storm local elections; UK
Independent; 25 November 2011.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/english-defence-leagueprepares-to-storm-local-elections-6267740.html.
Ray, Leonard. Measuring party orientation towards European integration: results from
an expert study; European Journal of Political Research, 36 (2), 283–306;
1999.

309

Ray, Leonard. When parties matter: the conditional influence of party positions on
voter opinions about; European integration. Journal of Politics, 65 (4), 978–
994; 2003.
Religion of Peace. Race, Racism (and Islam); Religion of Peace; Accessed October 10,
2015. http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/pages/racism-trop.htm.
Renton, Dave. Fascism: Theory and Practice; Pluto Press, London; 1999.
Renton, Dave. Toward a Marxist Theory of Fascism; 1997. Accessed August 23,
2014. http://www.dkrenton.co.uk/old/old3.html.
Reuters. Fico favorite as Slovakia sets June 12 poll; Reuters; Feb 1, 2010. Accessed
April 17, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/01/us-slovakia-politicsidUSTRE6104OC20100201.
Rhodes, Martin, and van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan. Capitalism versus Capitalism in
Western Developments in West European Politics; edited by Martin Rhodes,
Paul Heywood, and Vincent Wright. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 171-189;
1997.
Richman, Michèle H. Sacred Revolutions: Durkheim and the College of Sociology;
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.
Right Sector. Official Website; Accessed 08/18/2015. http://pravyysektor.info/.
Rihoux, Benoit and Ragin, Charles S. Configurational Comparative Methods:
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques (Applied
Social Research Methods); Library of Congress, 2009.
Ritzer, George, Sociological Theory, third edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2008.
Robins-Early, Nick. A Field Guide to Europe's Radical Right Political Parties; The
Huffington Post; 02/12/2015.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/12/europe-far-right_n_6511022.html
Rolfe, Brett. Building an Electronic Repertoire of Contention; Social Movement
Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, 65–74, May 2005.
Rootes, C.A. Political Opportunity Structures: Promise, problems and prospects; La
Lettre de la maison Française d’Oxford; Number 10, pp. 75–97; 1999.
Roushas, Roxani. Understanding the electoral breakthrough of Golden Dawn in
Greece: A demand and supply perspective; International Migration Institute
(IMI), Oxford University Department of International Development; 2013.

310

Routedge. Theories of Race, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Questions to
Sociobiology; p. 18; 1998.
Rovny, Jan. Conceptualising Party-based Euroscepticism: Magnitude and motivations;
Collegium; 29: 31–47; 2004.
Rt.com. Swiss anti-immigration party remains most popular – poll; 25 June 2015.
http://www.rt.com/news/269737-swiss-support-anti-immigration/.
Rucht, Dieter and Friedhelm Neidhardt, "The Analysis of Social Movements: the State
of the Art and Some Perspectives for Further Research" in D. Rucht (ed.),
Research on Social Movements: the State of the Art in Western Europe and the
USA. 443; Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.
Rucht, Dieter. “The Impact of National Contexts on Social Movement Structures: A
Cross-Movement and Cross-National Perspective.” Pp. 185-204 in
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, edited by Doug McAdam,
John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. Cambridge University Press; 1996.
Rydgren, Jens. ‘Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties:
The Case of Denmark;’ West European Politics 27:3; 2004.
Sabin, Lamiat. Nigel Farage defends outspoken Polish MEP as 'saving' Ukip; The
Independent, 22 October 2014.
Sagener, Nicole. Dario Sarmadi, Erika Körner. Germany's right-wing populists join
hands with anti-Islamist Pegida; EurActiv. 09 January 2015.
Sakai, J. Confronting Fascism: Discussion Documents for a Militant Movement,
Kersplebedeb and Anti-Racist Action Chicago; 2002. Accessed May 21, 2015.
http://www.kersplebedeb.com/mystuff/books/fascism/shock.html.
Sangsari, Marcel. Digital innovation propels political success story in Spain; The Globe
and Mail; March 19, 2015. Accessed 1/1/2016.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/digital-innovation-propelspolitical-success-story-in-spain/article23542220/.
Scally, Derek. German anti-Islam group Pegida presents six-point plan on immigration
rules; Irish Times; 1/12/2015.
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/german-anti-islam-grouppegida-presents-six-point-plan-on-immigration-rules-1.2063543.
Scarrow Susan. Multispeed membership parties. Paper prepared for “Contemporary
Meanings of Party Membership”, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops,
Salamanca, Spain; April 10-15, 2014.

311

Schulman, Moritz Josef. Pegida Spokesman: We are no Nazis; YNet Magazine News;
January 24, 2015. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L4618182,00.html.
Schulze, Ingo. Pegida: Germany’s useful idiots; The Guardian; 1 February 2015.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/01/pegida-germanys-useful-idiots.
Schwab, Sabine and Joyner, Alfred. From Pegida to Syriza: The rise of radical Europe;
International Business Times; Accessed February 6, 2015.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/pegida-syriza-rise-radical-europe-1486915.
Schneider, Carsten Q. and Wagemann, Claudius. Standards of Good Practice in
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-Sets; Comparative
Sociology 9; 1–22; 2010.
Serricchio, Fabio, Myrto Tsakatika and Lucia Quaglia. Euroscepticism and the Global
Financial Crisis; Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1): 51–64; 2013.
Sheppard, Charlotte. Online news consumption in Europe; PageSuite; 08 June 2015.
Accessed 12/28/2015.
http://www.pagesuite.com/blog/blog_story.aspx?storyID=2051.
Shuster, Simon. Meet the German Activist Leading the Movement Against
‘Islamization;’ Time Magazine; January 15, 2015.
http://time.com/3668889/pegida-germany-islamization/.
Siddi, Marco. Rising Euroscepticism and the dominance of national interests, EU-28
Watch- Issue 10; Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin; 2014. Accessed July
7, 2015. http://eu-28watch.org/issues/issue-no-10/rising-euroscepticism-andthe-dominance-of-national-interests/.
Skenderovic, Damir. The SVP: A success story of right-wing populism; Policy
Network; 21 January 2013. http://www.policynetwork.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4317&title=The-SVP-A-success-story-ofright-wing-populism.
Skocpol, Theda. 1985. "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current
Research." Pp. 3-37 in Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans,
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Sliwinski, Michael. “Right-Wing Groups in Europe: A Rising Force?;” Law Street
Media. Last Modified January 2015. Accessed January 2, 2016.
http://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/world/declining-europe-leads-rise-right-winggroups/.

312

Smelser, Neil J. Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press; 1963.
Smith, Helena. Greece's Golden Dawn party describes Hitler as 'great personality;' The
Guardian; 16 April 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/16/greece-golden-dawn-hitler.
Smith, P. Durkheim and Criminology: Reconstructing the Legacy; Australian & New
Zealand Journal of Criminology (Australian Academic Press), 41(3), 333-344;
2008.
Smythe, SA. Italy Is Not Just Racist, It’s Anti-Black; Okay Africa, August 1, 2013.
http://www.okayafrica.com/news/italy-racism-anti-black-cecile-kyenge/.
Snow, David A. Soule, Sarah A. Kriesi, Hanspeter.Eds. The Blackwell Companion to
Social Movements; Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
Solsten, Eric. ed. Austria: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of
Congress, 1994.
Sorenson, Catharina. “Love me, love me not…A typology of public euroscepticism;”
Sussex European Institute, Working Paper 101; January 2008.
Speigel. Interview with Marine Le Pen: 'I Don't Want this European Soviet Union;'
Speigel Online International; Interview Conducted by Mathieu von Rohr; June
3, 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-frenchfront-national-leader-marine-le-pen-a-972925.html.
Speigel.de. Anti-Semitism in Parliament: Hungary's Far-Right Rhetoric Reaches New
Dimension; By Keno Verseck; November 28, 2012. Accessed February 4.
2014. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/far-right-rhetoric-in-hungaryreaches-new-dimension-a-869826.html.
Spiegel, Peter. Alexis Tsipras: Greece’s radical or realist? Financial Times; January 23,
2015. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/301636be-a2e6-11e4-9c0600144feab7de.html#axzz3npD6botJ.
Squires, Nick. ‘Independence for northern Italy and an end to euro, says Northern
League leader;’ The Telegraph, 16 Dec 2013.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/10520482/Independe
nce-for-northern-Italy-and-an-end-to-euro-says-Northern-League-leader.html.
Squires, Nick. What is the Golden Dawn trial about? The Telegraph, 20 April 2015.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/11548387/What-isthe-Golden-Dawn-trial-about.html.
Stanley, Tim. English Defence League leader endorses Ukip. This is a nightmare for
Nigel Farage; The Telegraph; 4/4/2013.
313

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/timstanley/100210451/english-defenceleague-leader-endorses-ukip-this-is-a-nightmare-for-nigel-farage/.
Sternhell, Zeev. The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political
Revolution; Princeton University Press, 1995.
Stockemer, Daniel. “The Swiss Radical Right: Who are the New Voters of the Swiss
Peoples` Party?” Representation; 48(2): 197-208; 2012.
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/09/17/swiss-peoples-party-stockemer/.
Stokes, Bruce. Faith in European Project Reviving: Chapter 4. The Rise of
Nontraditional, Eurosceptic Parties; Pew Research Center; June 2, 2015.
Sundberg, Jan. Who are the nationalist Finns Party? BBC News; 11 May 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32627013.
Svoboda.org. Official Svoboda website; 2015. Accessed 10/06/2015.
http://en.svoboda.org.ua/about/program/.
SVP.ch. Swiss People’s Party Official Website; Accessed 8/18/2015.
Swank, D. and Betz, H. G. “Right-wing populism in Western Europe: The impact of
structural change, political institutions, and economic performance on party
electoral fortunes in 16 nations;” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Chicago; 1995.
Switzerland Business Law Handbook. International Business Publications, USA;
Washington, DC; 2012.
Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul, eds. Opposing Europe? The comparative party
politics of Euroscepticism. Vol. 1: Case studies and country surveys; Oxford:
Oxford University Press; 2008.
Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul, eds. Opposing Europe? The comparative party
politics of Euroscepticism. Vol. 2: Comparative and theoretical perspectives;
Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2008b.
Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak. “Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Systems of
the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe;”
European Journal of Political Research; 43.1 (January): 1-27; 2004.
Taggart, Paul and Szczerbiak, Aleks. “Parties, positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in
the EU candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe;” Opposing Europe,
Sussex European Institute, Working Paper, no. 461-38, 2001.

314

Taggart, Paul. A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western
European party systems. European Journal of Political Research, 33 (3), 363–
388; 1998.
Tarrow, Sidney. Contentious Politics in a Composite Polity. Chapter Eleven in Doug
Imig and Sidney Tarrow, eds. Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in
an Emerging Polity. Rowman and Littlefield, 2001.
Tarrow, Sidney. Cycles of Collective Action: Between Movements of Madness and
the Repertoire of Contention. In Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action,
ed. Mark Traugott. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 1995.
Tarrow, Sidney. Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975.
Clarendon Press; 1989.
Tarrow, Sidney. National Politics and Collective Action, Recent Theory and Research
in Western Europe and the USA, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 14, pp. 421440; 1988.
Tarrow, Sidney. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press; 2005.
Tarrow, Sidney G. Power in Movement: social movements, collective action and
politics; Cambridge University Press; 1994; 1998.
Tarrow, Sidney G. Struggle, Politics, and Reform: collective action, social movements,
and cycles of protest. Western Studies Program Occasional Paper No. 21; 2nd
Edition; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Center for International Studies; 1989,
1991.
Tarrow, Sidney. The New Transnational Activism.Cambridge University Press (August
1, 2005.
Tavits, Margit. Organizing for Success: Party Organizational Strength and Electoral
Performance in Postcommunist Europe; The Journal of Politics; Volume 74,
Issue 01, pp 83-97; January 2012.
Taylor, Matthew. English Defence League: Inside the violent world of Britain's new far
right; The Guardian; 28 May 2010. Accessed May 5, 2015.
www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/may/28/english-defence-league-guardianinvestigation.
Teitelbaum, Benjamin R. Sweden’s Fraying Tolerance; NY Times. Sept. 16, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/opinion/swedens-frayingtolerance.html?_r=0.

315

Terry, Chris. Party for Freedom (PVV); The Democratic Society-Europe; 11 May
2014. Accessed August 12, 2015.
http://www.demsoc.org/deme/europe/blog/party-for-freedom-pvv/.
The Turkey Analyst. The CHP Congress, Leadership Cults, and Turkish Democracy;
The Turkey Analyst; 08 May 2008.
http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/122-thechp-congress-leadership-cults-and-turkish-democracy.html.
The United States Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 2011: Greece; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; 2011.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186569.pdf.
Thiem, Alrik and Dusa, Adrian. QCA: A Package for Qualitative Comparative
Analysis; The R Journal; Vol. 5/1, June 2013.
Thiem, Alrik. Conditions of intergovernmental armaments cooperation in Western
Europe, 1996-2006; European Political Science Review, 3(1):1–33, 2011.
Thomas, James. Alison O’Mara-Eves, Alison and Ginny Brunton. Using qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA) in systematic reviews of complex interventions: a
worked example; National Center for Biotechnology Information, U.S. National
Library of Medicine; June 20, 2014.
Thorlindsson, Thorolfur. "Durkheim's Theory of Social Order and Deviance: a Multilevel Test", European Sociological Review, 20 (4): 271-285; 2004.
Thran, Malte and Boehnke, Lukas. The value-based Nationalism of Pegida; Journal for
Deradicalization. No. 3; 2015.
Tilly, Charles. Contentious repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834, in: M. Traugott
(Ed.) Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action; Durham, NC: Duke
University Press; 1995.
Tilly, Charles. From Mobilization to Revolution; McGraw-Hill; 1978.
Tilly, Charles. The Contentious French; Belknap Press, 1986.
Tomasino, Arthur P. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis Summary. Working
paper. Bentley University; 2015.
Tostes, Ana Paula. Explaining intolerance in an integrated Europe; Dados – Revista de
Ciências Sociais, v. 52, n. 2, pp. 335-376; 2009.
Tremlett, Giles. The Podemos revolution: how a small group of radical academics
changed European politics; The Guardian; March 31, 2015.
316

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/31/podemos-revolution-radicalacademics-changed-european-politics.
TRTWorld. Left-wing CHP asks Erdogan for right to form coalition govt; August 18,
2015. http://beta.trtworld.com/turkey/left-wing-chp-asks-erdogan-for-right-toform-coalition-govt-6244 (accessed November 14, 2015).
The Turkey Analyst. The CHP Congress, Leadership Cults, and Turkish Democracy; The
Turkey Analyst; 08 May 2008.
http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/122-thechp-congress-leadership-cults-and-turkish-democracy.html.
Tzilivakis, Kathy. Heated reactions to far-right ministers; IRED; November 19, 2011.
Tzur, Nissan. EXCLUSIVE: Ukip's far-right Euro partner attacks 'Holocaust industry;
Jewish Chronicle Online; October 21, 2014. http://www.thejc.com/news/uknews/124483/exclusive-ukips-far-right-euro-partner-attacks-holocaust-industry.
Udland, Myles. There's a new political risk looming in Europe; Business
Insider/Berenburg; September 6, 2015.
http://www.businessinsider.com/european-nationalism-risk-2015-9.
US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007;
Committee on Foreign Affairs; August 2008.
Üstüntağ, Gülten. CHP strives to be central party by pursuing new policy direction;
Today’s Zaman; September 6, 2014.
http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_chp-strives-to-be-central-party-bypursuing-new-policy-direction_357862.html.
Uzun, Melih and Kaleagasi, Bartu. Erdogan’s AKP loses majority government to
progressive HDP; Turkish Election results; Social Humanist; June 7th 2015.
van Noort, Wim. Bevlogen Bewegingen: Een vergelijking van de anti-kernenergiekraak- en milieubeweging, Amsterdam, SUA; 1988.
van Versendaal, Harry. The genealogy of violence; As Golden Dawn extremism grows,
some critics blame chronic tolerance of left-wing radicalism;
HKAΘHMEPINH; 07.01.2013. Accessed July 7, 2015.
http://www.ekathimerini.com/147443/article/ekathimerini/comment/thegenealogy-of-violence.
Vasilopoulou, Sofia and Halikiopoulou, Daphne. Golden Dawn’s ‘nationalist
solution’: explaining the rise of the far-right in Greece; London School of
Economics and Political Science. Last modified May 12, 2015.

317

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/05/12/golden-dawns-nationalistsolution-explaining-the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-greece/.
Vasilopoulou, Sofia. European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of
Opposition; Government and Opposition, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp.223-244; 2011.
Vis, B. Governments and unpopular social policy reform: Biting the bullet or steering
clear? European Journal of Political Research, 48(1):31–57, 2009.
Von Storch Interview. Interview with Beatrix von Storch, chairman of the Civil
Coalition e. V.; 2011. http://www.swg-hamburg.de/Beitrage_aus_der_Rubrik__Kult/Die_Gesellschaft_kann_nicht_das_leisten.pdf.
Wagner-Nagy, Thomas. “Far-Right Parties in the European Parliament;” University for
Peace. January 05, 2015. Accessed August 12, 2015.
http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=1074.
Wagsty, Stefan. Europe’s resurgent far-right seeks to capitalise on Paris terror;
Financial Times; Accessed January 8, 2015.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6d29ce92-974e-11e4-963600144feabdc0.html#slide0.
Walsh, Jason. Has Europe turned fascist, really? Vox Europe; Last modified May 2014.
http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/blog/4770241-has-europe-turned-fascistreally.
Waterfield, Bruno. European Parliament to ban Eurosceptic groups; The Telegraph; 27
May 2008. Accessed October 12, 2014.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/2038813/European-Parliament-toban-Eurosceptic-groups.html.
Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology; New York,
Bedminster Press, 1968.
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism; New York: The Citadel
Press, [1904] 1930.
Weber, Max. The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism unil Buddhism. H. H.
Gerth and D. Martindale (eds.). New York: The Free Press. [1919] 1958.
Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization; [1964] 1982.
Weissman, George Lavan. Leon Trotsky's FASCISM: What It Is and How to Fight It;
Pioneer Publishers; April 1969.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1944/1944-fas.htm (Accessed
March 20, 2015).
318

Wellings, Ben. English nationalism and Euroscepticism overlap and support each other
in important ways; London School of Economics; April, 2014. Accessed
February 13, 2015. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/english-nationalismand-euroscepticism/.
Wessels, Bernhard. "Roles and orientations of members of parliament in the EU
context: Congruence or difference? Europeanisation or not?" The Journal of
Legislative Studies; 11 (3):446 – 65; 2005.
West, Ed. UKIP are not 'far Right'. There's nothing extremist about rejecting the
'benefits of diversity; The Telegraph; 12 March 2012. Accessed July 3, 2015.
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/edwest/100143056/ukip-are-not-far-righttheres-nothing-extremist-about-rejecting-the-benefits-of-diversity/.
White, Jonathan. The Politicisation of the EU in Sociological Perspective; Workshop:
‘Does European Integration Theory need Sociology? Towards a Research
Agenda;’ ECPR Joint Sessions, Rennes, 11th-16th April 2008. Accessed March
12, 2015. http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/6e762d2d-0e77-4171-8783342dc9dd1ea9.pdf
Wickham-Crowley, T.P. A qualitative comparative approach to Latin American
revolutions; International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 32(1-2):82–109,
1991.
Wintour, Patrick and Watt, Nicholas. Ukip wins European elections with ease to set off
political earthquake; The Guardian; 25 May 2014.
World Justice Project. WJP Open Government Index; Washington, DC; 2015.
Accessed 2014, 2015. http://worldjusticeproject.org/open-government-index.
Yahoo News. Ukrainian ultranationalist party Svoboda, a history of violence; Yahoo
News; August 31, 2015. http://news.yahoo.com/ukrainian-ultranationalistparty-svoboda-history-violence-211617262.html.
Yale University. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV; Lillian Goldman Law
Library; Yale University, 2008. Accessed 11/29/2015.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/1708-ps.asp.
Yilmaz, F. Right-wing hegemony and immigration: How the populist far-right
achieved hegemony through the immigration debate in Europe; Current
Sociology, 60: 368-382; 2012.
Zabala, Santiago. Far-left Podemos has already changed Spain; Al Jazeera. 18 May
2015.

319

Zaslove, Andrej. The Re-invention of the European Radical Right: Populism,
Regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord; McGill- Queen’s University Press,
2011.
Zawadzki, Sabina; Hosenball, Mark and Grey, Stephen. In Ukraine, nationalists gain
influence - and scrutiny; Chicago Tribune/Reuters; March 18, 2014. Accessed
June 17, 2015. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-03-18/news/sns-rt-usukraine-crisis-farright-insight-20140318_1.
Zimmer, Oliver. 2003. Nationalism in Europe, 1890–1940, Chapter 4, pp. 80–107.
London, Palgrave.

320

